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Editor’s Note
The Comparative Study of Civilizations is a fascinating field that grips the imagination of
many people. Don’t agree? To prove the affirmative, let facts be submitted to a candid
world, as the American authors of the Declaration of Independence so forcefully wrote.
1. If you Google “comparative civilizations,” you are greeted with the possibility of
37,200 citations. On Bing, the total is 13,000.
2. If you Google “comparative study of civilizations,” you confront a listing of
49,200 citations. On Bing, it’s 9,940.
3. And if you Google “graduate study in comparative civilizations” (the Boolean
delimiters one inserts diligently being removed by the computer program even
without permission), an astounding total of 2,030,000 results will be presented.
Bing’s calculations are a bit more modest -- with 214,000. For masters programs in
comparative civilizations, you’ll find a total of 663,000 cites (Bing falls in at
280,000), and for doctorate programs in comparative civilizations, fully 584,000
citations are possible (with Bing, the number is an even more astounding 6,430,000).
So, there is your evidence. Objectively, there is a great deal of interest in and comment
upon the topic of comparative civilizations. To the scholarly world, and others, it is even
more clear that the topic has a magnetic quality, drawing thousands to it. Clearly, this field
is not moribund.
But you might concede these points and yet still wonder, how successful is our journal at
tapping into that considerable universe of interest, scholarly and general? It’s certainly a
question that this editor has pondered. Are we just talking to each other? Is there really a
big public yearning to read more or does scholarly fascination with comparative civilization
drive the subject, and are we serving that set of communities if the topic persists to entrance
so many?
One way to find out is to try to garner some data on our journal. Truth be told, we circulate
currently about 150 paper copies of the journal to members and libraries, not a huge number,
to be sure.
So how many people read us in the virtual world, that is, electronically? How often is the
journal searched by students and scholars of the field?
To find out the answer, we turned to Editor Connie Lamb. She is the intrepid, highly
professional and knowledgeable Social Sciences Librarian at Brigham Young University,
which graciously hosts our journal’s electronic publication. We contacted her to find out
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol73/iss73/16
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how popular the journal has been since it was first loaded onto the site via Brigham Young
and launched into the online ether back in the fall of 2011.
“As for the statistics, the only one I can readily get is this: since its launch in the fall of
2011, there have been 826,676 page views (an average of over 206,000 a year),” Prof. Lamb
reports.
What an amazing total! Imagine the hundreds of thousands of times – closing in on one
million – that our articles have been accessed. The medium of paper is wonderful, and from
Gutenberg on, the world has been reading and learning without regard to wealth or station,
with the access this implied before the invention of movable type now available to all.
But electronically we reach so much further, and so much quicker.
But I wanted yet further proof of our reach. So, I next took a look at the ISCSC website and
blog. As members know, our Civilitas blog, currently run by CCR Managing Editor Peter
Hecht, can be accessed online either via www.wmich.edu/iscsc or by going directly to the
URL www.civilitasblog.blogspot.com. And it’s been around even longer than the online
version of the journal. In fact, Civilitas has just passed its five-year mark.
According to Mr. Hecht, since inception in May 2010 there have been 35,545 page views.
In June 2015, there were 915 page views.
Further, a total of 156 posts have been uploaded to Civilitas, with fully 41 posts this year so
far. In other words, we have seen a terrific gain in popularity over the past year and a half.
“That’s 26% of the total for all five years, “Mr. Hecht noted. “Further, participation is
increasing, with rising numbers of views from over 20 countries and five continents.”
“Contributions are coming in from scholars around the world, and they cover the widest
possible variety of topics. The entries on the blog are the opinions of the authors, of course,
and not necessarily the opinion of the ISCSC. However, blog entries are reviewed before
posting to ensure that content is representative of the intellectually stimulating and
universally respectful spirit of the ISCSC,” he says.
Now the evidence comes in from three fronts: the topic of comparative civilizations itself,
the reach of the CCR as a journal of record for comparative civilizations, and the central
role of the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations in its field; all
are established and surging forth.
Given all this attention, and activity, we at the journal have responded by inaugurating
several changes designed especially for this new era: two major steps are being taken. First,
guided by Prof. Lamb at Brigham Young, we are in the process of migrating to a new and
more powerful electronic platform upon which to mount the CCR’s online edition. It is
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2015
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called Digital Commons, and it is operated by bepress. The transition will be completed
before the snow flies later this year. This is a powerful search and presentation vehicle.
Second, following diligent research by Peter Hecht, we have moved our printing operations
to The Sheridan Press. It’s a nationwide operation, but our presses will be located in
Hanover, Pennsylvania. This move will ensure that those reading the journal in hard copy
will get their edition on time, every time. Additional services are going to become available
to our subscribers. The Editorial Board will be weighing the value of these services against
the projected expense in the next few months. Expect more details next time.
In tandem with these two steps, the society has seen a jump in participation of new scholars
at our annual conferences. At the just-completed successful conference, held in beautiful
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, the first annual meeting of ISCSC ever held in South America, the
discussions were vivid and exciting. Since the Proceedings might not be published this
year, I thought it would be good to at least list the topics that were covered in Rio.
The plenary session was addressed on Thursday evening, June 11, by Professor Emmanuel
Carneiro Leão, Distinguished Professor at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
Sidetracked by an illness, his paper on the topic “Our Crisis,” was read by Ms. Noni Geiger.
On Friday mid-day the assemblage heard Pedro Geiger, Distinguished Professor of the State
University of Rio de Janeiro, and major host of the event, offer his personal insights via “An
Introduction to Brazil.”
Overall, there were 14 panels held, involving 58 papers and presentations featuring
representatives from 16 countries. Not unusually for an ISCSC annual conference, the
papers and their panels dealt with a wide range of subjects. Here they are.
Panel Sessions 1
Room A
David Rosner, Chair
Theodor Damian, Metropolitan College of New York, USA.
“The Signs of the Time: With or Without Postmodernism.”
Marek Jakubowski, Nicolaus Copernicus University, Torun, Poland.
“The Theory of Civilization by Felix Koneczny – Archaic or Inspiring?”
Adnan Çelik, Selçuk University, Turkey.
“Have the Global Crises a Philosophy? Who Creates Them and Why?”
David Rosner, Metropolitan College of New York, USA.
“On Civilizational Trauma: The Black Death and ‘Values at the Crossroads’ in
Boccaccio’s Decameron.”
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol73/iss73/16
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Room B
Michael Andregg, Chair
Dina Moscovici, Artigo de, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
“The Nomad Space of Art.”
Rochelle Almeida, New York University, USA.
“A Clash of Titans in India: Post-Modernist Quasi-Capitalism versus Socialism in
Literature and Film.”
David Wilkinson, UCLA, Los Angeles, USA.
“Was there a pre-Columbian Civilization in the Amazon Basin?”
Michael Andregg, University of St. Thomas, St. Paul, USA.
“Book reviews of ‘The Lowland Maya in the Late Pre-classic: The Rise and Fall of an
Early Mesoamerican Civilization’ (2011) and Marek Celinski’s ‘Civilizational Crisis and
Renewal’ (2015).
Panel Sessions 2
Room A
Lynn Rhodes, Chair
David Wilkinson,
UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, USA.
“Matthew Melko: A Civilizationalist Looks at Real Peace.”
Tereza Coni Aguiar, Consultant on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil.
“Lebret’s Legacy to Humanistic Planning.”
Randall Groves, Ferris State University, Big Rapids, MI, USA.
“The Origins of Religion and the New History of Reason.”

Room B
Michael Andregg, Chair
Abdulmajed Muhammed Wali, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
“Education Means Influencing the Sons and Daughters.”
Khalid Aleid, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
“The Impact of Islam on Strengthening Family Ties: A Value of the Civilized.”

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2015
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Abdullah Saleh Alsaif, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
“Islamic Cultural Values Regarding the Treatment of Children and Children with Special
Needs.”
Essa Nasser Alduraibi, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
“Civilizational Values in Dialogue, and Means for Promotion of Dialogue in
Education.”
Panel Sessions 3
Room A
Michael Andregg, Chair
Carla Monteiro Sales, Rio de Janeiro State University, Brazil.
“Representations of North South Relations in an Inverted Map of South America.”
Mauricio Goncalves Silva, with Maria Monica Vieira Caetano O’Neill, and Claudio
Stenner, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografiae Estatística, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
“Population Arrangements and Urban Concentrations in Brazil: Conceptual Aspects.”
Evandro La Macchia, with Jacob Binsztok and Julio Wasserman, Universidade
Federal Fluminense, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
“Petroleum Exploration and Production Policy: Brazilian Winding Paths.”
Mehmet Huseyin Bilgin, Istanbul Medeniyet University, Turkey.
“The Effects of Religious Beliefs on the Working Decisions of Women: Some Evidence
from Turkey.”

Room B
Randall Groves, Chair
Abdulmajeid Aldarwish, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
“Civilized Values of Dealing with Neighbors in Islam.”
Abdulaziz Saud Aldhowaihy, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
“The Determinants of Prestigious Values in Islam.”
Khalid Alsharidah, Qassim University, Burayaday City, Saudi Arabia.
“Socio-Cultural Transformations in Saudi Arabia: Displacement vs. Resistance
Theories of Change.”
Abdullah Alfauzan, Qassim University, Alqassim City, Saudi Arabia.
“Contributions of Civilization towards Social Freedom and Alienation in the Arabic City:
A Literary Point of View.”
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol73/iss73/16
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Panel Sessions 4
Room A
Michael Andregg, Chair
Hisanori Kato, Chuo University, Tokyo, Japan.
“Philanthropic Aspects of Islam: The Case of the Fundamentalist Movement in
Indonesia.”
Juri Abe, Rikkyo University, Tokyo, Japan.
“The Role of Foreign Teachers in Modernizing Meiji, Japan.”

Room B
Lynn Rhodes, Chair
Sami Alkhalil, Mohammed A. Alsuhaim, Ahmed M. Alkhalil, and Omar A. Alsedees
King Saud University and Qassim University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
“Islamic Values that Regulate Finance and Economy.”
Kamel Saud Alonazi, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
“Economic Crises: Reality and Solutions.”
Adel Mohammed Alabisy, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
“Samples in the Economic System from an Islamic Perspective, and its Effect on Building
Values.”
Bandar Al Anazi, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
“The Values of Faith and Moral Values in Islamic Economics.”

Panel Sessions 5
Room A
David Rosner, Chair
Zoltan S. Novak, Budapest, Hungary.
“‛Panta Rhei’ as the Central Idea of Spengler’s Life Work.”
Vincent Ho, University of Macau, Macau, China.
“Chinese Heritage in East Asia: Comparative Approaches in Literature, Religion and
Culture.”

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2015
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Room B
George Von der Muhll, Chair
Habibollah Babaei, Academy of Islamic Science and Culture, Qom, Iran.
“Standards of Islamity of Civilization.”
Fahad Mohammed Alsultan, Qassim University, Buraydah City, Saudi Arabia.
“Was there an Ideological Impact on Saudi-Iranian Relations Prior to the Iranian
Islamic Revolution in 1979?”
Saeed Ali Alghailani, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
“Alexis de Tocqueville and Muhammad on War: A Comparative and
Historical Perspective.”
Nasser Mohammed Almane, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
“The Motives of Ethical Commitment in Islam – a Comparative Study.”

Panel Sessions 6
Room A
Lynn Rhodes, Chair
Ronald J. Glossop, Southern Illinois University Edwardsville, Illinois, USA.
“The Meaning of the Twenty-First Century: From Inter-Nationalism to Globalism.”
Anna Sobolewska-Bujwid, Wroclaw University of Technology, Wroclaw, Poland.
“Together or Separately? The Problem of Social Capital in Central Europe.”
Yitzhak Weismann, Haifa University, Haifa, Israel.
“Salafi Interpretations of the Civilizational Values of Islam.”
George Von der Muhll, University of California, Santa Cruz, California, USA.
“Civilizations and Their Frontiers: Identities and Imagery.”

Room B
David Rosner, Chair
Hamza Ates, Istanbul Medeniyet University Center. for Civilizational Studies, Turkey.
“Ethics-Based Civilization: What Can Islam Contribute?”
Sultan S. Alsaif, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
“Values between Religions in Islam.”
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol73/iss73/16
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Ahmed Allhaib, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
“Civilized Values and Dealing with the Other in Islam.”
Ibrahim Guran Yumusak, Istanbul Medeniyet University Center for Civilizational
Studies, Turkey.
“Economic Development: Management from Al-Siyasah Al-Shar’iyah.”

Panel Session 7
Michael Andregg, Chair
Nissim Mannathukkaren, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada.
“Replicating or Reinventing Modernity? The Case of Kerala India.”
Ashok Malhotra, State University of New York (SUNY), Oneonta, NY, USA.
“Reflections on Clash or Reconciliation of Civilizations.”
Joseph Gualtieri, University of Hong Kong, China.
“Nature and the Crisis in Global Civilizational Values.”
Ahmed Alshbaan, Qassim University, Buraydah City, Saudi Arabia.
“The Role of Social Endowment Institutions in Promoting Geographic Trips to the Orient
From the Sixth to the Eighth Century AH (1122 – 1322 of the Common Era).”

Panel Session 8
Lynn Rhodes, Chair
Andrzej Szahaj, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun, Poland.
“The Values of Multiculturalism.”
Ahmed Almazyad, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
“Values in Islam.”
Tarkan Oktay, Istanbul Medeniyet University, Istanbul, Turkey.
“Sister City Relationships of Municipalities in Turkey in the Context of Soft Power.”
Lynn Rhodes, Royal Oaks, California, USA.
“Community Trust and Law Enforcement around the World: a Key to Peace and
Prosperity Everywhere.”
Two of the above presentations are being carried in this issue: the presidential address by
Dr. Rosner and the Melko analysis by Dr. Wilkinson.
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Thanks go out to all those who hosted this amazing conclave. We look forward to seeing
everyone at future annual meetings and, as always, we on the journal invite those who wish
to submit their papers to our peer review process to do so. If published, you will be widely
read, that’s for certain.
This year, as always, the annual meeting of the International Society for the Comparative
Study of Civilizations involved people from all over the world. Many flew very long
distances to be present. The ideas proposed at our annual get-togethers force a person to
consider many new and challenging perspectives. The reason is that each annual conference
features a wide range of papers, all offering what might be to most in attendance one or more
unique perspectives on civilizations in our world; the presentations are almost universally
rigorously constructed, thought-provoking, well worth the listening. Surely the same spirit
and scholarly, institutional vigor will prevail next year, as the organization meets once again,
this time at the beautiful campus of Monmouth University in New Jersey.
See you then!
Joseph Drew

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol73/iss73/16
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A CCR Festschrift to Matt Melko Begins
Matthew Melko:
He Kept the Candlelight Aglow Ever Brighter
Tseggai Isaac
tseggai@mst.edu
The onset of the 21st century was a period of hope and despair for the International Society
for the Comparative Study of Civilization (ISCSC). The despair arose as a result of a few of
its luminary scholars departed in death while its prospects for rejuvenation were getting
brighter. One of its luminaries who always kept the intellectual fire burning and the
candlelight of scholarship aglow was Matthew Melko. Unfortunately, he too is no longer
with us since his death in 2010.
During the Society’s 2005 annual conference in St. Paul, Minnesota, Lee Snyder, then
President of the Society, but now he too is no longer with us, in his presidential address to
the Society stated: “I see us as heirs of the tradition started by Spengler, and continued by
Sorokin, Toynbee, Quigley, Melko and others.”
Snyder’s testimonial to the effect that Melko stood with the giants in his penetrating
methodology on comparing civilizations was accurate to the point, as can be observed from
Melko’s books and illuminating articles. Among the scholars who have vouched for Melko’s
contributions to research are the illustrious Crane Brinton, Arnold Toynbee, Andrew
Quigley, Andre Gunder Frank, Andrew Targowski, and David Wilkinson.
They all noted the essential values of Melko’s work as detailed in the following books of
Melko and his coauthors:
The Nature of Civilizations, 1969
Fifty-Two Peaceful Societies, 1973, Canadian Peace Research Institute
Peace in Our Time, 1990, Paragon House
General War Among Great Powers in World History, 2001, Mellen Press
The Boundaries of Civilizations in Space and Time (1987 coauthored with
Leighton Scott, 1987
Peace in the Ancient World, (With Richard Weigel), McFarland Press, 1981
Single Myths and Realities, (with Leonard Cargan), Sage Press, 1982
Melko delved into the dynamic political and diplomatic atmosphere at the end of the Second
World War and the beginning of the Cold War. He was recruited to active duty in the United
States Army where he served in Korea from 1952-1954 after he earned his master’s degree
from the University of Chicago in 1952. Upon his return from the Army, Sergeant Major
Melko went to pursue a second Master’s of Science degree from Columbia University. He
then went to London to pursue his doctoral studies from the London School of Economics
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2015
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and Political Science where he studied under the incomparable historian, Arnold Toynbee.
His military and pedagogical training, in addition to the vibrant and optimistic post-World
War II years, allowed Melko to flourish in intellectual depth.
After his honorable service to his country in Korea, Melko’s career span the fields of
journalism, teaching, research and publication and university administration as a dean. In all
of these fields, Melko offered himself as a dutiful leader and a scholar of impeccable
accomplishments. He has authored and coauthored eight books, published over 70 articles
and served as a president of the International Society for the Comparative Study of
Civilizations.
During his tenure as president of the ISCSC (1983-1986), he endeavored to increase
membership and focus the Society’s mission on describing and articulating the meaning of
civilization. Beginning as early as the 1980s and continuing after the year 2000, the Society
also oriented its agenda on the problem of articulating civilization in terms of time and
geographical space.
The approach that Melko and his colleagues at the Society selected was a comparative study
of civilizations. This approach opened up the way to naming, categorizing,
ranking/classifying and assigning origin, influence, evolution, and identification of
civilizations. The prominent civilizations that were not disputed as historically visible were
not sources of controversy. Melko stated, “The mainstream civilizations are Egyptian,
Mesopotamian, Classical, South Asian, East Asian, Andean, Mesoamerican, African,
Byzantine, Islamic and Western.”1 These civilizations were accepted as units of analysis and
open fields of research. They were recognized, in their due times, as having impact in terms
of culture, language, diplomatic, and trade influences.
On the other hand, “the boundary of civilizations” and the character of their cultural,
diplomatic, ideological, and socio-linguistic contents with respect to war and peace may
vary. Melko emphasized the prevalence of war and peace and the extent to which war is an
abnormal occurrence and peace throughout the centuries, an abiding norm.
The problem arises from the fact that comparing civilizations involves examination of the
topic from a spatial perspective. In the spatial perspective, the intellectual panorama and the
methodological landscape are amorphous, with the structural lines in terms of origin and
influence difficult to articulate. Even if painstaking research efforts manage to produce
cogent conclusions about time-tested civilizations, the identifying features of a specific
civilization, such as the Greek or Egyptian civilizations represent problems of certainty.


1

Do we identify a specific civilization when scholars found the wherewithal to
observe, define, and enumerate its identifying characteristics, when it was firmly
institutionalized into the soil and soul of space and time, or do we possess the

Melko, M. “Cycles of General War in History”, in International Interactions, Vol. 25, No.3, p. 288.
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essential perspicacity to clearly say that other civilizations have or do not have a role
in its origination? 2


The time horizon and the “boundary” with which we associate civilizations is
obscured by the material facts the researcher must rely upon to articulate the
civilization’s origin, its internal characteristics, and the extent of its influence.

Along these lines, Melko queried the tendency of emerging and vibrant civilizations
attracting the glare of light to obscure other equally established civilizations. He asked, “Is
it conceivable that the great explorations beginning in the fifteenth century, and the
tremendous improvements in transportation and communication that followed, may have
stultified attempts to isolate and understand individual cultures at the very time such study
was beginning?”3
His answer was to be mindful, and circumspect in our selection with respect to the
“boundaries of civilization in space and time” and to be sensitive as to the scientific bases
of our research. Failing to do so, we risk accepting predetermined historical and
civilizational realities shrouded in subjectivity and devoid of scientific objectivity.
Professor Melko became the Society’s president in 1983 when its intellectual energy was
dynamic and substantive. Internationally recognized scholars enriched the Society and
Melko’s capacity to integrate scholars of various disciplines and steer them to the study of
comparative rigor revitalized the Society. They built on the Society’s founding principles
under the able leadership of Sorokin, Quigley, Melko, Wilkinson, and Wallerstein.
Melko received accolades for his edited book, the Boundary of Civilizations. Some were
glowing reviews recognizing his command of facts and the analytical force that he brought
to bear on his work. Some reviews were mixed, but nonetheless they celebrated Melko’s
scholarship and analytical creativity as setting new standards for the study of civilizations.
Quigley viewed Melko with reserve, but appreciated Melko’s book, The Nature of
Civilizations, stating:
“The successful accomplishment is his succinct exposition of the present state of the study
of this orphaned subject, which finds a home in no academic department or discipline but
turns up as frequently in sociology or philosophy as in anthropology or history, and may,
indeed, even be found resident in two of these simultaneously on the same campus without
anyone recognizing the fact.”4
2

See Krejci, Jaroslav (2004). The Path of Civilizations: Understanding the Currents of History. New York,
NY: Palgrave.
3
Melko, M. (1969). The Nature of Civilizations. Porter Sargent, Boston, MASS, p.155.
4
Quigley, C. Review of Melko, M. (1969).The Nature of Civilizations. Extended Horizon Booms, Porter
Sargent Publishers, Boston, MASS, The American Anthropologists, Vol.75, No. 1. 1970.
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Even though Quigley in his praise of Melko is not so generous, other towering scholars have
credited Melko’s creativity and the meticulous tenacity of his scholarship. Arnold Toynbee,
who must have sensed Melko’s contribution to the advance of the comparative studies of
civilization, said of Melko:
Melko, in his present book, recognizes handsomely his debt to his predecessors, and at
the same time he uses their work to help him to carry his and their common study farther
than the points reached by them. As a survivor of the preceding generation, I am
delighted by this. If one has taken a hand in any branch of study at a fairly early stage
in this branch’s development, when the workers in this particular field have still been
few, one hopes that the number of one’s fellow workers will increase and - speaking,
here, simply for myself - I gauge the success of my own work by the speed and the
extent of its replacement by the work of younger colleagues. Melko’s The Nature of
Civilizations covers much ground in few pages.5
Melko himself was pugnacious when he felt the need to assert the parameters of comparative
studies of civilization within the orbit of liberalism. He was not so parochial as to easily be
type-casted as Eurocentric. He was a progressive internationalist with most of his research
aimed as studying civilizations from their peaceful characteristics.
To that extent, he argued that Western Civilization is no different than any other civilization.
In its case, however, a difference is that Western civilization used technology to harness its
environment. Western science complemented Western Civilization. It was not encumbered
by religion or the overbearing demands of a command ideology. Equipped with its scientific
resources, it exhibited secular and progressive character. Its secular temper unleashed
bounties of technological innovations enabling it to extend its reach to the highest
firmaments and deepest shoals.
As the Society was expanding its influence, a few great scholars from the field of World
Systems theory added intellectual vigor to the Society’s stature. Andre Gunder Frank,
Immanuel Wallerstein, and Christopher Chase-Dunn were members who looked at the study
of civilization from the center-periphery perspective. They argued that Western capitalism,
rationalized by liberalism, emboldened with technological innovations, endowed with
industrial infrastructure and oriented for exploiting primary resources of the less developed
countries has subjugated the vast humanity of the Third World. Melko disagreed with the
substance and the tenor of the World Systems argument.
Melko’s stance was combative without being offensive in his criticism. He showed his
sharper edges when he confronted the World Systems approach for its vertical analysis of
the colonial and the pre-colonial evolution of powers. The vertical analysis was masterfully
addressed by such Society members as Andre Gunder Frank, Christopher Chase-Dunn,

5

Toynbee, A. in History and Theory, Vol 10. No. 2. 1971: pp. 246-253, Review of: Melko, Matthew.
(1969). The Nature of Civilizations. Porter Sargent Publishers.
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Immanuel Wallerstein, and David Wilkinson, all Melko’s friends and fellow members at
ISCSC.
These scholars took approaches that were laser-focused on delineating global configurations
of economic and political power from the perspective of “center-periphery” relationships.
They argued that military, industrial, and economic power were the determining factors in
the progress and development of societies. Whereas Melko was “cosmopolitan”, patient,
and circumspect so as to accord past civilizations their due reverence on account of their
glorious past, the scholars who propounded the World Systems theory looked at the Third
World states basically as plaintiffs helplessly needing advocacy before the court of global
jurisdiction. That jurisdiction is more responsive to the Western interests, however. It is
structured to facilitate exploitation and compound the dependency status of the poor
societies at the periphery.
From the World Systems approach camp, Andre Gunder Frank was imputative of the West.
He indicted European powers for the “accumulation” of the wealth of the periphery. Ever
since the European exploration and subsequent colonization, the primary resources of the
peripheral states were gutted by European powers to enrich their treasuries and feed their
ever gluttonous industrial establishments. The outcome, he argued, is “the Development of
Underdevelopment” or the slow, but progressive, impoverishment of the periphery and the
enrichment of the Center at a compound rate of exploitation.6
The year 1492 figured prominently in Frank’s analysis. He argued that it kick-started the
dynamic forces of European colonialism. Ever since then, the world was set to be configured
in accordance to the cultural tastes and industrial appetites of the “metropolitan” states.7
That was the extent of Western civilization, according to Frank. As direct consequences of
this civilization’s actions, Europe reigned supreme and its former colonial possessions lay
supine, prostrated under the iron fetters of neocolonialism. Frank was vocal, angry, apostolic
in his denunciations, and supremely rich in his details. He has not gone so far as to call for
revolutionary uprising in the tone of the Communist Manifesto, but did not hide his socialist
beliefs and his rejection of the promises and possibilities of liberalism.
Melko took exception to Frank’s theses and he expressed his protestation by calling Frank’s
argument a “Faustian delusion.”
Equally forceful and meticulously elegant in the scope and range of his historical,
sociological, and political analysis was Immanuel Wallerstein. His book, The Modern
World-System, trail-blazed a comprehensive and causal look at power, again from the
perspective of Europe’s insatiable appetite for industrial input.8 The raw materials of Africa,
Asia, and the Americas meant more to European powers than did the humanity and soul of
the natives. In Wallerstein’s conclusion, the causal link between the economies of the poor
Frank, A. G. (1966). “The Development of Underdevelopment”, Monthly Review, (Sept) 17-31
Frank, A. G. (1979a). World Accumulation 1492-1789. New York, NY: Monthly Review Press.
8
Wallerstein, I. (1977). The Modern World System Volume I. New York, NY: Academic Press.
6
7
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countries, which he identified as the “periphery,” and those of the Europeans, identified as
“the center,” is irrevocably linked to a horrible and inevitable result -- the dismal
impoverishment of the periphery.
Next, Christopher Chase-Dunn elaborated on World Systems theory from the structural
perspective. He was more in consonance with Melko and praised Melko’s work as an
“excellent introduction to an alternative way of conceptualizing and bounding of
civilizations.” Chase-Dunn argued that the superstructure of the World Systems theory
needed to look at the bureaucratic grassroots of colonialism.9
Both Frank and Wallerstein are ideological in their analysis. They have identified global
politics as structured along the lines of capitalism. Liberalism rationalized and
enthusiastically praised capitalism and countenanced its “tentacles” for global exploitation.
Capitalism cultivates the rise of avaricious industrial and commercial enterprises. These
enterprises are driven, restless in their quest to expand the horizons of scientific frontiers
and the “boundaries” of their domination. They push to the outer horizons of the periphery
irrespective of the inevitable human rights abuses and widespread corruption they cultivate
in the Third World. Liberalism, regardless of its stated principles of democracy and human
rights, lacks the capacity to harness multinationals and capitalist enterprises in the face of
massive human rights abuses and economic plundering.
The World Systems School saw this symbiotic link between liberalism and capitalism as a
detrimental force endlessly working against the prospects of Third World development.
Melko disagreed. Melko focused on liberalism and praised it for its ability to motivate
citizens, its endless capacities for creativity, its endorsement and championing of individual
freedoms, and its open and broad celebration of the sciences. He rejected the laying of blame
on liberalism. He is lukewarm on capitalism but warmhearted on liberalism for its measures
of natural rights and individual freedoms irrespective of its imperfections.
Melko’s forceful rejection of the World Systems approach and its pairing of capitalism and
liberalism was assertive and biting. He aroused the anger of its champions by calling the
World Systems theory a “Faustian Delusion.”10 The drama that unfolded and the disquiet
that Melko ignited on Frank, who has earlier commended Melko’s work as an excellent
scholarly endeavor, is revealing.11
Neither ideological nor polemical is the work of David Wilkinson who answered back to
those scholars often referred to as the radical school. Wilkinson’s identifying markers are
meticulous analysis, great craftsmanship in presenting data, tireless energy in amassing and
tailoring details, and mastery of historical, political, and cultural details. He exhibits
9

Chase-Dunn, C. K. (1982b). Societies in World Systems. Beverly Hills, CA: 21-55.
Melko, M. “World Systems: A Faustian Delusion” I &II. In Comparative Civilizations Review, No 30
(Spring 1994): 13-19,
11
Frank, A. G. “Confusion Worse Confounded: Through the Looking Glass of Matt Melko in Wonderland”,
Comparative Civilizations Review, No. 30 (Spring 1994): 22-27.
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scientific sensitivity and masterful scholarship. He catalogues the evolution of civilizations
to bring to bear scientifically grounded pedagogy.12 In Melko and Wilkinson’s analysis, the
analytical details and the spirited marshalling of arguments are visible; they share the same
ideological and intellectual template.
Disagreements notwithstanding, Melko felt at home with the scholars mentioned above. The
range of Melko’s analysis and the trajectories of the World Systems theory overlapped and
shared reciprocal “interdependence.” The sense of collegiality and the civility with which
they debated their ideas are instructive. They can be categorized into the conventional
classification of scholars that had prevailed since the end of the Second World War.
Whereas Frank and Wallerstein are at home with the spirit of socialist analysis, Melko,
Wilkinson, and Chase-Dunn are progressive liberals in the sense they empathize with the
Third World, but they do not credit socialism or communism to serve as the panacea for the
Third World ills. Melko, particularly, railed against these ideologies. He struck punches
courageously as a valiant soldier and received reactive punches, but these neither fazed nor
dispirited the Ohio thinker.
Melko was a great scholar and professor, a man of integrity, and a gentleman in the truest
sense of the word. He had gravitas, but he would also be the least enthusiastic to accept
words of endearment coming from people like me who observed him and who were edified
by the intellectual wealth of his vast scholarship and the gravitas of his character. Few
praises would be too many, given his sense of humility, but he would also be confirmed by
many who knew him as deserving the accolades and praises becoming a father to his beloved
children, a loving husband to his wife, and a great colleague to those who had the great
fortunes of knowing him.
Dr. Matthew Melko was a man of a few words, but he was full of intellectual wisdom
emanating from a context of tolerance, a gracious and unassuming giant. He was a scholar
of tenacious energy, enthusiasm, foresight and superior grace. He was a heavyweight, but
he liked to obscure his luminary force, opting to work from the depth of the deep trenches,
laboring, sweating, and exerting endless energy to recruit new members for the ISCSC. He
faithfully encouraged young scholars to increase their participation in the field of
comparative civilization studies, and he charted ways by which the ISCSC would sharpen
its vision and expand its horizon. His labor was not in vain as the ISCSC is growing in those
very areas that Melko envisioned.

12

Wilkinson, D. (1995). From Mesopotamia Through Carroll Quigley to Bill Clinton: World Historical
Systems, the Civilizationalist and the President”. Journal of World Systems Research Vol. 1 #1,
http://www.jwsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Wilkinson-v1n1.pdf.
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Matthew Melko and the Study of Real Peace
David Wilkinson
dow@ucla.edu
Matthew Melko (1930-2010), leading civilizationist and peace scientist, left a substantial
body of books and articles on the comparative study of actual peace, the condition of notbeing-at-war-with-one-another that is in fact (Melko, 1996) the real and historic norm for
human societies. Melko’s work will in due course prove foundational for the comparative
and scientific study of the character and causes of peace.
Melko’s main work on empirical peace is to be found in four books published between 1973
and 1990: 52 Peaceful Societies (1973a), Peace in the Ancient World (with Weigel, Katary
and McKenny, 1981), Peace in the Western World (with John K. Hord, 1984), and Peace
in Our Time (1990). The first three books survey human history in order to locate what
Melko called “peaces” or “zones of peace,” or what Robert Whealey labeled (disparagingly,
1986: 15) “pockets of peace,” and what I shall more often call “peace domains”—places and
periods bounded in space and time, with the periods being a century or more, where violence
was notably low. Peace in Our Time examined what Melko elsewhere (1985, 1989) called
the “Great Northern Peace,” or “the remission of violence” in the West since the end of the
Second World War.
52 Peaceful Societies collected fifty-two peace domains. Peace in the Ancient World and
Peace in the Western World replicated and corrected 52 Peaceful Societies for 10 and 12
cases respectively. A replication study summation (Melko, Hord and Weigel, 1983)
integrated and slightly modified the collection.
REAL PEACE
Carlyle’s phrase (attributed to Montesquieu) “Happy the people whose annals are blank”
(1888: 128) could be seen as governing for Melko’s groundbreaking survey of history. In
that survey, absence of evidence of war was taken as evidence of absence of war, i.e.,
evidence of the presence of peace. Peoples, places and intervals of time whose histories
lacked records of dramatic and bloody events were considered to have been at peace, absent
evidence to the contrary, on the reasonable assumption that historians find wars interesting
and important, and so would have recorded them had they been fought.
Real peace as a domain, pocket or interval that can exist between places and times of war is
an old concept. Imperial German general Erich Ludendorff’s concept of peace as “merely”
an interval between times of wars was not an original notion. The views of ancient Indian
lawgivers were summed up almost identically by Tähtinen: “Peace is the interval between
two wars.” (1976: 91) Ambrose Bierce presented the same idea even more cynically:
“PEACE, n. In international affairs, a period of cheating between two periods of fighting”
(2000, s.v. PEACE).
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol73/iss73/16
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Some writers both admit the possibility of peace that is real but not durable, as does the
nuclear physicist Leo Szilard: “The traditional aim of foreign policy is to prolong the peace,
i.e., to lengthen the interval between two wars.” (Szilard preferred measures that would
instead establish a “state of permanent peace” 1947: 102.) Others, more idealistic perhaps,
reject real peace as unreal, e.g. Orchard: “A peace that is nothing more than an interval
between two wars is not a real peace” (2003). Hobbes might concur: “the nature of War,
consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time
there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE.” (Leviathan, ch. 13)
Rather less disparagingly patronizing is John Ogilvie’s Imperial Dictionary, which, at
“Interval,” proposes “The space of time between two paroxysms of disease, pain or delirium;
remission; as, an interval of ease, of peace, of reason.” (Ogilvie, 1863, s.v. Interval)
Melko’s approach is close to Ogilvie’s, and also to Mao Zedong’s: “Politics is war without
bloodshed, while war is politics with bloodshed” (1954: sec. 64). For Melko, “Peace is
considered to be an absence of [violent, physical conflict among political entities or among
substantial factions within these entities]. It includes situations in which anger or hostility
is openly expressed, and in which arms buildups occur, if there is little physical conflict. A
situation of mutual war preparation between potential adversaries who nevertheless do not
fight would be a period of peace. The term cold war has been used to describe such a period,
but it could better be described as a cold peace.” (2010: 22)
Melko’s method of peace-locating work was inverse to A.L. Kroeber’s method for locating
cultural creativity. Kroeber (1944) used general sources to find major cultural creators and
achievements, and these to map times and places of exceptionally high cultural activity.
Melko “looked for periods when nothing was happening” (2001c: 28) and then focused more
specifically upon the locations, circumstances and phenomenology of such nothingness.
PEACE DOMAINS
Table 1 lists 46 peace domains, and reflects Melko’s 1975 summation (1975b: 550-551) as
modified by the 1983 partial replication by Melko, Hord and Weigel. I have partitioned the
list of domains among the civilizations (as bounded in Wilkinson, 1987, 1992, 1993) within
which they were space-time “pockets” of peace.
In choosing the cases, Melko faced ontological issues and resolved them in ways that could
have been reversed. An interrupted peace was treated as continuous; peace in domains as
small as a city-state was not negated by the size of the unit; peace in contiguous areas was
treated as being in a single domain; regions at peace within a state undergoing war were not
treated as peace domains, except for one long hinterland peace (Hispano-Roman) that was
treated as separate from its “parent” Pax Romana; interruptions judged “minor” were
discounted; and war outside a peace domain did not negate the peace within (Melko, Weigel
et al., 1981: 10-11; Melko and Hord, 1984:2-3).
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Table 1
Melko Peace Domains

PEACE DOMAIN
DURATION
LOCATION
Egyptian Civilization: (1 peace domain):
Middle Kingdom
1991-1720 BC
Egyptian Civilization to c. 1500 BC, then Central Civilization (1):
New Kingdom Egypt
1565-1231 BC
Central Civilization (25):
Phoenician
1150-722 BC
Athenian
683-513 BC
Corinthian
655-427 BC
Achaemenid
520-331 BC
Iran and Mesopotamia
Ptolemaic
332-216 BC
Egypt and Cyprus
Roman Republican
203-90 BC
Italy
Pax Romana
31 BC-AD 161
Southern Europe, Asia Minor, Levant, North
Africa
Hispano-Roman
19 BC-AD 409
Iberian Peninsula
Byzantine
838-1071
Asia Minor
Venetian
1033-1310
Scandinavian
1262Mameluke
1250-1517
Hungarian
1312-1428
Polish
1410-1606
Brandenburger
1486-1527
British
1485-1940
Spanish Imperial
1492-1808
Brazilian
1654Pacific
1788Australia, New Zealand, Hawaii, Tonga
Costa Rican
1842-1948
Swiss
1856Canadian
1885South Asian Civilization: (4)
Gupta
336-450
Northern and Central India
Mughal
1585-1707
Northern and Central India
Anglo-Indian
1818
Southern India and Ceylon
Nepalese
1846SE Asian/Indonesian Civilization (8):
Cham
650-952
Southeast coast of Indochina
Khmer
813-921
Central Indochina
Burmese
1084-1277
Irrawaddy and Sittang Valleys
Laotian
1373-1564
Upper Mekong Valley
Mon
1426-1535
Irrawaddy Delta
Arakanese
1546-1684
East Coast, Bay of Bengal
Javanese
1830-1942
T’ai
1802
Menam Valley
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PEACE DOMAIN
DURATION
East Asian Civilization (5):
Han
202 BC-AD 184
T’ang
626-868
Sung
Ming
Manchu
Japanese Civilization (2):
Fujiwara
Kamakura

LOCATION

1004-1235
1403-1629
1682-1852

China, Annam
China, Annam, Manchuria, Korea, Tibet,
Taklamakan Desert
China
China, Korea
China, Manchuria, Korea, Taiwan

600-900
1185-1331

Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku
Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku

STUDENTS OF PEACE
Other scholars have examined actual non-war relations from various approaches. Lewis F.
Richardson summarized the views of several philosophers and other writers who puzzled
over “The fewness of wars among Chinese”; Richardson concluded that the most likely
explanation had been cultural-educational, i.e. Confucian instruction (1960: 240-242). Karl
Deutsch (1977), Adler and Barnett (1998) and others have examined “security communities”
of persons who share the belkief that their mutual problems must be addressed by nonviolent
means. With roots in the writings of Immanuel Kant, Thomas Paine and Alexis de
Tocqueville, there has developed a massive body of work pro and con the “democratic peace
theory” that democracies are to some degree inhibited from making war upon one another
by their institutions and/or their sense of kinship. (Wikipedia, s.v. “Democratic Peace
Theory.”)
Somewhat closer to Melko’s line of work is a school inspired by Kenneth Boulding’s
concept of “stable peace” ("a situation in which the probability of war is so small that it does
not really enter into the calculations of any of the people involved": 1978, 13). Alexander
George (2000, 12-13) contrasts stable peace with “precarious” peace teetering upon the
brink of violence, and “conditional” peace based upon the calculative rationality of
deterrence. Stable-peace research as most recently represented by Arie Kacowicz and
Charles Kupchan (Kacowicz, 1998; Kacowicz et al, 2000; Kupchan, 2010) tends to confine
itself to international peace. Thus Kacowicz conceives of a “zone of peace” as “a discrete
geographical region of the world in which a group of states have maintained peaceful
relations among themselves for a period of at least thirty years—generations span—though
civil wars, domestic unrest, and violence might still occur within their borders, as well as
international conflicts and crises between them” (1998: 9).
Kacowicz identified (1998: 15) the following “zones of peace” since 1815:
Europe, 1815-1848
Europe, 1871-1914
Western Europe, since 1945
Eastern Europe, 1945-1989
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North America, 1917 to the present
South America, 1883 to the present
West Africa, 1987 to the present (again, K wrote in 1998)
East Asia, since 1953
Australasia, since 1945
The ASEAN countries of Southeast Asia, since 1967.
Of the real-peace researchers Kacowicz is probably closest to Melko in spirit, none of their
approaches is identical to, subsumes, or builds upon Melko’s research line. Some confine
themselves to international peace, as Melko does not. Others are theory-driven or practicedriven. Like L.F. Richardson’s study of wars, Melko’s study of “peaces” is first of all a
data-collection exercise, driven by the need for more comprehensive data-bases for the
various uses of reflection, theory and practice. It is an undertaking deserving to be continued
much in its own terms.
MOVING FORWARD
How might the study of real peace along the lines defined by Melko go forward? I would
suggest the following program.
1. Replications.
(a) The history-search should be replicated by area historians, to reduce the frequency
of false negatives (genuine peaces erroneously rejected or overlooked). Melko, Hord
and Weigel (1983) mention as candidates for a possible false negative- status an
Egyptian Old Kingdom peace 2650-2350 BC, a Mesopotamian peace 1540-1220
BC, a Bohemian peace 1197-1394, a North Italian peace 1538-1701, a Dutch peace
1794-1940, and West Indian peace (in the Guianas as well as the West Indies) 1815.
That 1983 replication also added a Roman Republican peace, a Spanish Imperial
peace, and a Brazilian peace to the collection. It removed the United states post 1866
from a previous “North American” peace, but with doubts that should be addressed
(Melko, Hord and Weigel 1983: 42).
(b) The existing list of peaces should be scrutinized by area historians to reduce the
frequency of false positives (unpeaces misclassified as peaces). The 1983 replication
moved the 6 candidate peaces cited above from the prior list to a “not validated” list,
and withdrew a previously listed “Habsburg” peace 1711-1848, and a Sassanian
peace AD 363-590. The Middle Kingdom and new Kingdom peace carried the note
“interrupted”; the interruptions will need attention.
(c) Time-boundaries of peace domains should be scrutinized closely. The 1983
replication made minor changes in the time boundaries of the Middle Kingdom, New
Kingdom, Phoenician, Achaemenid, Ptolemaic, Hungarian, Brandenburger, and
Swiss peaces.
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(d) Spatial boundaries of peace domains should also be reviewed. The 1983 replication
shrank a North America peace (1866-) to a Canadian peace (1885-) because of
uncertainty regarding the scale of racial violence in the United States, while
expanding the boundaries of a former Australian peace to take in Tonga and Hawaii
as well as Australia and New Zealand.
The first round of replication was not done (Melko, Hord and Weigel, 1983: 39) for the
South Asian, Southeast Asian/Indonesian, East Asian and Japanese civilizations.
These should accordingly receive priority in any future replication study.

2. Ontology.
Complex issues arise in war-analysis when different areas enter and leave violence at
different times. Did World War II begin in 1937 in China or in 1939 in Poland? America
and Russia entered in 1941, but were they in the same war in 1941, or was one in a
European war and the other in a Pacific war?
Peaces offer similar ontological challenges. Melko, Weigel and Hord combine the
formerly separate Icelandic (1262-) and Scandinavian (1721) into a single Scandinavian
peace, and must then note five different dates for the five participant societies: Iceland
(1262-), Norway (1371-1940), Denmark (1660-1801), Sweden (1721-), and Finland
(1809-1918). The peace of the British Isles was shorter in Ireland (1690-1919) and
Scotland (1746-1940) than in England and Wales. The Pacific peace began for Australia
in 1788, for Hawaii in 1824, for Tonga in 1845, and for New Zealand in 1872. The
Spanish Imperial peace of 1492-1808 lasted in New Spain only from 1590 to 1780.
The most controversial ontological choice made by Melko was to accept that the
government of a peace domain might be fighting elsewhere, even fighting continuously,
and yet the external war was not treated as negating the peace that held within the
domain. Leitenberg (1975) and Whealey (1986) took particular exception to the British
Isles peace domain 1485-1940. The matter must be considered, but if Melko’s criteria
are chosen that peace must be recognized.
Such issues must be discussed in terms of definitional criteria for the concept being
applied, and in terms of historical evidence of connectedness between the various parts
of the phenomenon. When statistics are to be employed, it will be prudent to determine
the maximum expected error by analyzing the disputable data twice (at least), once with
any variable defined with maximum strictness, once with maximum leniency.
3. Reflection and conjecture
As the list of peace domains becomes better attested and its problems and probabilities
become better known, a reflective, insight-generating, discursive phase will be in
order. Essays and conferences in which dueling specialists propose, for those peace
periods they jointly accept, their alternative historical explanations for their inception,
continuance and termination. Especially urgent would be the contemplation of long
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intervals of peace between great and general wars (in which Melko will also proved a
forerunner—cf. Melko, 1997, 1999, 2001a, 2001b). Melko’s own explanations should
be a part of, and can be seeds for, the discussion.
4. Comparison and hypothesis
With a fair number of cases in hand, it becomes appropriate to compare cases, educe a
typology (like George’s stable vs. precarious vs. conditional peaces) and conjecture
causality. Melko will be a companion here as well: see especially the Recapitulations
chapters in 52 Peaceful Societies, Peace in the Ancient World and Peace in the Western
World, his major analytical articles (1973d, 1975c, 1985, 1992, 2010), and the entirety
of Peace in Our Time.
Within these, his theories of peace termination via
institutionalization and via saltations in the evolution of military technology demand
special consideration.
5. Hypothesis testing.
The human social sciences are the truly “hard” sciences when what is at stake is the
researcher’s ability to test hypotheses. The subjects of hard-science study can render it
harder by financing and biasing, appropriating and abusing, or resisting and preventing
it. The ethics and governance of any real-world hard-science experimental testing of
peace theories, were that feasible, would be doubtful at best. Substitutes, however
unsatisfactory, must be sought.
Partitioning sets of historical peaces, deriving hypothetical generalizations from one
half, and trying them against the other, may offer a route to an approximation of an
inductive historical science of peace. Games of various sorts, and an enormous variety
exists, would seem the best agenda for an observational science of real peace.
6. Practice
Aeronauts rose to their heights (and flew, or fell), while aeronautical theory was
nourished by their successes and their disasters.
Practice rarely awaits science;
unsatisfactorily tested theories are nonetheless constantly being tried out upon
unforgiving reality. Real peace is no different. Consider the diplomatic efforts
surrounding (in 2015) the Libyan, Ukrainian, Syrian, ISIS, Iranian nuclear, Afghan, and
South China Sea crises and wars. These and all such crisis diplomacies are inescapably
grounded upon incomplete information and inadequately verified or partly-baked
theory.
Crisis diplomacy concerns itself with the short term: peace now. Matthew Melko’s work
is concerned with the longue durée of peace, peace at the century scale. Melko (1989,
1990, 1992) observed that the powers of the West (or the North) had entered after World
War II into a period of “remission of violence,” a point with which the securitycommunity, stable-peace and democratic-peace schools of real-peace theory would not
at all disagree. But Melko’s view was that this remission should be perceived, as Leo
Szilard would have perceived it and despaired of it, as a shaky and wasting asset, an
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol73/iss73/16
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Indian Summertime destined to fade, as social instruments once functioning for a general
good—e.g. states, corporations--ossified into institutions for the benefit of their owners.
Melko’s theories offer a starting point for a practice of long-peace prolongation and
extension at least as well-founded as the short-term pacifying efforts of the crisis
diplomats.

If we were to concur with Melko’s assessment of the key variables in the termination of
durable peaces, we would want to proceed on the one hand with a Quigleyan economics of
reform or circumvention (Quigley, 1961: 78; Melko, 1972a: 601-603), and on the other with
the selective advancement of military technologies designed to frustrate and obstruct major
power shifts based on the rapid exploitation of new technique.
Other schools of real peace propose other priorities, which merit discussion. But Melko’s
line of work satisfies the criteria needed for civilizationists to move ahead through the
worlds of discourse of history, science and practice (Oakeshott, 1933) in a lively and durable
direction for the historical, scientific and practical study of peace
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Civilizational Trauma and Value Nihilism in Boccaccio’s Decameron
David J. Rosner
drosner@mcny.edu
Introduction: Civilizational Trauma and Values Crises
In the introduction to their edited volume The Cultural Life of Catastrophes and Crises,
Carsten Meiner and Kristen Veel discuss catastrophes and crises as “disruptions of order”1.
They argue that “through consequences of varying severity, catastrophes and crises change
and subvert what we have become accustomed to as the normal state of things, thereby
exposing what was previously taken for granted.”2 Yet their book explores not merely the
particular catastrophic events themselves, but in the “multi-layered and complex
interlinkage between actual events and the cultural processing of these events”3, i.e., how
they “understood in terms of their cultural life….how they are interpreted once they occur,
and what kinds of cultural representation they subsequently engender.”4
This paper traces what happens to a civilization’s fundamental values during times of
catastrophe and specifically how civilizational values are affected by collective psychic
trauma. The specific case under consideration here is the Black Death plague, which ravaged
Europe starting from around 1348. The paper examines how some themes in Boccaccio’s
Decameron, perhaps the most influential literary production created in reaction to the
plague, can also be considered one of the West’s earliest chronicles of a
moral/epistemological crisis, and how certain themes in the work, understood as a reaction
to the Black Death, can even be seen to reveal elements of trends towards what we now call
value nihilism (at least according to Nietzsche’s definition of the term).
This paper will also address the more general question of how crises and catastrophes are to
be properly studied, as part of the “methodology” of civilizational studies. I will thus follow
the theoretical lead of Meiner and Veel above (and civilizationalists like Piritrim Sorokin)
in that, for this paper, the crucial moment to be studied is not necessarily the external
catastrophic event itself (e.g., all of the details concerning an earthquake, economic collapse
or world war--in this case the Black Death plague) but rather the internal “void of ethics”
(Cf. Patrizia McBride) that this event left in its wake, and the implications this “void of
ethics” has had upon those of us living in Western Civilization today.

Carsten Meiner and Kristen Veel (eds), “Introduction” to The Cultural Life of Catastrophes and Crises
(Berlin: DeGruyter, 2012).
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid. See also Elizabeth Kovach, “Locating the Quotidian in Catastrophes and Crises”, review of Meiner
and Veel, Op Cit, in KULT_Online. Review Journal for the Study of Culture 38.2014.
4
Ibid.
1
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The Abandonment of Values in Desperate Times
According to the Brown University Decameron Web:
in 1334 an epidemic which would eventually kill two-thirds of China’s inhabitants
struck the northeastern Chinese province of Hopei, claiming up to ninety percent of
the population…carried along trade routes, the ‘Black Death’, as it soon would be
called, began to work its way east…In 1346 the plague came to Kaffa, a Genoese
cathedral city…plague ridden ships from Kaffa brought the disease to Italy. Some
cities lost almost all their inhabitants. In Venice at least three-quarters died. In Pisa
seven tenths of the inhabitants died, and many families were completely
destroyed…Estimates of the dead vary greatly…throughout Italy, at least half the
population died.5
Boccaccio describes the physical symptoms and progression of the disease in the first
chapter of Decameron: First there would be the appearance of certain swellings in the groin
or armpit, which then would begin to spread, soon appearing at random all over the body.
Later on, the symptoms changed, and many people began to find dark blotches on their arms,
thighs, and other parts of the body…At this point, this was a certain sign that the person
would die…”6
The question for this inquiry is how did this affect medieval civilization on a spiritual plane,
in terms of its basic values? Part of the experience of trauma here was the unique sense of
hopelessness spreading through Christendom, due to the fact that no matter who one was or
what actions one took (or didn’t take), nothing proved effective to stop the plague’s deadly
progress. Boccaccio thus writes: “against this pestilence no human wisdom or foresight was
any avail.”7 Whether priest or layman, Christian or Jew, rich or poor, man or woman, all fell
victim. Neither prayer nor medicine worked. Some desperately beseeched God, seeking
penance through self-flagellation or participation in novenas, while others (perhaps equally
desperately) attempted to “carpe diem,” trying to find a modicum of pleasure wherever
possible. But it didn’t really matter what the people did, as the plague progressed
relentlessly and indiscriminately across Europe. While the mass death wrought by the
plague in itself was horrific enough, the accompanying realization of futility must only have
exacerbated the collective trauma experienced in Europe at this time.
This sense of despair led to a widespread breakdown of morals. Boccaccio writes that in the
face of mass death, (and with the hysteria, hopelessness and social disorder attendant upon
the recognition that nobody, including the medical establishment and the clergy, could do
5

See Brown University Decameron web,
www.brown.edu/Departments/Italian_Studies/dweb/plague/origins/spread.php.
6
See Giovanni Boccaccio, Decameron, 4. I will refer throughout to the edition: Mark Musa and Peter
Bondanella (ed. and trans.) The Decameron: Norton Critical Edition (NY: Norton, 1977).
7
Boccaccio in Mark Musa and Peter Bondanella (ed. and trans.) The Decameron: Norton Critical Edition
(NY: Norton, 1977). 3.
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anything to stop the plague’s progress) “the revered authority of the laws, both divine and
human, had fallen and almost completely disappeared.”8
How, more specifically, was this moral breakdown made manifest? For one thing, we see
that civilization’s most basic family ties and relations were abandoned out of sheer panic
and fear for self-preservation. Boccaccio writes:
…brother abandoned brother, uncle abandoned nephew, sister left brother, and very
often wife abandoned husband…even worse, almost unbelievable, fathers and
mothers neglected to tend and care for their own children, as if they were not their
own.9
Moreover, in their desperation to quickly rid themselves of diseased corpses, the most sacred
rituals in Christianity concerning death and funerals were also suddenly abandoned. People
died alone in the streets and were then simply thrown into mass graves:
The city was full of corpses. Things had reached such a point that the people who
died were cared for as we care for goats today…so many corpses would arrive in
front of a church every day and at every hour…when all the graves were full, huge
trenches were dug in all of the cemeteries of the churches and into the new arrivals
were dumped by the hundreds, and they were packed in there with dirt, one on top
of another….until the trench was filled.10

Sexual (Im)morality in Decameron: Crisis or Catharsis?
In what other ways did mass trauma in medieval Christian civilization lead to the
questioning of the most basic values of Christianity and of civilization itself? Decameron
is interesting in large part because of its specific focus on the loosening of sexual morality.
Hence Nancy Reale in her interesting paper “Boccachio’s Decameron: A Fictional Account
of Grappling with Chaos,” writes:
Decameron is a recording of a deep crisis in Italian life in the largest sense and
simultaneously Boccaccio’s personal crisis of faith. The text repeatedly and
courageously questions received assumptions about religion and social organization
and offers views of trecento Italy that are diverse, often destabilized and
destabilizing, and sometimes devoid of an overarching religions faith that would
otherwise (?) have been assumed.11

8

Decameron (Musa & Bondanella) 5.
Decameron, (Musa & Bondanella) 5.
10
Decameron, (Musa & Bondanella) 8.
11
See Nancy Reale, “Boccaccio’s Decameron: A Fictional Account of Grappling with Chaos”,
www.nyu.edu/projects/mediamosaic/literature/BoccaccioDecameron 7.
9
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We know that medieval Europe was a civilization saturated in religion and dominated by
Christianity; religious explanations were offered and accepted without question in response
to almost all events in life. Themes of salvation and sin were read into all aspects of human
behavior and punishment, and the fear of eternal hellfire was on almost everyone’s mind
consistently. (This obsession explains one of the origins of the indulgence controversy
initiated by Luther, et al.) Thus the devastation of the Black Death was commonly explained
as God’s punishment for human wrongdoing and transgression. Yet the destabilization
described above is in many ways the central theme of Decameron. This destabilization
becomes apparent also when Boccachio’s fictional account focuses upon (through the
various tales told by the young people in the “brigata”) the loosening of Christian sexual
morality as a consequence of the plagues’ devastation.
While Decameron is a fictional account of Late Medieval Europe’s reaction to catastrophe,
it is also crucial to note that works of art often act as mirrors, reflecting pre-existing cultural
patterns and tendencies (albeit sometimes lying just under the surface). Such works of art
are not simply created “ex nihilo,” completely without context. And the loosening of sexual
morality has often been viewed as a basic feature or symptom of societies in breakdown.12
The civilizationalist Pitirim Sorokin discussed the tendency for civilizations to become
increasingly “sensate” as part of the process of gradual disintegration. So one might ask,
with medieval Christendom in mind: Did the Black Death trigger, at least as reflected in
Decameron, the fading of medieval Christendom’s more “ideational” culture (in which life’s
fundamental frame of reference was religion and its transcendent God) and thereby herald
the dawning of a more “sensate” culture, now focusing on forbidden sex and decadence? 13
Decameron is famous for its tales of seduction, including those involving clergy, especially
nuns. While perhaps the author was going for some “shock value” here, as background it
should be noted that sex among clergy was not completely unknown at this time, and
contrary to the modern stereotype that men desire sex more than females, during the Middle
Ages women were viewed as more lustful than men. Thus Decameron has many instances
of women overcome by lust, women with insatiable desires, women needing younger lovers
because their older husbands can no longer satisfy them sexually, etc. 14 According to R.
Hastings15, there is also in Decameron a new implicit value system being put forth by
Boccachio, which was certainly “not the general morality of his time,” arguing that morality
is “based on nature.”16 Hence attention is drawn to the quote by the character Dioneo (on
John Reilly “The World After Modernity” Comparative Civilizations Review Fall 2003, 120.
See Pitirim Sorokin, The Crisis of Our Age (Oxford: One World Publishing, l992). Original book
published 1941. See also Pitirim Sorokin, Man and Society in Calamity (NY: Dutton, l942). Regarding the
connection of “sensate” cultures and nihilism, see Palmer Talbutt , Rough Dialectics: Sorokin’s Philosophy
of Value (Leiden, NL: Brill/Rodopi, l998).
14
Brown Decameron web - www.brown.edu/Departments/Italian_Studies/dweb/society/sexual-desire.php
15
R. Hastings, Nature and Reason in the Decameron (Manchester: Manchester University Press, l975), as
found in “Nature and Morality” on the Brown University Decameron web,
www.brown.edu/Departments?Italian_Studies/dweb/themes_motifs/amore/nature.php.
16
Ibid.
12
13
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the Tenth Story of the Second Day): “I shall show the…foolishness of those who,
overestimating their natural powers…attempt to mold people in their own image, thus flying
in the face of nature.” According to Hastings, he then goes on to tell of an old man who
cannot sexually satisfy his young wife, a recurrent theme in the Decameron…according to
this…interpretation of the laws of nature, a young woman needs to be sexually satisfied and
the old man, by failing to do so, quite justly loses her.17
We thus see in Decameron many instances where Christian morality seems to be
conveniently discarded when it is found inconvenient and in conflict with more “natural”
sexual desires. For example, one nun confesses to another her lust for a young man (in the
story of the ‘deaf-mute’ gardener) and the question is then asked “don’t you know that we
have promised our virginity to God?” This question is met with the interestingly pragmatic
and somewhat jaded rationalization from the other nun: “how many promises do we make
him every day which we can’t keep?”18 This example clearly reflects a break with the
established Christian morality which dominated Europe during the Middle Ages. Moreover,
no one could ever confuse the above emphasis on “nature” with any sort of natural law
theology (e.g., that put forth by St. Thomas Aquinas) justifying Christian morality either.
What are we to make of this sudden and clear deviation from traditional Christian sexual
morality in Decameron, a morality so dominant in medieval Europe, a culture long
dominated by the values of religion? Is this apparent disintegration of traditional values in
the text an almost nihilistic rejection of Christian morality? First, it should be noted that
instances of premarital sex and adultery were much more common during the Middle Ages
than many have supposed, and that despite very strong religious and cultural prohibitions,
the temptations of the flesh were no less powerful then than they are now.19 Moreover, even
if “nature” is now touted by Boccaccio as a new moral value, this is not, strictly speaking,
nihilism (defined as the absence of values altogether) but rather it is just the substitution of
new (perhaps more permissive) values for old values. Or could the above serve merely as
an extreme and desperate example of “carpe diem,” indeed a rationalization for sexual
license? After all, when bodies litter the streets at every turn, when the smell of death is
everywhere, when your relatives and friends have all died horrible deaths in front of your
very eyes, when your own chances of survival are slim to none, when none of the doctors
have any idea what to do, when the priests themselves are all either dead or have abandoned
their sick parishioners, perhaps the only honest way to view the situation is to take the
position that nothing makes any sense, there is no cosmic justice, nothing matters anymore,
so why not take pleasure in this life while one still can? Tendencies towards decadent
sexuality are further detailed by David Herlihy, who writes how “plague mortalities
reminded survivors of their own fragile grasp on life, and prompted some of them to spend

17

Ibid.
Boccaccio, Decameron, in Musa and Bondadella (ed. and trans.) p. 66.
19
Brown University Decameron Web.
www.brown.edu/Departments?Italian_Studies/dweb/society/sex/fornication-adultery.php
18
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their remaining hours in revelry.”20 People seemed to desire a temporary victory over
death21, however illusory, and Herlihy describes how people sacrilegiously danced, played
trivial games or committed “unseemly acts” in cemeteries, “over the graves of the dead.
Prostitutes solicited in cemeteries, and fornicators and adulterers trysted among the
graves”.22
Given the context of total catastrophe and existential hopelessness, the impetus towards
short-term pleasure must have been strong. This is especially interesting given the belief of
most religions (including Christianity, cf. Saint Augustine) that this life is merely
preparation for the much more important life to come, thus justifying delaying gratification
in the present. We have seen how the element of hopelessness was evident in light of the
impotence of both science (medicine) and religion (prayer) to stem the tide of death. How
did this affect the prevailing value system? Christoph Jedan writes:
Boccaccio notes that …in this situation, religion proved ineffective: it did not
prevent the outbreak, it did not protect the faithful and it could not prevent the
complete disintegration of social structure.” Boccaccio notes the widespread
disillusion with religion e.g., by referring repeatedly to the inefficacy of prayer and
devotion…”23 Regarding the widespread licentiousness (especially in the
descriptions of the behavior of nuns) described in the tales told by the brigata,
“religious values and religious experience…are depicted as a façade, concealing a
uniform human nature in which desires that are repressed or denied by Christianity
are the motivating force.24
Some critics might argue here that I’ve looked at this through too dark a lens and
fundamentally misunderstood Boccaccio’s point. By this view, Decameron is not nihilistic
in any sort of serious philosophical sense, but is actually a more playful work that
refreshingly pokes fun at the seriousness of medieval religious fundamentalism (e.g., Dante,
etc.). Decameron takes a fresh look at human beings as they really are (often lustful, lighthearted, imperfect and pleasure seeking) rather than as the haughty, humorless, pious and
cerebral creatures that medieval Christianity seemingly would’ve liked them to be. Hence
the tales told during the brigata, tales of infidelity, lust and adultery, are retold by Boccaccio
in a light and almost playful manner. Like the Florentine Renaissance thinkers soon to come
(e.g., Machiavelli), Boccaccio has a more human-centered, realistic and “this-worldly”

20

David Herlihy, The Black Death and the Transformation of the West ed. S. Kohn, Jr. (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, l997). P. 64.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid. Herlihy cites as the source for this: Jacques Chiffoleau, “La Compabilite de l’au-dela: Les Hommes,
La Mort et la Religion dans la Region d’Avignon a la fin du Moyen Age (Rome: Ecole Francaise, l980).
23
Christian Jedan, “Overcoming the Divide between Religious and Secular Values”, Introductory Essay to
Christian Jedan (ed.) Constellations of Value: European Perspectives on the Intersection of Religion, Politics
and Society (Verlag, 2013), p. 5.
24
Ibid.
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approach to life, and has to some degree tried to leave behind the sterile, theocratic
worldview of the recent past.
This is the view, for example, of Francesco De Sanctis.25 Moreover, according to De
Sanctis, the emphasis on sensuality, almost ridiculing medieval piety26was already present
and established in the Italian spirit (many think Italy always took its religion with a few
grains of realism and salt anyway--as opposed to the more dour Northern variants of
Christianity). De Sanctis writes: “the book seemed to respond to something in people’s souls
which had been wanting to come out for a long time…”27 It was, he says, “a time of
transition.” Yet, on the other hand, and admitting the truths in this incisive analysis, we must
remember also that the Decameron was written against the backdrop of the Black Death, the
horrors of which Boccaccio himself vividly describes in the Proem. Perhaps going through
the horrors of the plague functioned as a catharsis for the Italian people--ironically not as
part of a pattern of moral disintegration, but instead as part of the progress from crisis to
renewal. Yet Decameron was nevertheless still a reaction to an epic crisis, and in such times
of crisis, value systems are questioned and often rejected.
Reactions to catastrophe are complicated and many-faceted. Of course we know that most
citizens of medieval Europe retained their religious beliefs in the wake of the plague and
many might even have increased in the intensity of their religious belief, as often happens
during desperate times. Herlihy thus describes in detail “flamboyant movements of penance”
such as the flagellants who “stripped to the waist and whipped themselves with knotted
cords”28, scourging themselves in expiation for their own sins and those of society.”29
Religious explanation was still the overarching conceptual framework of the time, the basic
prism or conceptual framework through which all human experience was inevitably filtered.
And these religious impulses were similarly taken to extremes in these desperate times. On
the other hand, Boccaccio’s text, while certainly illustrating his own personal crisis of faith,
perhaps also reflected a repressed undercurrent of a more radical sort of doubt beginning to
simmer under the surface of medieval civilization itself during this horrific time.
Works such as Decameron are not conceived or written in a vacuum, but often reflect larger
crises on the civilizational level. Interestingly, Pitirim Sorokin uses Decameron as evidence
of the complexity of the phenomenon of civilizational disintegration (that of medieval
Christendom). Sorokin observed that often during this process there occurs a splitting
between ideational and sensate tendencies. He writes:
the soul of the society in the transition will be split into the Carpe Diem on the one
hand and on the other into ideational indifference and negative attitude towards all
See Francesco De Sanctis, “Boccaccio and the Human Comedy” in Mark Musa and Peter Bondanella (ed.
and trans.) The Decameron: Norton Critical Edition (NY: Norton, 1977).
26
F. De Sanctis in Musa and Bondanella (ed.), 216.
27
DeSanctis, 217.
28
Herlihy, Op Cit, 68.
29
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the sensory pleasures. Society itself will be increasingly divided into open, perfectly
cynical sinners with their ‘eat, drink, and love, for tomorrow is uncertain’ and into
the ascetics and saints who will flee the sensory world into a kind of new
refuge…such a split has uniformly occurred in small and great transitions and
especially in the period of the great transitions from one culture to another.
Boccaccio’s Decameron with its hedonistic company, and the medieval flagellants,
mystics and ascetics are the concrete examples of such a split in the transition of the
fourteenth century.30

This “splitting” thus illustrates the complexity of the reactions to the Black Death (and
catastrophes generally) and in all likelihood, the matter was complicated--so much so that
all of these patterns in the realm of psychology and morality were perhaps occurring
simultaneously.
Aporia in the Later Middle Ages
What does all this mean? The widespread, indiscriminate death caused by the plague called
into question the most basic assumptions of Christian Europe and left it in a state of
widespread spiritual aporia. Robert Gottfried writes:
People were traumatized. They lost faith in their own abilities, in the old values, and
if not in God then in the traditional ways in which He had been propitiated. Europe
was plunged in a moral crisis. The old order was collapsing and the new one was
not yet in place.31
At the heart of the moral crisis was also a crisis of understanding and explanation--an
epistemological crisis. What is an epistemological crisis? Alasdair MacIntyre describes this
as “a problem about the rational induction of inferences from premises…to
conclusions…that would enable us to make reasonably reliable predictions.”32 What one
“took to be evidence pointing unambiguously in some one direction now turns out to have
been equally susceptible of rival interpretations”33. MacIntyre continues:
it is not only that an individual may rely on the schemata which have hitherto
informed all his interpretations…and find that he has been led into…error…so that
for the first time the schemata are put in question…but the individual may come to
recognize the possibility of systematically different possibilities of interpretation, or

30

Pitirim Sorokin, The Crisis of Our Age (Oxford: One World Publishing, l992), 301-2.
Robert S. Gottfried, The Black Death: Natural and Human Disaster in Medieval Europe (NY Free Press,
1983). 103.
32
Alasdair MacIntyre, “Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative and the Philosophy of Science” in Why
Narrative? Readings in Narrative Theology , eds. Stanley Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones (Eurgene Oregon,
Wipf & Stock, l997). 138.
33
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the existence of alternative…schemata which yield mutually incompatible accounts
of what is going on.34
Or, perhaps more to the point of this pre-modern situation (as opposed to the “post-modern”
one MacIntyre describes), the epistemological crisis was even more dire. The dominant
religious interpretation (in which there exists a coherent moral order or overarching cosmic
justice) had been called into question by the indiscriminate nature of the plague, yet there
were no other rival explanations to confront, no larger set of alternative explanations among
from which to choose. Moreover, there were no coherent or convincing scientific
explanations at the time. One couldn’t even find another alternative explanation, so there
was basically no coherent understanding or explanation of the event at all.
The Spectre of Cosmic Disorder
Perhaps in its starkest form, catastrophes like the Black Death raised (and still raise) the
prospect of the complete lack of a cosmic order and any moral justice in the universe. This
theme goes back much further than medieval times; it paradoxically goes back to the Bible
itself. Consider the following quote from the Book of Job, as Job, by all accounts a righteous
and religions man, loses inexplicably everything he has in the blink of an eye. In the midst
of his inexplicable suffering, Job laments of God: “It is all one. He destroys wicked and
blameless alike.”35
This astonishing exclamation by Job helps us understand how it must have felt to experience
not merely the wholesale nature of death through the plague but its indiscriminate nature as
well. In fact, the quote suggests the entire cosmic order or system of divine justice that
religion is built upon either has been somehow overthrown, or perhaps it never really existed
in the first place. Perhaps the universe is simply amoral, and things just happen as they must,
regardless of any human concerns, any discernible patterns of human behavior or any
considerations of morality whatsoever.36
Let’s look at this more closely and how this is played out in the case of the Black Plague,
specifically with regard to the indiscriminate nature of the plague’s destruction. One
illustration of this indiscriminateness is that there apparently were higher rates of mortality
among the clergy than among the general population, especially in England.37 Clergy
generally were among those who ministered to the sick and dying, so this might make sense,
yet it on the other hand revealed to many the fundamental impotence of the clergy and the
church in the face of this crisis. Moreover, in a great many cases, priests actually abandoned
their sick flocks to save themselves. Although priests generally would have been thought
to exist on a higher spiritual plane than the average citizen, (though perhaps there has always
34
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been some cynicism on this score) the abandonment of their flocks by many clergymen
caused many citizens to further question the moral integrity of the clergy, and the anger of
the masses began to simmer.38 Gottfried writes:
Many parish priests fled, leaving no one to offer services, deliver last rites and
comfort the sick. Flight might have been intellectually explicable, but it was morally
inexcusable.39
Pitirim Sorokin, in Man and Society in Calamity, devotes a chapter to how calamities affect
the spiritual life of society. He cites A.M. Campbell’s The Black Death and Men of Learning
to furnish examples of how the demoralization of clergy was decried by a number of
chroniclers during this time, e.g., John of Reading’s lament that many mendicant priests
have “become unduly rich through confessions” and were now “seeking after earthly and
carnal things,” or the Archbishop of Canterbury’s charge that the priests “now desire
voluptuous pleasures to such an extent that souls are neglected and churches and chapels are
empty.”40 This priestly abandonment of their flocks and general bad behavior paved the way
for further skepticism of the masses towards the clergy itself, as phenomenon which in turn
helped the eventual cause of Wycliff, Luther and the Reformation. This is relevant further
as the Reformation helped usher in, according to Hermann Broch, “the dissolution of values”
characteristic of modernity, which it seems to me we still face today in post-modernity.
Broch writes:
In the Renaissance, that criminal and rebellious age, the unified Christian worldview
was broken in two halves, one Catholic and one Protestant. With the falling asunder
of the medieval organon, a process of dissolution destined to go on for five centuries
was inaugurated and the seeds of the modern world were planted.41
In this sense, the Black Plague contributed to the Reformation, the decline of religious
authority, and the general erosion of the values of medieval civilization as it had traditionally
been known.
David Herlihy also discusses another important aspect of the widespread perception of
cosmic disorder--how it impacted fundamental debates in late medieval philosophy. Herlihy
notes how St. Thomas Aquinas’ thought, perhaps the dominant philosophical system of this
time, “argued that the universe possessed an underlying order, and that the human intellect
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could achieve at least a partial understanding of its structure.”42 Yet Herlihy reports how
Aquinas’ late medieval critics, the nominalists, “claimed that he was wrong on both
counts.”43
According to this nominalist perspective, “the human intellect had not the power to penetrate
the metaphysical structures of the universe. It could do no more than observe events as they
flowed.”44 Again, of course, this viewpoint did not entail the wholesale rejection of religious
belief, as the nominalists (like the other major schools of medieval European thought) were
always thoroughgoing theists. Yet the nominalists still had to reconcile their religious beliefs
with “the experience of plague--unpredictable in its appearance and…unknowable in its
origins, yet destructive in its impact.”45 Herlihy describes how the conception of God put
forth by these late medieval critics of Aquinas involved an interesting view of divine
omnipotence. This divine omnipotence “meant in the last analysis that there could be no
fixed order. God could change what He wanted when He wanted. The nominalists looked
on a universe dominated by arbitrary motions,” and thus their criticism of Aquinas was
“consonant with the disordered experience of late medieval life.”46
Boccaccio’s Lessons for Modernity
It might be interesting to now view in more depth this state of affairs from a more modern
philosophical lens. The larger questions here are these: what happens to a civilization when
its most basic assumptions and values are ripped asunder? What were the symptoms of the
values crisis engendered by the Black Death, and how did this crisis help usher in the
eventual disintegration of medieval European civilization? And how did this values crisis
reveal the problem of nihilism, in my view still the most important moral question facing
humanity today?
Is Decameron in some important sense a nihilistic work? After all, Boccaccio’s depiction
of the Black Death with its indiscriminate destruction, chronicled the dissolution of a
number of basic Christian values. Or is it rather (to paraphrase Patrizia McBride writing on
modernity specifically through the writings of Robert Musil) that such crises with their
revealing of the indiscriminate, relentless nature of death and suffering “merely provide the
conditions” through we can somehow see that a coherent moral order “never really existed
in the first place?”47 And if the latter option is true, how can we deal with this? Nietzsche,
the first thinker of modernity to deal comprehensively with the problem of nihilism, argues
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the problem of nihilism arises when “the problem of why receives no answer”48. The
questioner (in this case the survivor of catastrophe) experiences only a deafening cosmic
silence. But Nietzsche seems somewhat unclear on some other key points here. He suggests
at one point that nihilism arises when values devalue themselves and no longer hold 49. But
elsewhere he suggests that the problem is that human beings seek “meaning in events that is
simply not in them”50, and then attempt to fabricate this meaning “solely out of
psychological needs”51. But exactly what are these psychological needs?
This is a complicated question, but basically we need the events in our lives to make sense
in order to survive psychologically and spiritually in this world52. It is a basic human need
to make sense of things. An unintelligible world is for many an unlivable one.
But what happens when events don’t make sense, and we have no scientific, psychological,
religious or philosophical tools at our disposal to help us make sense out of the events?
Survivors are then left bereft in the aftermath of catastrophe; without a guiding set of
coherent and consistent principles or values, they are then at a loss to explain properly the
events, integrate them, predict future events, and/or put the entire situation into a larger
context. Long standing values and cultural assumptions have proven themselves ineffective,
but they have not yet been replaced with new ones. A spiritual void or aporia is thus what is
revealed during moments of moral crisis, and as this aporia becomes more widespread and
more pervasive in the collective consciousness of a civilization, it increasingly becomes a
relevant factor in the process of this civilization’s gradual disintegration--until which time a
new moral paradigm is somehow eventually put in its place.
The lessons of Decameron are important for us to learn because the human need for a
coherent guiding value system is still the central philosophical question of our postmodern
age. After all, we currently are living at the dawn of the twenty-first century. What lessons
can we apply from the devastation of the Black Death, an event that occurred in such a
completely different time and place than our own today? Is it even possible to make
intelligible comparative judgments (e.g., the comparative study of civilizations), given the
considerable foreignness of the world-picture of medieval Christendom as compared with
our own, postmodern civilization? I believe that human nature, if there is such a thing,
probably doesn’t change dramatically over different times and places. Given certain similar
conditions, human beings feel (as they always have and always will) emotions like jealousy,
lust, hopelessness and joy, and they will act and react to stimuli and situations in similar,
often predictable ways. Thus, I believe some important applications apply.
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First, we are beginning to see the rise and spread of another plague or epidemic--the Ebola
outbreak--which may be revisiting many of the issues we have already discussed above. A
recent (May 9, 2015) New York Times article, “Liberia Conquers Ebola, but Faces a Crisis
of Faith” highlights some of these similar themes. The article describes how congregants of
a Liberian church ceremoniously laid hands on an ailing parishioner, and soon thereafter,
“the disease tore through the church, killing eight members, or about a tenth of the
congregation.”53 The article reports that many of these otherwise religious people began to
have “doubts in their minds about God” in large part because “Ebola’s apparent
randomness…took a toll. Scientists believe that some people have a greater resistance to
Ebola, or even immunity. But to church members, the deaths of some, though not others,
challenged their faith.”54
Herlihy discusses similar reactions to the AIDS virus:
Many persons today do not believe what the experts relate about AIDS and its modes
of transmission. They still want infected children taken from schools and contacts
with the sick severely limited. We seem to witness here too a crisis of confidence in
expert opinion, much like the one that occurred in the Middle Ages.55
Of course, some panic in the face of widespread epidemic will perhaps always be a part of
human nature, as most of us fear death, and are still terrified by the fact that all the expertise
and technology we currently possess simply cannot completely protect us and our loved
ones in many such cases.56
Moreover, on the moral level, we who live in the postmodern West are actually experiencing
a “void of ethics” right now. We still have yet to intellectually and spiritually process the
catastrophic events of the twentieth century--perhaps history’s bloodiest century ever. After
the horrors of the twentieth century, what enduring value system can we now ascribe to in
the postmodern West? We may have advanced technology today, but can this technology,
or science generally, ever explain which values we should believe in, and why, in an age
Norimitsu Onishi, “Liberia Conquers Ebola but Faces a Crisis of Faith”, The New York Times, May 9,
2015.
54
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which featured two brutal world wars and culminated in Auschwitz--a scene of mass death
almost incomprehensible in its scale and scope? Further, much postmodern philosophy has
offered us nothing beyond various forms of skepticism and relativism. Mark T. Mitchell
writes:
modernity has reached a dead end. The optimism in which the modern world was
conceived and nurtured has been replaced by a thoroughgoing skepticism that denies
the possibility of making meaningful truth claims, especially as those claims bear on
morality and religion…From a certain vantage this situation might appear a stable
solution to the…bloodletting that moral and religious truth claims spawned. Yet on
another level such a position is simply intolerable, for it is inhuman. It is not possible
to deny for long the very things for which human souls most yearn. If these sorts of
claims are denied…they will invariably assert themselves in perverted and often
violent ways.57
Perhaps the rise of (increasingly violent) religious fundamentalism that we now are
witnessing worldwide is an attempt by some to fill this void of truth and meaning. But it
also seems that in many cases (ISIS, etc.), the fundamentalist cure may be worse than the
disease. We in the West have actually been down this path many times before--consider also
the bloody cycles of Reformation and Counter-Reformation, the wars of religion, mass
killings of “heretics,” witch burnings, etc., that characterized the early modern period on the
European continent, in light not only of the Protestant Reformation but also of the scientific
revolution and other major upheavals of thought. During this time, the poet John Donne
famously wrote of the anomie and spiritual dislocation experienced so acutely by thoughtful
people when “a new philosophy calls all into doubt.” This spiritual dilemma thus reveals to
us another important pattern in the history of civilizations--that with regards to the question
of values in times of crisis, the more things change, the more they remain the same.

Works Cited
Boccaccio, Giovanni, Decameron: Norton Critical Edition (ed, & trans. by Mark Musa
and Peter Bondanella) (NY: Norton, l977).
Berger, Peter, The Sacred Canopy (NY: Image/Doubleday, 1967).
Broch, Hermann, The Sleepwalkers (London: Quartet, l986).
Brown University Decameron Web:
www.brown.edu/Departments/Italian_Studies/dweb/index.php
Mark T. Mitchell,“Polanyi, MacIntyre and the Role of Tradition”, Humanitas, vol. xix, nos 1 & 2, 2006.
www.nhinet.org/mitchell19-1.pdf
57

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2015

45

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 73 [2015], No. 73, Art. 16

Comparative Civilizations Review

41

De Sanctis, Francesco, “Boccaccio and the Human Comedy”, in The Decameron, (ed. &
trans. by Musa & Bondanella).
Gottfried, Robert, The Black Death: Natural and Human Disaster in Medieval Europe
(NY Free Press, 1983).
Hastings, R. Nature and Reason in The Decameron (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, l975).
Oxford Study Bible (Oxford: Oxford University Press, l992).
Herlihy, David, The Black Death and the Transformation of the West (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, l997).
Jedan, Christoph (ed.) Constellations of Value: European Perspectives on the Intersection
of Religion, Politics and Society (Berlin:Verlag: 2013).
Kovatch, Elizabeth, “Locating the Quotidian in Catastrophes and Crises”, Review of
Meiner & Veel, The Cultural Life of Catastrophes and Crises, in KULT –online.
Review Journal for the Study of Culture 38/2014.
MacIntyre, Alasdair, “Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative and the Philosophy of
Science” in Why Narrative? Readings in Narrative Theology, eds. Stanley Hauerwas
and L. Gregory Jones (Eugene, Oregon, Wipf & Stock, l997.
McBride, Patrizia, The Void of Ethics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2006).
Meiner, Carsten & Kristen Veel, (eds.) The Cultural Life of Catastrophes and Crises
(Berlin: DeGruyter, 2012).
Mitchell, Mark T. “Polanyi, MacIntyre and the Role of Tradition”, Humanitas, vol. xix,
nos 1 & 2, 2006. www.nhinet.org/mitchell19-1.pdf
Nietzsche, Friedrich “Will to Power”, trans. by W. Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale, ed. by
W. Kaufmann) NY: Vintage/Random House, l968). p. 9.
Onishi, Norimitsu, “Liberia Conquers Ebola, but Faces a Crisis of Faith”, The New York
Times, May 9, 2015.
Reale Nancy, “Boccaccio’s Decameron: A Fictional Account of Grappling with Chaos”
www.nyu.edu/projects/mediamosaic/literature/BoccaccioDecameron.
Reilly, John “The World after Modernity”, Comparative Civilizations Review, Fall 2003,
120.
Rosner, David J. “Self-Deception and Cosmic Disorder in the Biblical Book of Job”
forthcoming in Cosmos and History, vol. 11, 2015.
Sorokin, Pitirim The Crisis of Our Age (Oxford: One World Publishing, l992). Original
book published 1941.
Sorokin, Pitirim, Man and Society in Calamity (NY: Dutton, l942).
Talbutt, Palmer, Rough Dialectics: Sorokin’s Philosophy of Value (Leiden, NL:
Brill/Rodopi, l998).

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol73/iss73/16

46

Review: Full Issue

42

Number 73, Fall 2015
Brokers of Legitimacy:
Intellectuals And Politics In Early Republican China
Shakhar Rahav
shakhar@research.haifa.ac.il

This article discusses the role of intellectuals in Chinese politics in the twentieth century. I
will argue that intellectuals, particularly what I call political intellectuals, emerged as a
category of identity in the early years of the Republic of China between 1912 and 1927. I
will then try to argue that political intellectuals positioned themselves as brokers of political
legitimacy. Political intellectuals thereby formed a part of a rapidly evolving political culture
at that time, one which saw the emergence of mass politics based on political parties.
The historiography of twentieth-century China tends to depict intellectuals after the 1910s
as wholly different from earlier intellectuals. Standard textbook accounts rarely mention
intellectuals before the 1910s -- with a few outstanding exceptions such as Kang Youwei 康
有為, Liang Qichao 梁啓超, or Zhang Binglin 章炳麟.
Yet after the 1910s the term “intellectuals” surfaces increasingly, and the historiography
describes a greater number of people than ever as intellectuals who intervene in culture and
politics. One might argue that the main thing that changed was not the position of educated
elites in politics but rather their role in writing history and that after 1920 they dominated
much of the history writing, depicting therefore their own social group as crucial to the
events of the time.1 Others might argue that this is merely a matter of terminology.2
While there is much to support these views, they do not preclude an actual change in the
role of intellectuals in society. I therefore propose that not only the historiography changed
after 1919 but also that educated elites did indeed carve a new role for themselves in a
political culture that they helped remold.
My question then can be formulated as follows: what is it that changed in the role Chinese
intellectuals played after 1920?
I will open with a few remarks on the term “intellectual.” Then, I will sketch the role of
educated elites, or intellectuals, in the imperial period, the role before the changes took place
in the waning years of the Qing and the early Republic. I will then argue that in the late
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604–31.
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1910s and early 1920s the role of intellectuals changed as they became what I call “brokers
of political legitimacy.”
Intellectuals
The term “intellectual” was coined at the turn of the twentieth century by nationalist French
thinkers as a pejorative term for supporters of the alleged traitor Alfred Dreyfus. 3 These
thinkers appropriated the term, and it became their identifier. The term has come to denote
social groups and individuals usually based upon their education and occupations that have
to do with abstract thinking. As its history shows us, the term itself originated in a context
of political strife and, perhaps for this reason, the term often retains its association with
politics and with political dissent.
The classical formulation of the intellectual as political dissenter was outlined by Julien
Benda in La Trahison des Clercs, who accused intellectuals of not living up to an ideal of
resistance. For some, the term “intellectual” has come to imply conscientious dissent—
speaking truth to power—in the name of higher ideals.4 We might question whether a term
that originated in such a specific context is universally applicable and whether it accurately
describes different societies.
For the purposes of this essay suffice it to say that much of the scholarship that discusses
intellectuals, in any case, does assume that the term is universally applicable.5 Indeed, the
idea or trope of the loyal intellectual scholar official remonstrating against political power
in the name of higher ideal existed in China as well.
Intellectuals in Imperial China
In order to understand the position of educated elites in Chinese society in the late imperial
period, we must take into account two factors. The first has to do with the institutional setting
within which intellectual elites operated. The second has to do with an ethos that this group
adopted.
Regarding the institutional framework: the relationship of Chinese intellectuals to the state
and their position in society was determined above all by means of the imperial civil service
examination system (keju 科舉). As early as the second century BCE, the Chinese empire
used exams to recruit at least some bureaucrats. Examinations for the civil service began to
be implemented again during the Sui dynasty (581-617); and in the course of the Song
3
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dynasty (960-1279) the examination system became firmly institutionalized as the premiere
channel for attaining government positions. Due to the centralized nature of the Chinese
state passing the exams became the most promising channel to attaining and maintaining
power, status, and wealth. The examination system tested mastery of classical, canonical
texts and commentaries, which were presumed to convey moral principles, which were to
direct governance, and the ability to produce texts in a similarly refined style. There were
different levels of exams, and the success in the highest level of examinations held in the
national capital promised a position in the governmental bureaucracy. Most education in
imperial China was therefore directed toward the civil service exams.
In this system, the pinnacle of scholarly knowledge was therefore identified with
government position, not merely as a scholar, but as an official. The ideal official was a
scholar, and the ideal scholar a dedicated official. The state was ideally taken to be one
whose bureaucracy is composed of scholar-officials, ideally men of worth (junzi 君子) who
implement a moral order. Naturally, many of the most celebrated cultural figures in Chinese
tradition were either officials or had failed to pass the exams. For example, the essayist and
poet Su Dongpo 蘇東坡 (1037-1071) was also an official, whereas the renowned poet Li
Bai 李白 (or Li Po, 712-770) failed the exams.
This leads to the second point I wish to make, that is, there was an ethos that accompanied
the institutional position of intellectuals or educated elites. Ideally, Chinese educated elites
were to serve the state. However, rulers themselves were presumed to draw legitimacy from
the so-called “mandate of Heaven.” Thus, many of the scholar-officials saw themselves as
serving the state, but under the aegis of a yet higher source of legitimacy, or serving the state
but beholden to standards that were not identical with the policies of the reigning court.
This ideal was exemplified in the well-known maxim (Xian tian xia zhi you er you, hou tian
xia zhi le er le先天下之憂而憂, 後天下之樂而樂) coined by the Song dynasty scholar-official Fan
Zhongyan 范仲淹 (989-1052): “Be the first to worry about the worries of the world, the
last to take pleasure in its pleasures.”
This maxim itself is cited to this day by Chinese intellectuals as a justification or explanation
for their actions, views, and position in the society.6
The ideal of serving the state so as to benefit the society by imparting moral principles to
the ruler (not as a scholar-official but as an independent adviser) was exemplified by the
ancient scholar Mencius (Mengzi, 孟子) in the text that bears his name. Most of the Mencius
consists of dialogues between the itinerant scholar (though not an official) Mencius, and
kings of kingdoms in the pre-imperial period. In these texts Mencius remonstrates with the
6

For the persistence of this image, which is also self-serving, see for example Davies, Worrying About China
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), p.17 and passim; Perry Link, Evening Chats in Beijing: Probing
China’s Predicament (New York: Norton, 1992), p.12 and passim. For an inquiry into late Ming and early
Qing literati as dissidents see Frederic Wakeman Jr. “The Price of Autonomy: Intellectuals in Ming and Ch’ing
China” in in Daedalus Spring 1972.
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kings, calling on them to rule in a just manner, which, he argues, will also be efficacious.
The important point is that Mencius became canonized as one of the four books (四書) which
were fundamental texts in preparing for the exams and were used to teach small children as
well.7 It therefore formed part of the basic curriculum at all educational levels between the
10th and 20th centuries.
The image of the intellectual as one who dissents against a particular regime, often in the
name of the people, persisted far beyond the demise of the imperial examination system and
well into the twentieth century, for example in the events and student protests of spring
1989.8 Recent expressions of this view can be found in the political stances of dissident critic
and winner of the 2010 Noble Peace Prize Liu Xiaobo and the contemporary novelist Yu
Hua, who in a recent collection of essays states “when in this book I write of China’s pain,
I am registering my pain too, because China’s pain is mine.”9
The End of the Imperial Order
However, by the late nineteenth century the relationship between the educated elite and the
imperial court had become frayed due to social, political, and intellectual changes. During
the previous hundred years China had experienced vast rebellions and civil wars (most
notably the Taiping war, 1851-1864), and was challenged by expanding European
imperialism and gunboat diplomacy. Members of the educated elite increasingly viewed the
bureaucratic structure and its intellectual underpinnings as inadequate for addressing
China’s pressing problems. At the same time, alternative routes to social mobility emerged,
most prominently the accumulation of wealth.
Together these developments meant that the status of scholarly learning was eroded and the
linkage between classical learning, the examination system, and the imperial bureaucracy
was weakened. This fraying finally received official institutional recognition when the
examination system was abolished in 1905. It is no coincidence that the imperial regime
itself crumbled in 1911 and it was replaced by a new “Republic of China.”
The new Republic was born with many high hopes among the educated elites. Hopes,
however, soon disintegrated, as political strife emerged and China degenerated -- first into
a dictatorship and then into a weak state partitioned among local strongmen (or warlords),
and finally into a civil war. This period of social ill, however, proved to be a period of great
creativity. Chinese intellectuals, in an attempt to respond to the crises of the times,
7
See Benjamin Elman, A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China (Berkeley, University
of California Press, 2000), pp.79-80. The limits Mencius professed in serving kings sometimes caused
authorized versions of the text to be censored. Ibid, ibid.
8
See, e.g., Merle Goldman et. al. eds. China’s New Intellectuals and the State: In Search of a New Relationship
(Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies Harvard University Press, 1987) Jeffrey Wasserstrom,
Student Protests in Twentieth Century China: The View from Shanghai (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1991), pp.281-283.
9
Yu Hua, China in Ten Words, Allan H. Barr trans. (New York: Pantheon Books, 2011), ix.
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experimented with various schemes for ordering the state and society along with the new
ways of defining their own position in Chinese society.
In a period dubbed in retrospect “the May Fourth Movement” (parts of which were called
the “New Culture Movement”), Chinese intellectuals enthusiastically explored foreign
cultures and ideas. Intellectuals now translated, read, and discussed ideas in a plethora of
fields, from science to music, to health, family, gender relations, sports and physical fitness,
theology, and politics. This explosion of intellectual exploration was enabled by a growing
readership and a growing publishing industry, primarily in the form of periodicals. These
periodicals varied in circulation and in scope from several dozens to around 16,000. Some
periodicals sustained publication for several years, while others published a mere handful of
issues or even a single issue before collapsing or being shut down.10
Another crucial venue for these discussions and explorations were small cultural-political
societies that sprang up in urban centers across China. This intellectual and cultural
fermentation climaxed in the summer of 1919 during “The May Fourth Movement” when
students, merchants, and other urbanites took to the streets to protest increasing Japanese
incursions into China and the ratification of these incursions by the Versailles Conference.
Intellectuals levelled criticism at the policies of the weak, putative national government, and
the warlords who dominated most of China. Moreover, they launched fierce attacks on
traditional values and institutions—such as filial piety, the traditional family structure, and
Neo-Confucian thought—which they saw as responsible for China’s crises.11 These
criticisms were very much informed by the study of foreign ideas, state and society as well
as of social order.
Educated elites debated the merits of different views of social order, introduced these views
to the right audience where possible, and even tried to implement them. The most noted
examples of the study of foreign systems of administration, ideology, and politics would be
the interest of Chinese intellectuals in different forms of socialism, liberalism, and
nationalism.
One fine example of the curiosity of intellectual elites and of the eclectic and probing nature
of their inquiries is a young teacher, journalist, and activist named Yun Daiying. In his
journal Yun recorded his readings of Thomas More’s Utopia as well as the Chinese novel
Dream of the Red Chamber (also known as The Story of the Stone).12 When planning a book
series for one of the most important cultural societies of the time (the Young China
Association 少年中國學會), the topics that Yun proposed included Kropotkin and his
10

See for example Chow Tse-tsung, Research Guide to the May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in
Modern China, 1915-1924. (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1963).
11
For example, Wen-hsin Yeh, Provincial Passages: Culture, Space, and the Origins of Chinese Communism
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 174-196.
12
Yun Daiying, Yun Daiying riji (Beijing: Zhongyang danganguan, Zhongguo ge ming bowuguan, Zhonggong
zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1981), pp.88, 114-116 and passim.
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theories, Russell and his theories, Dewey and his theories, Darwin and his theories,
Proudhon and his theories, the materialistic vision of history, democracy, Bolshevism,
experimentalism (試驗主義), foundations of morality, the question of labor, the question of
women, elementary-level village education, research on middle education, anarchism,
Japan, the international movement, and mass psychology.13
The ideological experiments and explorations of educated elites, especially the youth, led to
a new wave of organizations. Now like-minded youth gathered to explore similar cultural
and political interests. Some of these explorations also resulted in the construction of small
communes, though most of which were short-lived.14
In the late teens and early twenties these interests and experiments resulted in a host of small
cultural-political societies diffused across China, mainly in large urban centers such as the
Mutual Aid Society and Benefit the Masses Book Society in Wuhan; the Marxism Study
Society in Beijing; the New Citizen Society in Changsha, of which Mao Zedong was a
member; and the Young China Association. These small societies formed an infrastructure
out of which new political organizations eventually emerged, including such parties as the
Chinese Youth Party (Qingnian dang 青年黨), the Nationalist Party (國民黨), and the
Communist Party (共產黨). These parties shaped China in the twentieth century and have
remained central to Chinese politics to this day; the Communist Party still rules China
whereas the Nationalist Party, although it now operates in a democracy, remains a major
factor in Taiwanese politics and currently holds power.
The emergence of Chinese political intellectuals then is closely tied to the appearance of
mass political parties, that is, parties claiming to speak in the name of the masses or the
people. As such they have based their claim to authority on their representing the best
interests of the people or the nation.15
Brokers of Legitimacy
In China’s post-imperial political chaos one acute problem that not only actual contenders
for political power such as politicians and warlords but also all those who had an interest in
politics or in national affairs have faced was the absence of a clear source of political
legitimacy.

13

Shaonian zhongguo, vol.1, no. 11, May 1920, p.55.
For example the “new village movement” that took root in 1919 and 1920 and led to several urban
communes, such as the Beijing Work Study Mutual Aid Corps [Beijing gongdu huzhu tuan], the Morning
Garden Scoeity [Xi Yuan], or the Wuhan Benefit the Masses Book Society [Liqun shushe]. I elaborate on
some of these groups in “A May Fourth Peach Garden” in Twentieth Century China, November 2007; “Yun
Daiyng and the Rise of Political Intellectuals in Modern China”, Ph.D. dissertation, Berkeley 2007.
15
Political parties appeared in China during the 1910s as well. These, however, were mostly small and elitist
organizations that were designed to leave power in the hands of their members rather than to recruit lay people
and mobilize the masses.
14
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The absence of a clear and agreed-upon source of political legitimacy had also to do with a
crisis of identity. Historian Joseph Levenson highlighted the dilemmas of Chinese
intellectuals of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as they struggled to
determine their own identities.16 For the problem, as Levenson pointed out, was not simply
a matter of describing oneself but of searching for a morally acceptable basis for one’s
identity; in other words, consolidating a foundation for one’s identity that he or she would
see as legitimate.
In the small cultural-political societies of the time, educated young men and occasionally
women cultivated their moral identities. These identities provided the basis and legitimacy
for a critique of politics and society, a critique that was based on these youngsters’ sense of
their own moral rectitude. Relying on their image and aspiration to be moral paragons, and
on the historical legacy of the role of educated elites under the imperial regime, young
intellectuals felt justified in positioning themselves as social critics who adjudicated the
legitimacy of ideas, policies, and politicians. At the same time they suggested alternative
social and political arrangements. By pointing to alternative possibilities of organizing state
and society, they expanded the political discourse and the political imagination of their
peers. In so doing they were part of the changing political scene, as organizations and
institutions were created to try to embody these ideals. They thus had an essential role in
shaping the emergence of political parties.
Criticisms of the current order along with proposals for alternative orders were made in
speech and writing. As print media circulation grew, its producers gained influence. Writers,
editors, and publishers—the producers of media—therefore rose in importance. May Fourth
left a legacy of significant ties between politics and the press and therefore between politics
and the producers of media. By the mid-1920s the print media had established itself as a tool
for political mobilization.17
Ideological parties, the press, and its producers therefore all grew together. The process by
which they grew also meant a transformation of political culture. Producers of the new media
introduced and developed new cultural and political concepts, thereby assuming a role as
mediators of legitimacy. In the course of the May Fourth movement and the new culture
movement, intellectuals changed from advisers (who due to the civil-service examinations
had been reliant on the state) into brokers of legitimacy, mediating between the contenders
for power—the political parties and the state—and the masses, whose will or support was
invoked as the basis for legitimacy.

16

Joseph R. Levenson, Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: Vol. 1, The Problem of Intellectual Continuity.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968.

Reed, “Advancing the (Gutenberg) Revolution” in Christopher Reed and Cynthia Brokaw eds., From
Woodblocks to the Internet: Chinese Publishing and Print Culture in Transition, circa 1800 to 2008 (Leiden:
Brill, 2010), 275.
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Political power increasingly drew its legitimacy from the putative support of the people, and
therefore sought to mobilize large numbers of people in its support. The 1920s saw larger
numbers of people than ever commenting on political affairs, taking part in demonstrations
and strikes, and increasingly joining political parties.
Conclusion
The more politics involved mass political parties, the more intellectuals constituted an
indelible part of political culture. Intellectuals positioned themselves as what sociologist
Zygmunt Bauman has called “legislators” of social and political norms who make
authoritative statements which arbitrate in controversies of opinions
and which select those opinions which, having been selected, become
correct and binding. The authority to arbitrate is in this case legitimized
by superior (objective) knowledge to which intellectuals have a better
access than the non-intellectual part of society.18
As legislators of social and political norms, intellectuals now became brokers of political
legitimacy. A new political culture was thus constructed in a way which provided for the
interests of its different constituents. Those who aspired to power required intellectuals to
articulate ideas and convey them to the wider public as well as to recruit supporters. The
political public benefitted from intermediaries who could serve as conduits to the leadership
while providing insight into the leadership’s aims. In return, intellectuals themselves gained
power from their position as mediators.
The new role of intellectuals was also reflected in the changing ways in which they referred
to themselves as a distinct social group with its own characteristics and interests.19 Since the
early twentieth century, intellectuals were viewed as constituting a zhishijieji 知識階級—
“intellectual class” (though not in a Marxian sense), a term based on ancient concepts of
occupations. In the 1920s, under the influence of Marxist theory, intellectuals began to refer
to themselves as zhishifenzi 知識份子— which literally means “knowledgeable elements,” a
term that the Communist Party adopted and later became a category of formal
classification.20
18

Zygmunt Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 4-5. This view
is reminiscent of Edward Shils’ view of intellectuals. According to Shils, intellectuals function as mediators
with access to the symbols and values of a society. Shils, “The Intellectuals and the Powers.”
19
For example, May Fourth activist Yun Daiying implicitly and explicitly discussed intelligentsia as distinct
from masses in e.g.: Yun Daiying riji, 328–329 ,332; Yun Daiying, “Geming de jiazhi”, Yun Daiying wenji,
(Beijing: Renmin chuban she, 1984) vol.1, pp.224-227.
20
See Eddy U, “Reification of the Chinese Intellectual: On the Origins of the CCP concept of Zhishifenzi” in
Modern China, 35: 6, 604-631. U examines the terminology; by contrast I am trying here to examine political
significance. Fabio Lanza, Behind they Gate (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010) discusses the
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It should be noted that this change in the position of intellectuals occurred in tandem with
the emergence and growth of many new professions and occupations in China—such as
lawyers, journalists, then academics and scientists—and the change in its labor structure
with the expansion of urban labor (or proletariat) that provided a basis for socialist labor
organizing.21
The emergence of these new social identities, together with the emergence of politically
involved intellectuals resulted in a new political culture, conceived by its components as
composed of a political leadership, an intellectual class, and a mass citizenry which was to
be mobilized, shaped, and recruited. Intellectuals now became the linchpin that connected
people and politics to each other. This role determined the way in which they were
subsequently treated by China’s governments, both Nationalist and Communist.

21

See, e.g.: Xu Xiaoqun, Chinese Professionals and the Republican State: The Rise of Professional
Associations in Shanghai, 1912-1937 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
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Evidence for Belarusian-Ukrainian Eastern Slavic Civilization
Piotra Murzionak
petermurzionak@yahoo.ca
This article argues for the existence of a distinct Eastern European Slavic civilization on
the territories of modern Belarus and Ukraine. One group of Slavs migrated to Eastern
Europe from the fifth century to the ninth century and then, for various reasons, separated
and formed two civilizations – an Eastern Slavic civilization (Belarusian-Ukrainian) and a
Eurasian civilization.
The critical factors for this division were the Mongol-Tatar invasion and the emergence of
the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Principality, which saved Eastern Slavs from “Eurasian
influence.” Belarus and Ukraine share a number of characteristic Western features.
Today it is obvious that including Belarus and Ukraine in the Orthodox, Eastern or
Eurasian/Russian civilization must be revisited. Including the two civilizations as one has
resulted from the prevalence of created myths and misinterpretations of history, such as the
asserted threefold nature of East Slavic people (Great Russians, Little Russians and White
Russians); on the claimed Slavic nature of the Russian Empire; on a supposed historical
continuity between Kievan Rus’ and modern Russia; and on Muscovy’s role in uniting the
Eastern Slavs.
Introduction: Was Rurik in Polotsk -- or who wrote our history for us?
Kievan Rus’ emerged at the end of the ninth century on the territory occupied by the Eastern
Slavs. The term Kievan Rus’ is used by many investigators, both in scholarly and in popular
literature, to refer to the ancient land around Kiev that is today part of Ukraine and, to some
extent, Belarus (Zacharii, 2002; Plochy, 2006). Modern Russia emerged out of the area
known as Muscovy (the territories around Suzdal, Murom, and Rostov).
The change in meaning of Russia-Rus’ began in the early eighteenth century, especially
during the reign of Empress Catherine II (1762-1796). She ordered a history of Russia to
be written that included the Normanist theory of the origin of Rus’ and Tatishchev’s (16861750) and Karamzin’s (1766-1826) histories of Russia. In fact, all these works, as well as
some later ones (Solovyov, 1820-1879), were used to justify the de facto annexation of the
Polish Republic and the 'reunification' of the Eastern Slavs (Great Russians, Little Russians,
and White Russians), confirmation of both the Slavic nature of the Russian Empire, and the
legitimacy of historical continuity from Kievan Rus’ to modern Russia.
For a long time, the history of the Russian state was official in Belarus and Ukraine.
Karamzin’s and Solovyov’s histories of Russia were based on the Normanist theory,
developed by G. F. Mueller (1705-1783), who worked at the Russian Academy of Sciences.
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According to the Normanist theory, a major role in the creation of Kievan Rus’ [not Russia
- PM] was assigned to Scandinavians, Germans and Varangians (Vikings), and these alien
peoples were called “Rus’”. The territory of Rus’ has often been known in the West as
“Ruthenia.”
This theoretical formulation was familiar to people of the region since the end of the
Russian Empire, although Soviet historians were anti-Normanists. There is a political bias
to the topic. Obviously, it was necessary to maintain the Slavic unity of the three nations
that had formed the basis of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, supported
unconditionally in both cases by the Orthodox Church. During the reign of Catherine II, it
was needed to prove the leadership of Scandinavians and Germans in governing the Slavs;
in the Soviet era, between the two world wars, it was necessary to keep the unity of the
Slavic spirit. No wonder that the Second World War saw the release of the film on
Alexander Nevsky who defeated the Teutonic Knights (Germans) on Lake Peipus.
Mikhail Lomonosov did not accept a history of Russia written by German scholars and he
accused Mueller of falsification. Lomonosov believed that the Rus’ hailed from Slavic
lands and they were not Varangians (Bielawski, 1955). Only the first part of the first volume
of Lomonosov’s Ancient Russian History was published posthumously by Mueller, while
Lomonosov’s archives have vanished. It should be noted that Muller managed the archives
of the Academy of Sciences from 1766 until his death. Such was the case also with the
works of Tatishchev, with Mueller posthumously publishing five volumes of Russian
history based on Tatishchev’s notes. Again, as in the case with Lomonosov’ archives, the
Tatishchev manuscripts mysteriously disappeared, along with earlier and now unknown
chronicles on which these manuscripts had been based.
Perhaps it is no coincidence that the ideas contained in such works of Lomonosov are
similar to those of Mueller. So what were they arguing about? That's why it is crucial to
create today an accurate understanding of the actual place of the Eastern Slavic states of
Belarus and Ukraine in the modern world.
The starting point for the Normanist theory was ‘The Tale of Bygone Years’ or ‘The
Chronicle of Nestor’. For more on Normanists, neo-Normanists, and anti-Normanists see
the historical reviews of Zakharii, 2002, Klein, 2009). The Tale of Bygone Years (Povest'
Vremyan'nykh Let) (PVL), which dates back to 1113, was written by a monk named Nestor,
and perhaps not only by him (Pihio, 1981), based on lost chronicles, legends, and Byzantine
documents.
The first mention of the Slavs in PVL dates them back to 862. This means that the chronicle
was written more than 250 years after the events it was describing could possibly have
taken place. PVL tells of the arrival of the Vikings/Varangians, whom the Slavs had invited
to reign over them. Three semi-mythical brothers (Rurik, Truvor, and Sineus) began to
rule in Novgorod, Izborsk, and Beloozero in 862.
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However, there is no further information on the latter two brothers anywhere. Moreover,
the current reading of PVL gives the following explanation of the names 'Rurik, Sineus, en
Truvor' as 'Rurik, his relatives and companions' ('Rurik, sine hus, en tro(gna) vär (ingar),'
Scand.; 'Rurik, his house/relatives, and true companions, Eng. (Katsva, Yurganov, 1996).
Catherine II, who certainly believed this theory, even commanded a medal in honor of
Truvor; on the front side of that medal was an imaginary portrait of Rurik, and on the back,
the Truvor mound and the inscription: “Before this day is memorable,” and below “Truvor
died in Izborsk in 864.” Perhaps nobody of that name existed, but there was a medal struck.
As for Rurik himself, the original version of his sojourn in Novgorod was not confirmed.
Given that modern Novgorod, according to archaeological research, appeared only in the
second half of the tenth century, the principality of Beloozero (“White Lake”), where
'Sineus' might have ruled, did not even exist at that time.
There is a hypothesis that Rurik, in contrast, founded his settlement on the shores of Lake
Ladoga, but, again, so far there is no evidence for this. Rurik, like Truvor and Sineus, may
have been a fictional character. Therefore, it is a major question whether there was a man
named Rurik in the late ninth century. But thanks to Mueller this idea was taken up by
Russian historians, and Prince Rurik and his successors reigned in Muscovy until the end
of the sixteenth century. Karamzin wrote that Rurik came to Novgorod, Sineus to the
Finnic Ves in Beloozero, and Truvor to Izborsk, the city of the Krivichi. Smolensk, also
populated by Krivichi, and Polotsk itself still remained independent, and they had no
involvement with Vikings.
Consequently, the power of the three rulers, connected by ties of kinship and reciprocity,
extended only from Beloozero to Estonia, where we can still see the monumental ruins of
the old Izborsk fortress, not far from the contemporary border between Russia and Estonia.
This part of the current St. Petersburg, Estonia, Novgorod and Pskov provinces was then
called Rus', named after the Scando-Russian Princes. Two years after the deaths of Sineus
and Truvor (864) the elder brother, Rurik, attached their areas to his principality and
founded the Russian Monarchy.
Thus, at a time when neither Moscow, Beloozero, Novgorod, nor maybe even Truvor,
Sineus, or Rurik, actually existed, in Karamzin’s interpretation they more or less founded
a Russian Monarchy, and Karamzin himself called a certain territory 'Rus' for the first time.
Yet, neither the PVL nor Karamzin’s history mention Polotsk or Smolensk as cities that
invited the Varangians to reign. In addition, Karamzin wrote that Polotsk was independent,
i.e., he acknowledged that the city had its own history, independent from the history of
Kiev and moreover from Russian history, where automatically, due to the imperial
'traditions' of the Russian Empire, the history of Kievan Rus’ is included.
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We can also find a free interpretation of the PVL in Solovyov’s history; there, Polotsk was
independent according to Karamzin, and according to Solovyov the ‘Polochans in the south'
were already under the authority of Rurik.
It is doubtful that the arrival of a few Vikings could have had more than a superficial effect
on the development of the Slavic tribes that had lived there for a long time. Although there
is a hypothesis that they controlled the trade route 'from the Varangians to the Greeks',
Scandinavian colonies seemed 'islands in the sea of the Krivichi of Polotsk, the Slovene of
Novgorod, or the Polyane of Kiev. (Kotlyarchuk, 2002).
There are many contradictions in the interpretation of the past by Russian historians, but
these history tales, using documentary material, lead the reader to the main idea that
Russia’s statehood began with Rurik and Kiev.
The free interpretation of the most famous and ancient Eastern Slavic chronicles, even if
written with deviations, is one thing. But by contrast, the record of this historically
fundamental chronicle (PVL) was repeatedly rewritten and reworked.
For example, since the reign of Vladimir Monomakh (1113-1125, from whom the line of
Muscovy’s Rurikid princes descend) in Kiev, the PVL had been crafted by the monk
Sylvester and other scribes in the Monomakhs' interests (first in Kiev, then in Novgorod
during the reign of Monomakh’s son Mstislav). See Cross, Sherbowitz-Wetzor, 1953,
Talochka PP, and Talochka OP, 1998.
So there appeared new PVL editions which were later included in the Laurentian (1377)
and Hypatian (early fifteenth century) chronicles, and that information, supplemented with
additional explanations, was included in Russian history textbooks.
One cannot deny that the PVL and its later versions are important documents reflecting
simultaneous or related changes and accretions.
However, the constantly changing examples of past events, as well as later ones distributed
worldwide (the trinity of the three eastern Slavic peoples, the Slavic character of the
Russian state, the historical continuity from Kievan Rus’ to modern Russia, the role of
Muscovy in unifying the Eastern Slavs) all suggest the necessity for a more critical reading
of the previous history and the identification of the true events in Belarus and Ukraine,
especially given the contextual analysis of those who were favored by the myths created.
Migration and demarcation of the East Slavic tribes
There are several theories of the origin of the Eastern Slavs, starting from that they came
from the Scythians or Goths, that they had always been living in nearly the same territories
which they currently occupy, and, finally, that they gradually migrated from the regions of
central Europe to the South, East, and partly to the North.
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It is now believed that the Slavs emerged over a fairly large area, stretching from the Oder
in the West to the Danube in the South, and all the way to the Dnieper in the East (Curta,
2001; Geary, 2003). The Eastern Slavs probably migrated in the fifth through the seventh
centuries from the Elbe (now Pomerania in Germany) and Vistula areas to the territories
they currently occupy.
However, some researchers consider it unlikely that the Slavic tribes were able to occupy
the territory of the Eastern and central-Eastern Europe in such a short period of time,
especially because the Slavs were farmers and, therefore, led a life that was tied to the land
they occupied (Halsall, 2006).
So perhaps, it was the second wave of Slavic migrants who joined the Slavs who had
already settled there, in the new lands, earlier, in the fifth through the seventh centuries.
According to Shakhmatov (1919) Slavic tribes from the Elbe and Vistula moved from west
to east in two groups. The western group, gradually moving to the north, northeast and east,
occupied the territory of present-day Belarus and the Pskov, Novgorod, and Smolensk
areas. The second, moving south and southeast, gradually settled the territory of modern
Volhynia, Ukraine, and the Carpathians. Thus, the Slavs had gradually occupied the
territory which later historians called Kievan Rus’.
However, by the period of settlement and under Kievan Rus’ the division of the Eastern
Slavs into groups by language had not yet emerged. The Eastern Slavs of the pre-Kievan
and Kievan periods (Rus’, Rusyns, and Ruthenians) can be assigned to one ethnonationality (Plokhy, 2006). But the start of their split can be seen as early as the latter
period, and it is conceivable that this process may have become clearer with the collapse
of Kievan Rus’.
Eastern Slavs are divided into tribes based on archaeological and other studies. It is
believed that to northwest Eastern Europe came such tribes as the Dregovichi, Drevlyane,
Duleby, Krivichi, and Polochane peoples, who were then assimilated by the existing Baltic
tribes. Indeed, some authors argue for the Baltic theory of the Belarusians’ origin
(Dzermant, Sanko, 2005; Deruzhynsky, 2009; Goldenkov, 2009). The Slavs who reached
Kiev and border areas (Drevlyane, Polyane) were assimilated by the Sarmatians and gave
rise to the modern Ukrainians.
The Slavic tribes (Ilmen and Novgorod Slavs, Krivichi, Radimichi, and Severjane) who
later moved to the north, northeast and east, reaching the territories occupied by FinnoUgric tribes, gave rise to another East Slavic branch, later called Great Russians (people
who occupy the land of what became known in the rest of the world as “Russia proper”,
i.e., the land that formed the basis of Muscovy and, then, Russia).
The north and eastwards movements of the Slavic tribes were constrained by both natural
factors such as unsuitability for agriculture (forests, grasslands, cold climate), and by their
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lack of sufficient numerical preponderance in order not to be assimilated by the FinnoUgric tribes who occupied these territories (Mordovians, Merya, Ves, Meshchera,
Muroma).
One passage in the PVL indicated that there were tribes speaking non-Slavic languages:
these included the Chud, Merya, Ves, Muromians, Cheremissians, Mordovians, Permians,
Pechora, Iam, Lithuanians, Zemigalians, Kors, Narva, and Livs (in Russian: чудзь, меря,
весь, мурома, чарамісы, мардва, перм, пячера, ям, літва, зімігола, корсь, нарова,
лівы). They lived by the lakes (Rostov, Beloozero, Kleshchyna) and the Oka river and
paid tribute to Rus’, which means that the Slavs from Novgorod region and the Dnieper,
coming to the North-Eastern lands, inevitably were assimilated with non-Slavic tribes.
Assimilation of the 'Great Russian Slavs' by those tribes (the first wave of assimilation)
was one of the reasons for the subsequent separations of the Eastern Slavs. This indicates
that the split of Eastern Slavs into 'Belarusians, Ukrainians, and Great Russians' did not
happen in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but started much earlier, even
before the collapse of Kievan Rus’.
Internecine war as a reason for separation of Eastern Slavs
Feudal fragmentation was one of the reasons not just for the collapse of Kievan Rus’, but
also the prerequisite for further ethno-national division of the Eastern Slavs.
Kievan Rus’ was not united. It had three centers (Kiev, Polotsk, and Novgorod) constantly
at war and struggling for supremacy. The wars did not contribute to the unity of the Slavs;
on the contrary, multiplied by tribal characteristics, they led to local concentrations of
population around the local leaders and traditions, control over the occupied territories, and
the emergence of new ethnic groups with the development of linguistic differentiation.
The documented history of Kievan Rus’ begins with the reign of Prince Igor (912-945).
However, there is no evidence that he was the son of Rurik, apart from the description in
the PVL. Obviously, Prince Igor existed, and he had a father who has gone down in history
under the name of Rurik, and from whom many Rurikids originated, including the line of
Muscovite princes and tsars. The main point is that he was the prince of Kiev who
extended its influence over the lands inhabited by Slavs.
Was Kievan Rus’ strong during Prince Igor's reign? If we accept that Prince Igor mounted
two campaigns against Constantinople, it is possible that the principality of Kiev was
beginning to be established, albeit still heavily dependent on the powerful trading kingdom
of the Khazars, a longtime Turkish buffer state between the Byzantines and the Umayyad
Caliphate which flourished for three centuries between 650 and 950 and that became
Jewish.
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Certainly, in the middle of the ninth century, the Khazars controlled the territory south of
a line drawn from Smolensk to Murom, and ruled over Kursk, Chernigov, and Kiev. All
these cities paid tribute to the Khazars. Even after 967, the Khazars’ defeat at the hands of
Prince Svyatoslav I of Kiev (Igor's son), and his capture of Itil, their capital, did not protect
Kiev from further clashes with the Pechenegs, the successors of the Khazars. It is from that
moment that we can talk about the beginning of the flowering of Kievan Rus’ during the
reign of Prince Svyatoslav (945-972), Princess Olga (945-969, as regent), the brothers
Princes Yaropolk (972-980) and Vladimir (980-1015), and Yaroslav the Wise (1019-1054).
It is believed that during the reign of Yaroslav the Wise, the population of Kievan Rus’
totaled about 7.8 million. Yaroslav’s power was especially strong in the principalities
closest to Kiev, such as Chernigov, Pereyaslav, and Galicia. At the same time, we should
not conclude that Kievan Rus’ as a whole was a real feudal power.
Why? Polotsk kept its independence and specific position, among the three centers - Kiev,
Polotsk, and Novgorod. Yaroslav the Wise was the Prince of Kiev, Novgorod, and Rostov,
but not the Prince of Polotsk. So was Polotsk ruled by Kiev? The first known prince of
Polotsk was Rogvolod (920-978). According to one hypothesis, Rogvolod was one of the
Varangians (Orlov, 2005); another hypothesizes that he was the son of Princess Predslava
of Polotsk who came to the throne after his mother's death, returning to her ancestral lands
'from overseas' (Ermolovich, 1990).
Prince Rogvolod and his family were destroyed by Kievan Prince Vladimir
Svyatoslavovich, who went on to become king of Kievan Rus’. Vladimir was very tough
and during the struggle for power he killed his brother Yaropolk while the latter was the
Grand Prince of Kiev. The daughter of the Prince of Polotsk, Princess Rogneda, became
Vladimir’s prisoner and then his wife at age 13 and gave birth to Princes Izyaslav (Prince
of Polotsk 988-1001), Yaroslav the Wise (Grand Prince of Kiev 1019-1054), Vsevolod
(Prince Vladimir-Volyn), Mstislav (Prince of Chernigov and Tmutarakan), Princess
Predslava (married to the Czech Prince Boleslav III) and Pramislava (married to the
Hungarian Prince Ladislas the Bald).
Even if we consider only Yaroslav the Wise, who reigned in Kiev for 35 years, we can note
the significant role played by Princess Rogneda in the formation of Kievan Rus’. If
Vladimir is considered the godfather of Kievan Rus’, Princess Rogneda is the mother of
Kievan Rus’. As Prince of Polotsk (986-1001), their son Izyaslav continued to pursue the
policy of independence of Kiev that started by his grandfather, Prince Rogvolod.
Yermolovich’s 1990 monograph documents that there was no decade where Polotsk was
not at war with either Novgorod or Kiev. The Principality of Polotsk saw its greatest
flowering during the reign of Vseslav the Seer (1044-1101). For a short period (1068-1069),
he even reigned in Kiev. Many researchers now believe that in the ninth through the
thirteenth centuries, the Principality of Polotsk was the first form of statehood on
Belarusian territory.
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Thus, except for the short period of Prince Vladimir’s attack on Polotsk, we can assume
that Kiev did not control the activities of the Principality of Polotsk. In other words, all
Rurik did was cast a shadow over Polotsk. This independence of Polotsk from Kiev is a
positive factor, or if you will, a valid reason for Belarusians not to participate fully in the
struggle for the full heritage of Kievan Rus’ now underway between Ukraine and Russia.
Historically, there were constant wars between other principalities of Kievan Rus’. As a
result, this feudal structure fell apart after the death of Yaroslav the Wise in 1054. The land
was divided into small principalities among his sons, who began quarrels that signaled the
beginning of the disintegration of Kievan Rus’. The actual struggle for the throne of Kiev
also contributed significantly to this (the continuity of the position of Prince of Kiev is one
of the fundamental issues of historical disputes involving Kievan Rus’ and Russia).
Power transferred in Kiev according to seniority, i.e., from highest to lowest in the whole
clan, and not from father to son. In 1093, the eldest prince Svyatopolk Izyaslavich of Turov,
a cousin of Vladimir Monomakh (1053-1125) took power. After Svyatopolk’s death in
1113, the Kiev throne by right of seniority was claimed by Svyatoslav’s sons. However,
their cousin Vladimir Monomakh, a top military leader, ascended the throne instead.
According to Russian historians, this event was at the invitation of the elders and with the
consent of the people of Kiev. What is significant is that from the time of Vladimir
Monomakh, the rotation system governing changes of power was broken.
The violation of the rules of heritage led to the war between the sons of Oleg of Chernigov,
the sons of Monomakh from Pereyaslavl, the sons of Izyaslav from Turov/Volhynia, and the
Princes of Polotsk.
Over 45 years, from 1125 to 1169, the throne in Kiev changed hands twenty-one times.
Some of them, after a hard struggle, had sat on that throne three times (e.g., Yuriy
Dolgorukiy, son of Vladimir Monomakh, Izyaslav Davidovich, Rostislav Mstislavich, and
Vyacheslav Vladimirovich). Even the sons of ‘Oleg’ of Chernigov, Igor and Vsevolod
Olegovich (1139-1146), were able to prove their right to the throne of Kiev.
Although it is written in Russian sources, they (the sons of Oleg) forced Monomakh’s
descendants to recognize their right. See the first and fourth chapters of Solovyov’s History
of Russia from Ancient Times ('On the prince's relationship at all' and 'Events involving the
great-grandchildren of Yaroslav'; Volume 1) regarding the cause of these quarrels.
The descendants of Vladimir Monomakh personally undertook the literal destruction of the
city of Kiev in 1169: Kiev was destroyed by the army of Andrew Bogolyubsky, Prince of
Rostov-Suzdal, (grandson of Vladimir Monomakh and the son of Yuri Dolgorukiy, the
founder of Moscow) and then in 1203, Kiev was sacked by Rurik Rostislavich (greatgrandson of Monomakh -- who had married three times -- by his second line), together with
the sons of Oleg and including the Polovtsians. (It should also be remembered that Rurik
Rostislavich held the great Kiev throne six times at various intervals.) Then finally, at the
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end of 1240, Kiev was seized and destroyed by Batu Khan’s invading Mongol armies. They
massacred most of the population of the city, and then proceded on their way to capture
much of Europe.
Thus, the strife between the principalities of Kievan Rus’ was one of the main factors in its
disintegration. The collapse of Kievan Rus’ led to the strengthening of existing centers and
the created conditions for the development of new eastern Slavic centers with their own
specific features. The separate nature and independence of the Principality of Polotsk (the
predecessor of the future Belarusian State) became even stronger, as did that of the
principality of Volyn-Galich (the precursor of the future Ukrainian State). In the same
period, the Republic of Novgorod (1136) was formed with limited power given princes, as
well as the principality of Vladimir-Suzdal (1157), the first North-Eastern Duchy, which
became the nucleus of the future Muscovy, on the territory of the Finno-Ugric tribes. But
that was nearly 200 years after the establishment of the principalities of Polotsk and Kiev.
The Mongol invasion and the formation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania - the main
factors distinguishing the Eastern Slavs
The migration of the Eastern Slavs south and south-east of Kiev was impossible, not
because of the endless, agriculturally unfriendly steppes, but because the steppes were
longtime centers of activity and control by the nomads. The Black Sea - Caspian steppe
joins the Kazakh steppe, and thus becomes part of the vast Eurasian steppe. For thousands
of years, warlike tribes of nomads moved across the steppes from east to west, and even
reached and occupied significant regions of Europe. There were Scythians (700-200 AD),
the Sarmatians (200 BC -200 AD), the Huns (370 - 453 AD), the Alans (500-1100 AD)
Avars (600-800 AD), the Khazars (600-1000 AD), and later the Pechenegs (800-1100 AD),
Kipchaks and Cumans (1100-1300), and Genghis Khan’s Mongols (1300-1500)
(Riazanovsky, 1993).
According to some Russian historians (most notably L. Gumilev, the classic Eurasianist),
the nomads and the steppes played a huge role in the further establishment and development
of Russia. The Mongol-Tatar invasion was one of the key factors dividing the Eastern
Slavs into two civilizations – Eastern Slavs/Belarusian-Ukrainian civilization and
Eurasian/Russian civilization.
This line between civilizations is readily apparent if one follows territories captured by the
Mongol Empire. The former remained free of the invaders from the Eurasian steppe, while
the latter were reduced to the status of vassals. The defining feature of the Mongol
campaign -- relevant to this paper’s civilizational division argument -- was that the Mongols
bypassed principalities located on the territory of modern Belarus and part of Ukraine. As
a result, the Eastern Slavs living in the territory of Belarus and Ukraine, in contrast to the
inhabitants of the Northeast, avoided the empire being established by the Mongols. They
remained apart, avoiding domination by the Turkic peoples.
By the mid-thirteenth century, the Eastern Slavs living in what is now Belarus had come
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under the sway of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL), while the north-eastern and
southern principalities fell under the influence of the Mongols’ Golden Horde khanate.
Thus, Mongols contributed to the separation of the Slavic 'Great Russians' who fell under
their power for two and a half centuries (up to 1480) from other Eastern Slavs, including
'Belarusian' Slavs, free from the Mongols, and 'Ukrainian' Slavs, some of whom came under
the influence of the nomadic Mongols for 100 years. However, the Ukrainian lands were
freed after 1362, when troops under the leadership of Prince Olgierd defeated the Tatars at
the Blue Waters.
Subsequently, the southern and south-western parts of the former Kievan Rus’, as well as
the territory of modern Belarus, were gradually incorporated into the GDL, which had
played a special role in uniting the East Slavic lands.
In the GDL at the end of the fourteenth century, only one out of nine people was of
Lithuanian origin (O'Connor, 2003), i.e., almost all the rest were Ruthenians. At that time
the word 'Russian' meant Ruthenian. But, the official language of the GDL was Old
Belarusian. Starting from the early fourteenth century, the full name of GDL was The
Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Ruthenia and Samogitia, the last a region in northwestern
Lithuania.
The GDL stopped the 'Eurasianization' of a large part of the Slavs, the future Belarusians
and Ukrainians. Hence, the unification of the Eastern Slavs in the GDL was the major factor
in creating and saving East Slavic European civilization.
Russia as a State originated in the lands located to the northeast of Kievan Rus’ (Suzdal or
Zalesie, Rostov, Murom). These were remote areas separated from Kievan Rus’ by forests
and frequently arable farming regions.
The Slavs assimilated relatively unwarlike Finno-Ugric tribes, and subsequently they
combined into the principality of Suzdal, a first for these lands (1157). The fact that Suzdal
emerged as a principality two centuries later than the Polotsk and Kievan principalities
points, on the one hand, to a slow migration of the Eastern Slavs and to the length of the
time involved in their peaceful assimilation by the local population.
Mikhail Pogodin (1800-1875), one of the ideologues of pan-Slavism, claimed that the Slavs
in Russia were actually immigrants from Kievan Rus’ who, under pressure from the
Mongol-Tatars, had been forced to migrate to the area which was to become Muscovy.
In fact, he denied the existence of a Ukrainian people, saying that the Ukrainians had come
to the lands of the former Kievan Rus’ from the Carpathian Mountains later, in the fifteenth
to sixteenth centuries. However, Pogodin’s hypothesis on a mass migration of Slavs has
not confirmed (see Plochy, 2006).
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It is obvious that the Slavs’ assimilation in Muscovy substantially accelerated with the
Mongol-Tatar invasion, and actually led to an even greater degree of dissociation from the
eastern Slavs of future Belarus and Ukraine. From this period the formation of a new East
Slavic civilization based on Ruthenians (Belarusians and Ukrainians) became more in
evidence, as well as the formation of a Eurasian civilization which first arose on the
territory of Muscovy. The Mongol-Tatar invasion occurred at about the same time as the
disintegration of Kievan Rus’, but did not cause it, as some maintained.
A number of facts point to the interaction between Muscovy and the Horde for about 240
years.
The Mongols, after returning from campaigns in Western Europe, stayed in the Lower
Volga region, where they founded the town of Sarai, the capital of the Golden Horde. In
1243-1246, the principalities of Kiev and of the North-Eastern edge acknowledged their
dependence on the Golden Horde, i.e. they became its vassals. In 1245 Yaroslav, Grand
Prince of Vladimir, suggested that the Russian princes should recognize Batu Khan as their
king. In 1246, Prince Yaroslav was poisoned while in Mongolia, however, and his son,
Alexander Nevsky, allied with the Horde in 1257.
According to Lev Gumilev, the Horde and Russian principalities agreed to establish a
defensive alliance against the Teutonic Knights and the pagan Lithuanians. Since the
conclusion of such an agreement, almost 20 years after Batu’s campaign, subordinate
principalities started to pay tribute to the Golden Horde, and the Khans of the Horde gave
out yarlyki (permission and right to Russian princes to govern a designated territory) to
reign.
The interaction between the enslaved principalities and the Horde was not solely negative.
Alexander Nevsky was the adopted son of Batu Khan, and he was named a brother to the
Khan's son – Sartak. In Sarai, thanks to Alexander Nevsky, the Orthodox bishop established
a farmstead. Thus, the Orthodox faith began officially to exist in the Horde.
In addition, Academician Halikau has compiled a list of more than 500 noble Russian
family names derived from Tatar (see Magazine «SAKAVIK», № 1, 2013). Recently, the
debate has been focused on the Tatar origins of such prominent Russian leaders as Ivan IV
(the Terrible), Boris Godunov, and Peter I (Abdullaev, 2011; Garyfullin, 2012).
In the early fourteenth century, Sarai, capital of the Golden Horde, had a population of
600,000 (Encyclopedia Britannica), while Moscow had 30,000 in 1350. Muscovy gradually
borrowed systems and characteristics from the Horde government, pursuing military,
monetary, and fiscal reforms, studying military skills, and finally taking on an authoritarian
and centralized management style.
The principality of Muscovy was formed in 1263, under the rule of the Golden Horde, 23
years after Batu’s aggressive campaigns, i.e. not against the Horde, but thanks to it.
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Muscovy and the Golden Horde used the strife between the northeastern principalities; so
the Tver Uprising (1327) was brutally suppressed by the Horde army led by Prince Ivan
Kalita of Muscovy. Thanks to Russian historians, that prince has gone down in history as
the “Collector for Rus.’” Note that when he “united the Slavs”, he did it with the help of a
punitive Mongol army.
In a certain sense, the Golden Horde was an artificial and unsustainable state. Its population
consisted of Mordva, Slavs, Greeks, Bulgars living permanently in the Volga area, as well
as nomadic Turkic tribes (Kipchaks, Tatars, Turkmens, and Kyrgyz). In addition, the
Horde was greatly weakened by internal strife between Tokhtamysh and Tamerlane in the
late fourteenth century; this led to Moscow’s transformation from a vassal state into a semivassal state. Still, even the Mongol-Tatars’ defeat at the battle of Kulikovo on September
8, 1380 did not end their dominance, which lasted for about another century.
On the other hand, Moscow, with the establishment of a vassal Tatar principality in
Kasymov, actually became the successor to the Golden Horde (Vernadsky1968: 17). Thus
the vassal Kasymov Khanate lasted in the lands of Muscovy for nearly 250 years (14521681, the modern Ryazan region).
It was the first of the great heritage of Eurasia, and Muscovy’s first step in the conquest of
peoples of the Eurasian steppes and North Asia, which led to the formation of the Eurasian
civilization. Nowadays, the Eurasian steppes alone are home to many peoples of Russia’s
autonomous republics and peoples (Bashkir, Mari, Mordovians, Tatar, Udmurt, Chuvash,
Adyghean, Ossetian, Balkarians, Ingushetians, Kabardians, Kalmyks, Karachai, Chechens,
and Circassians).
Thus, one can conclude that Russia, by absorbing over the course of a long history these
and other Eurasian territories and the populations that inhabit them, is arguably the result
of the east-west Eurasian movement commenced by the Mongols.
Relations between the East Slavic and Eurasian civilizations in the thirteenth to
nineteenth centuries
After the collapse of the Golden Horde for internal reasons, Muscovy gained freedom of
action and directed its predatory interests to the fragmented and scattered Khanates over
the Eurasian steppe: the Khanates of Kazan (1552) and Astrakhan (1556), the Great Nogai
Horde (1557), the Siberian Khanate (1582), and the Skewbald Horde (1619). As a result,
by the late sixteenth century, the territory of the Muscovite state was about 5.5 million
square km, with a population of about 10.9 million people (whereas in 1450 it was only
430,000 square km with a population of 3,000,000).
The only region still unattainable for Moscow from the fourteenth century to the eighteenth
century was westward expansion, for there was a strong State, the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania (GDL), blocking the way. In fact, people who lived in what is now Belarus,
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Lithuania, and Ukraine had created a strong European power; the bulk of the population
were Ruthenians (Belarusians and Ukrainians), and within the GDL, they were protected
from absorption by the Eurasian civilization.
Unlike Muscovy, this State, the GDL, as has been noted above, barely experienced the
Tatar-Mongol yoke and developed under completely different conditions. It became even
more powerful in 1569, forming along with the Kingdom of Poland, a federation called the
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.
Before the conclusion of Union of Lublin (1569), the GDL in many respects had been an
independent principality. Even after the annexation of the GDL in the late eighteenth
century, Tsarist Russia did not dare to infringe on the rights and freedoms of people for a
further 30 years: thus, the GDL statutes remained in force, and the institutions of the
nobility (Szlachta) and the Uniate Church (more than 70% of Belarusians at the time were
Uniates) still existed.
Data at the end of the fourteenth century (i.e. to the time after which the gradual annexation
to Muscovy of territories inhabited by Turkic peoples had been started), demographic data
show that in the GPL in 1493 there were about 3.75 million Ruthenians, i.e. Belarusians
and Ukrainians (Pogonowsky, 1987). At about the same time (1450), Muscovy had about
three million inhabitants, and in 1500, after the accession of the neighboring rival
principalities – the Republic of Novgorod (1478) and Tver (1485) – about six million
inhabitants (The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 1969-1978). How many of them were Slavs
is unknown, because along with the Muscovites there lived Komi, Udmurt, Tatar, Mari,
Chuvash, Mordovians, Karelians and other Finno-Ugric peoples.
However, if we extrapolate the results of the latest census for the population of Russia
(2010), the Slavs might have totaled a maximum of 4.8 million (77.7% Russians out of 6
million). Thus, the ratio of Muscovy Slavs to the Slavs of Belarusians and Ukrainians could
be pretty close (such as, e.g., 1.3:1, respectively).
With the expansion of the territory of the GPL under the Treaty of Deulino, which
concluded the Polish–Muscovite War (1605–1618) between the Polish–Lithuanian
Commonwealth and Russia, the population rose. There were 12 million inhabitants, of
which Ukrainians made up 3.5 million and Belarusians 1.5 million (the Ruthenian portion
was 5 million). But half of the population of Belarus was killed during the GDL’s next war
with Muscovy (1654-1667); only 1.4 million survived out of 2.9 million (Saganovich,
1995).
By the end of the eighteenth century, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had
disappeared. Belarus was annexed by Russia, under the rule of Empress Catherine II.
According to current estimates, there were 11-14 million people living in the
Commonwealth in 1770 (Bideleux, Jeffries, 1998, Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2001), and in the
Russian Empire about 19 million in 1762, while in 1800 there were as many as 35.5 million
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(Falcus). It is easy to calculate the source of this increase, if we recall that the
Commonwealth was divided among Prussia, Austria, and Russia. Russia took the entire
territory and population of present-day Belarus and Ukraine. These were forcibly seized
and became part of the Russian and Eurasian empire. They thus acquired the status of
Eurasians, surrendering their European status.
In sum, Russia’s history involves permanent territorial expansions during the existence of
Muscovy (1263-1547), the Russian kingdom (1547-1721), the Russian Empire (17211917), Soviet Russia (1917-1922), the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922-1991),
and the Russian Federation (since 1991). Additions and changes in the Russian population
were not only quantitative but also qualitative.
Now there are more than 180 nations in multinational Russia, in accordance with official
statistics. Simple calculations show that the ratio of the Great Russians to the Ukrainians
and Belarusians for five centuries is growing in the favor of Russians. So, if at the end of
the fourteenth century this ratio may have been 1.3 to 1, then according to the Russian
census of 1897, the ratio of the Great Russians (55.7 million) to Ukrainians and Belarusians
(22.4 and 5.9 million, respectively) accounted for about 2:1 (calculated on linguistic
criteria). According to the census of the USSR in 1989, the proportion was already 2.7:1
(Russians, 145.5 million; Ukrainians, 44.2 million; and Belarusians, 10.0 million).
These calculations show that for five centuries, the relative strength of the Great Russians
has been increasing twice as fast as that of the Belarusians and Ukrainians.
It should be noted that these calculations were made by this author’s conservative estimate
(PM). It may well be argued that this increase cannot be explained by assimilation alone,
and most likely points to the direct admission of other nations to the Slavic population of
the Great (Russian).
To this day, many Russians deny that the Finno-Ugric and Turkic peoples assimilated Great
Russian Slavs. However, recent studies have shown a significant difference in the
distribution of genetic material, with a gradient from north to south and from west to east
in the North-Eastern Slavic lands where Russia emerged; this points to the migration of the
Slavs and their assimilation into the non-Slavic peoples of Russia (Malyarchuk et al., 2004;
Balanovsky et al., 2008).
We are clearly discussing the emergence of two different civilizations in the eastern regions
of Europe.
Characteristics of the East Slavic and Eurasian civilizations
According to the foregoing analyses, we can conclude that a number of factors influenced
Eastern Slavs to be split and to form two civilizations - East Slavic European civilization
(the Belarusian-Ukrainian) and Eurasian civilization (Russian).
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Objective factors that contributed to the formation of these civilizations were tribal
specifics of the Eastern Slavs; assimilation of eastern Slavs with local tribes; the internecine
war between various lands and kingdoms; the Mongol-Tatar invasion, a historical
continuation of the movements of nomads of the Eurasian steppes; and the emergence of
the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the unifier of the Eastern Slavs.
Today, the East Slavic civilization is represented by two relatively ethnically homogeneous
countries: Belarus and Ukraine; and Eurasian civilization – Russia and the countries that
adhere to the Eurasian ideology. We can distinguish three periods in the development of
both civilizations, the pre-Kievan and Kievan period, the formation period, and the modern
period (Table 1).
Table 1.
Characteristics of the periods of development of East Slavic and Eurasian civilizations

Period
Pre-Kievan and Kiev
period

Formation Period

Development Period

Short Description
The initial division of the Eastern Slavs in the 9th to 11th
centuries on the basis of the features of Slavic tribes
themselves, their assimilation with local tribes, and the feuds
between lands and kingdoms
Emergence of European East Slavic civilization (the
Belarusian-Ukrainian) in the 13th and 14th centuries and the
beginning of the formation of Eurasian civilization in the 13th
to 15th centuries (modern Russia and the countries sharing
Eurasian ideas now)
Continued to present

East Slavic civilization began to emerge from Slavic migration from central Europe, and
from their settlement in the territory of modern Belarus and Ukraine. We can assume that
East Slavic civilization has existed for eight centuries, as far back as the mid-eighth century,
while Eurasian civilization was just beginning to take shape.
It should be noted that some of the features in the modern period of the development of the
East Slavic civilization are most relevant to its 'Ukrainian' part: firstly, they are due to the
temporary Mongol occupation of Ukraine territory in 1240-1362, and secondly, due to the
characteristic features of the Ukrainian national liberation movement during the Hetmanate
(the Ukrainian Cossack State between 1659 and 1764) (Bohdan Khmelnitsky, Ivan
Mazepa).
There are several major points that show significant differences between East Slavic and
Eurasian civilization, and are at the same time proof of their existence (Table 2).
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East Slavic civilization is much older, and it has existed for almost three more centuries
than the Eurasian for two main reasons: first, due to the slow migration of the Slavs in the
land of future Muscovy as evidenced by the considerably later emergence of the
Principality of Suzdal in comparison to the principalities of Polotsk and Kiev; second,
Muscovy’s status as a vassal of the Tatars for 240 years (such features as assimilation and
changes in the territory occupied were also mentioned earlier).
The populations of Belarus and Ukraine have been largely ethnically homogeneous for
nearly eight centuries, while in the North-East the Slavs assimilated first the Finno-Ugric
tribes, and later the Turkic peoples.
The principal difference in the population in our time might be noted when calculating the
ratio of Slavs to other ethnic groups (30:1 and 24:1 for Belarus and Ukraine, respectively;
contrasted with 4.8:1 for Russia); and the ratio of Christians to Muslims (90 or 180:1 and
27:1 for Belarus and Ukraine, respectively; and 7:1 for Russia). When calculating the group
of Slavs, Great Russians, Bulgarians, Belarusians, Poles and Ukrainians were included
(similar results were obtained by calculating the ratio of the eponymous nation to a portion
of other ethnic groups [not shown - PM]. Religious affiliation to Islam was chosen for the
calculations because the corresponding figures for all comparison groups were available.
There are a number of features typical of both Belarusian-Ukrainian civilization and
Western civilization.
There is enough scholarly evidence (Bekus, 2011; Kuplevich, 2013) to assign BelarusianUkrainian civilization to Western civilization. (Also, Szporluk, 2001 and Kohut, 2001).
Kuplevich (2013) highlights 15 key factors pointing to Belarus’s European nature,
including:






the 1000-year history of Belarusian traditions,
the presence of European civilization processes in Belarus (the Renaissance, the
Reformation, the Counter-Reformation, the Union of Brest, the Enlightenment),
the presence of the European institutions (parliaments, the Sejm, Magdeburg Law,
the Town Hall),
the modern nation-building process, and
the integration of Belarusian elites into the European political, cultural, economic
processes, etc.

Recently, a substantial difference in mentality between the two civilizations was discussed
(Zgerski, 2014). Additional research, however, is required to study the mentality, behavior
and traditions, typical of representatives of the two civilizations.
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Table 2.

Characteristics of the East Slavic and Eurasian civilizations1
East Slavic civilization

Eurasian
civilization

Duration of existence

More than eight centuries

Territory occupied

Was not changed substantially

Assimilated by Eastern Slavs

Balts, Sarmatians

Ratio of Slavs (Great Russians,
Bulgarians, Belarusians, Poles,
and Ukrainians) to other ethnic
groups*
Ratio of Christians to
Muslims**
Features of Western civilization
(see the text)

Belarus– 30:1 (96.8%:3.2%);
Ukraine– 24:1 (96%:4%)

Less than five
centuries
Increased more than
tenfold
Finno-Ugric and
Turkic peoples
Russia – 4.8:1
(82.7%:17.3%);

Belarus – 90:1 (а) Belarus–
180:1 (б) Ukraine – 27:1
+

Russia – 7:1
―

There are a number of approaches to the classification of civilizations (Toynbee, 1934;
Huntington, 1993; Kuzik & Yakovets, 2006; Targowski, 2009; Kuplevich, 2013).
According to Huntington, there are eight civilizations – Western, Orthodox, Islamic,
Chinese, Indian, Japanese, Latin, and sub-Saharan Africa. Huntington assigned Belarus
and Ukraine to the Orthodox civilization. But that is a moot point. As mentioned above,
many features of Slavic East European civilization (Belarusian-Ukrainian) can be assigned
to Western civilization.
Not assigning Belarus either to the Eurasian or the Orthodox civilization is supported by
postulating a separate Belarusian civilization (Maldis, 2003) or border civilization
(Titarenko, 2009).

1

* Calculations based on population census: Belarus (2009), Russia (2010), Ukraine (2001).
** Calculations based on the following information: for Belarus - (а) Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights
and Labor. International Religious Freedom Report 2010. Belarus. U.S. Department of State; (б)
Республика Беларусь в зеркале социологии. Сборник материалов социологических исследований за
2011 год. — Минск: Бизнесофсет, 2012б с. 44. — ISBN 978-985-6939-42-9; For Ukraine - “РЕЛІГІЯ І
ВЛАДА В УКРАЇНІ: ПРОБЛЕМИ ВЗАЄМОВІДНОСИН”. Інформаційно-аналітичні матеріали до
Круглого столу на тему: “Державно-конфесійні відносини в Україні, їх особливості і тенденції
розвитку” (2010). http://www.razumkov.org.ua/upload/prz_2011_Rlg_smll.pdf; for Russia - Атлас
религий и национальностей России (2012). Данные социологического исследования:
http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki; исследовательская служба «Среда», www.sreda.org.
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According to Kuzik and Yakovets, the early twenty-first century should see the discussion
about the creation of fifth-generation local civilizations; the authors divide them into three
groups: Western group – West European, East European, North American, Latin American
and Oceanic; an East group – Chinese, Japanese, Indian, Buddhist, and Islamic; and mixed
– Eurasian (Russian), and sub-Saharan African.
If one adheres to that classification, Belarus and Ukraine may be involved in Eastern
European civilization, and as shown in this essay, even more specifically to Eastern
European Slavic civilization. However, Russian authors carried the two countries into
Eurasian/Russian civilization: it can be seen on the maps of the future development of
Russian civilization (until 2050); the rationale for including Belarus and Ukraine on those
maps is generally not given.
According to the classification proposed by A. Targowski (2009), Belarus, and Ukraine, in
our opinion, could be assigned to the West-central civilization, for the reasons described
above, and not to the Eastern civilization where the author assigns two countries, along
with Russia and Bulgaria. Targowski’s definition of civilization consists of a number of
factors, but if the predominant religion (Orthodox Christianity) was taken as a basis in
assigning Belarus and Ukraine, then one would have to take into account the ratio of
Orthodoxy with other religions. For example, the relationship between Orthodoxy and
Islam among believers in Russia and Bulgaria is around 6:1 and 7:1, while among the
believers in the Ukraine and Belarus, 50:1 and 150:1 respectively.
In a post-industrial society in the era of globalization, the general existence and role of local
civilizations varies greatly, and their future depends on the nature of the relationship
between them – whether conflict or cooperation. Conditions for the development of the
East European Slavic civilization were more favorable in Boris Yeltsin’s time.
However, it is believed that the reforms initiated by Boris Yeltsin, just like the reforms of
Peter I, were 'null and void' because they did not correspond to the values of Eurasian
Russia (starting from as far back as Alexander Nevsky, Russia has engaged in anti-Western
rhetoric). The Yeltsin period replaced a time of uncertainty and transition with a new
Eurasian policy, which included the change from pro-Western to anti-Western, and which
may now be partially observed in the organization of the Eurasian Economic Union.
As recently noted (Kuzik, Yakovets, 2006), Western civilization has incorporated Baltic
countries, and intends to include Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia (v. II, p.69). But there is
no mention of Belarus at all. The authors also add that Russian strategy for the twentyfirst century was not formulated yet, so soon after the fall of the Soviet Union.
The authors do predict a possible split of the Eurasian/ Russian civilization, where central
Asia might fall under the influence of Islamic civilization, while the Russian Far East and
Siberia could fall under the influence of Chinese, Japanese, and North American
civilizations.
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In this case, as the authors say, Eurasian civilization will have no choice but to be Russian
or East Slavic civilization. The same authors, in speaking of 'Russian' civilization, seem to
incorporate Belarusians and Ukrainians into that civilization.
Attempts by Russian researchers to learn Russian history more profoundly during the
transition period following the collapse of the Soviet Union were subject to severe
criticism. The concept of Tartary, a country that existed, according to the authors, in the
northern part of Asia (Nosovskiy, Fomenko, 1999; Agrantsev, 2005) was condemned as
unscientific by a special commission of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Commission,
2007). The politicization of the issue under consideration may be observed arising once
again.
Evidently, a period of uncertainty in the restoration of Russia's strategy is to be replaced by
Eurasian ideology. It is clear that the movement of the Eurasian civilization back to the
east was forced or, from the point of view of modern Eurasianists, was wrong. It is obvious
that the new Eurasianists, as with the classic ones, will continue to implement their ideology
to legitimize the existence and expansion of empire. M. Danilevsky (1822-1875) saw
Russia as a distinct civilization, which should absorb and assimilate the whole of Europe,
and called on the Slavs to rid themselves of Turkish and German influences and to form a
Slavic empire.
The ultimate goal for classic Eurasianists was – and remains -- to end the hegemony of
Western culture by demonstrating the superiority of the East (Vernadsky, 1927).
Classical Eurasianism was founded by Russian émigrés in the 1920s, primarily by Prince
Troubetzkoy (1890-1938), Karsavin (1882-1952), Savitsky (1895-1968), Vernadsky
(1887-1973), Jakobson (1896-1982), Shuvchynski (1892-1985). The more recent
proponents of this theory include L. Gumilev (1912-1992), Panarin (1940-2003) and his
contemporaries, A. Dugin, V. Surkov, N. Nazarbayev, S. Karaganov. The main theses of
the classical Eurasianists were that Russia has a unique culture, one peculiar only to Russia,
and that Eurasian culture is the basis of Russian civilization. This includes an ideology
based on the Christian Orthodox religion and culture, reflecting Russia’s national interests
and unique destiny, as determined by its geo-strategic location as a bridge between Asia
and Europe and by specific ethnographic mixture of Eurasian peoples.
According to these thinkers, Russia is not truly a Slavic country. It was a great surprise
and even 'shock' to B. Haggman, a Western scholar, most recently (2011). The classical
authors of this movement argued that Russia was not even genuinely Slavic. What's so
shocking, even if the Russians admit it?
However, the West still reads the myths and legends-clichés of Rurik, of Russia as a Slavic
country, written by eighteenth and nineteenth century Slavophiles. For more on the history
of the Eurasian ideology, see recent reviews (Laruelle, 2006; Matern, 2007; Pry, 2013).
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Classic Eurasianists did not recognize the rights of Belarus and Ukraine to independence
in the 1920s, considering the peoples of these countries as a separate branch of the Russian
people, while at the same time noting the major role played by the Turkic peoples in the
development of Russia. Gumilev wrote that in fact the Russians were closer to the nonSlavic people, and that the empire of Genghis Khan was transformed into Moscow; “The
merger of Genghis Khan’s military and political experience with Russian Orthodoxy in the
fourteenth century gave birth to Muscovite Russia” (from the preface to Khara-Davan,
1992).
In turn, P. Sawicki in a letter to Gumilev wrote, “I still consider our great and terrible father
of Genghis Khan as one of the greatest figures in the history of pre-Leninist Eurasia. Lenin
was only surpassed by its scope and strength of his purpose” (cited from M. Laruelle, 2006).
Classical Eurasianists’ idea did not find support in the USSR, but they themselves had
subsided when they saw that after World War II, Eurasia-Russia extended up to central
Europe, signifying that in fact, their ideas were being implemented.
However, no matter the views adhered to by Russian historians and leaders (Normanist or
anti-Normanist theories, or the Eurasian, Pan-Slavic or Slavophile currents), few of them
rejected Kiev/Kievan Rus’ as his historic fiefdom. From the today's point of view it is not
quite true because of the existence of an independent state – Ukraine, which is primarily
based on claiming the history of Kievan Rus’.
After all, the recognition that modern Russia has nothing to do with Kievan Rus’ currently
leads to the absolute recognition of the independence of Ukraine and Belarus and, as a
consequence, to the loss of those claims on Slavic territory and to the loss of 'informed'
historical influence on these countries, which the imperial mindset cannot afford.
The idea of the Slavophiles, Eurasianists, and Pan-Slavists, including Russian national
patriots, was to consider Russia a Slavic country (“Russian Russia”) or as a country where
the leading role of the Slavs led to the crisis in the explanation of the current situation. This
meant that, on the one hand, the former Russian Empire included no countries from East
Slavic civilization, such as Belarus and Ukraine yet, on the other hand, there was a need to
solve national problems in their own country. Imperial thinking is a logical counterweight
to the normal process of self-reflection as a Eurasian state, which led to its strengthening.
For East Slavic civilization, the treatment of Russia in such a situation by Western
civilization is important. Until recently, everything to the east of the Brest-Lvov line was
called “Russia” by many Westerners, not even called the Soviet Union. It is now gradually
becoming known that the East Slavic world was not so united, and that the Eastern Slavs
had their own civilizational values that cannot be attributed to Eurasia or Moscow.
Some might even argue that the war between Russia and Ukraine nowadays is a convincing
argument for the existence of two civilizations – East Slavic civilization and
Eurasian/Russian civilization. Certainly, its historic roots should not be ignored.
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Whether Western civilization is interested in supporting an independent development of
the East Slavic civilization and its possible movement to the West will determine the future
of a Slavic civilization. If such support does not occur, it can be swallowed by Eurasian
civilization, sharing the fate of many other territories and peoples from the fifteenth century
to the twentieth century (now parts of the Russian state).
The Eurasian Economic Union came into being on January 1 of this year. When
Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev first called for an organization in 1994, it was
to be based on economics, a regional trading bloc, and it was not to be a political union.
Still, there is historically justified suspicion among the peoples of the East Slavic
civilization, caused by constant westward movement of Eurasian forces, although in a time
of globalization, aggression will have to be perceived to be limited.
The disadvantage of East Slavic civilization today is that two of its components, Belarus
and Ukraine, are pulling in different directions. But nothing stands still: the centuries-long
development of the East Slavic European civilization has its own continuation.
Summary
The article explains the existence of a separate East Slavic civilization in the modern
European territories of Belarus and Ukraine.
The Slavs migrated to Eastern Europe in the fifth to ninth centuries; under the influence of
various factors, they separated and formed two civilizations – East Slavic (BelarusianUkrainian) and Eurasian.
The disengagement of the Eastern Slavs was determined by the characteristics of their
tribes, natural conditions of the Eastern European plain and the Eurasian steppes,
assimilation to local tribes, internecine wars between lands and kingdoms, the influence of
the Mongol Empire, and the emergence of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as a unifying
factor for the Eastern Slavs.
It seems that the ethno-national division of the Eastern Slavs began in the tenth and eleventh
centuries, regardless of the processes of formation of Kievan Rus’, and even before its
collapse.
This division emerged between the Slavs living in what is now Ukraine and Belarus, and
the Slavs who had migrated to the North-East (the territory of the future Muscovy), where
they mingled during “first wave” assimilation with Finno-Ugric peoples (Mordvins, Mari,
Vepsians, Meshchera, and Muromians).
A second wave of assimilation with Turkic peoples continued for centuries, as under the
rule of the Golden Horde and later, the Muscovy Slavs were separated even further from
the Slavs of Belarus and Ukraine.
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Muscovy/Russia’s Eurasian culture is based on interpenetration, lifestyles, mentalities,
traditions and knowledge amongst Slavic and Finno-Ugric and Turkic peoples. We can
assume that Russia, including during the long history of the Eurasian territory and its
population, is the successor of the Eurasian movement from east to west. However, many
Russians still consider Russia, in defiance of the facts, an exclusively Slavic nation, and do
not recognize the separate existence of the Belarusian and Ukrainian ethnicities.
Infighting between the principalities of Kievan Rus’ was one of the major factors in its
decay, but perhaps counterintuitively, it led to the strengthening and separation of coeval
centers (the principalities of Polotsk and Galicia-Volhynia) and to the creation of new
feudal formations of the future Muscovy (the Republic of Novgorod, and the Principality
of Rostov-Suzdal). The Belarusian and Ukrainian Slavs preserved their identity and
civilization largely because of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL) which actually united
the Eastern Slavs after the collapse of Kievan Rus’. At the time that sort of unifying role
could not have been performed by Muscovy, itself a vassal dependent on the Mongol
Golden Horde.
East Slavic civilization is nearly three centuries older than Eurasianism, both because of
the slow migration of the Slavs to the future lands of Muscovy (as evidenced by a much
later formation of Suzdal compared to the principalities of Polotsk and Kiev) and due to
Muscovy’s status as a Tatar vassal for over 240 years. The population of Belarus and
Ukraine, dating back almost eight centuries, is largely ethnically homogeneous and has
been resident in the same territory, while the North-Eastern Slavs were assimilated in
Russia, first by the Finno-Ugric tribes, and later with the Turkic peoples.
A principal difference between the populations of the two civilizations is understood at
present by calculating the ratio of the Slavs to other ethnic groups, and the ratio of
Christians to Muslims.
Belarus and Ukraine are assigned to the Orthodox, eastern or Eurasian/Russian civilization
(although they share a number of characteristic features of Western civilization) on the
basis of myths and conclusions resulting from the interpretation of historical facts viewed
from the prism of geopolitics.
These myths address the assumed trinity of the three Slavic nations –‘Great Russians,’
‘Little Russians’ and ‘White Russians.’ They are based on the supposed Slavic character
of the Russian Empire, historical continuity between Kievan Rus’ and Russia, and
Muscovy’s claim for a role in the union of the Eastern Slavs.
The development of civilization requires a long time, and it is clear that East Slavic
European or Belarusian-Ukrainian civilization will take its proper and appropriate place in
an era of global change in the world through the understanding and co-operation of its
constituent parts, which still have a great deal in common.
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A Biosystematic View of Civilizations: Western Europe and Japan
Before and After the Industrial Revolution
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Abstract
Civilization may be regarded as a biosystem. The relationship between the roles of
civilization and its building blocks in relation to the environment is analogous to other
biosystems at different hierarchical levels (a biosystematic view of civilization). Recently,
a conceptual view of history was translated into English as An Ecological View of History:
Japanese Civilization in the World Context. Its method was successfully adapted to
comparative studies of civilizations in the Eurasian continent. However, this approach has
not yet been applied to the evaluation of New World civilizations.
Here, we consider the evaluation of the behavior and structure of civilizations in the New
World. The analysis describes the parallel behaviors of Western Europe and Japan around
the time of the Industrial Revolution.
Introduction
The idea that history can be evaluated from the standpoint of natural science is not readily
accepted, for history itself is traditionally discussed from the viewpoints of the humanities
and the social sciences.1-2 Yet is it not evident that human societies can be treated as adaptive
units?3-5
We can begin by asserting that group selection is a basic aspect of evolution.6 Many analyze
human history through the lenses of such academic fields as the humanities, history, social
sciences, and anthropology.7 But let us consider the principles of evolution. We can define
civilization by extrapolating from human cultures8, 9 and cultures may be evaluated in
relation to Darwinian adaptation.3-5 Some scholars have attempted to draw the
characteristics of civilizations from the viewpoint of systems research2, 10, 11 and from the
viewpoint of the interaction between society and nature.12
I would like to draw your attention to the fact that an Eastern scientist attempted to explain
the evaluation of history as a natural phenomenon more than half a century ago. Tadao
Umesao proposed an ecological view of history in 1957 for the first time.13, 14 The approach
he proposed is not been well recognized by Western scholars in social sciences, history, and
anthropology, even though the work has now been translated into English.15,16
The idea was that Eurasian history can be primarily evaluated based on the principle of
ecology. There are parallels between the history and modernization of Western Europe and
that of Japan, just as there are parallel historical phenomena among other societies such as
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China, India, Arabia, and Russia. Clearly, we can adapt the principles of ecological
succession and parallel evolution in biology to the behavior of human history.
Umesao comparatively evaluated Japanese civilization as a system along with Western
European civilizations. He divided Eurasian civilizations into two groups, as shown in his
original conceptual illustration (Figure 1). Is this hypothesis oversimplified?

Figure 1. Classification of the civilizations in Eurasia proposed by Umesao in 1957
He classified Western Europe and Japan as Area 1, and the other civilizations on the
Eurasian continent (Arabia, India, Russia, China, Eastern Europe, and Southeast Asia) he
categorized as Area 2.
In the past, many have written of a parallel history between Western Europe and Japan.17-21
However, via Umesao’s method, we can clarify the behaviors and the differences between
the two groups by demonstrating why Japan modernized at the same time as Western
Europe. Why? The differences between the two groups of civilizations are mainly
attributable to the ecological and geological locations of the groups on the Eurasian
continent.
Umesao did not apply his method to the New World; indeed, he mentioned not having an
idea of how the New World should be evaluated via his ecological theories. Thus, the
evaluation of civilizations in the New World—such as North America, South America,
Australia, and New Zealand—mounts an interesting academic challenge.
I have attempted to develop a unified theory that describes the behavior of biosystems at
different hierarchical levels such as chemical evolution, prokaryotes (unicellular),
eukaryotes (multicellular), social insects, ecosystems, and civilizations. One can easily
deduce the principle of the theory by observing the roles of a biosystem and its building
blocks in relation to their environment.23-25 The building blocks in a biosystem do not tend
to interact directly with the environment. The biosystem itself relates to the environment
(Figure 2).
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Figure 2. The interaction between a biosystem and the environment, where the biosystem
interacts with the environment although the building blocks do not interact directly with the
environment
The theory successfully demonstrates the unique properties of biosystems at different
hierarchical levels; this principle constitutes the biosystematic view of civilization (BVC).25
Furthermore, the principle of the BVC may be applied to the description of the behaviors of
civilizations.
The biosystematic view of civilization is ecological, an extension of the idea that we may
look at civilizations ecologically; both the biosystematic view and the ecological view see
civilization as a system. The idea that civilization can be evaluated as a system26, 27 since
groups of organisms at higher hierarchical levels can be evaluated as an organism 1,28,29 is
actually not new. We all know that groups of organisms at higher hierarchical levels such
as social insects can be evaluated as organisms themselves. Looking at civilization from a
biosystematics point of view and from an environmental point of view, we observe analogies
and differences among biosystems at different hierarchical levels. Principally, the latter
applies more widely to different biosystems since biosystematics views derive from widerranging observations of biosystems than an ecological view, which focuses merely on
civilizations and human societies.
Let us evaluate civilizations in the New World and deduce the parallel emergence of
hierarchical levels among civilizations in relation to Western Europe and Japan, using
systematic theory.
A Reevaluation of the Ecological View of History in Relation to the Industrial
Revolution
The ecological view of history builds upon the observation of parallelism in the histories of
Western Europe and Japan, and of Arabia, India, China, Russia, Eastern Europe, and
Southeast Asia. This contrasts with the idea that cultures would involve characteristics
formed by the evolutionary adaptation of human societies30, 31 since the ecological view rests
on applying succession theory in plant ecology to human history.32, 33
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We may classify Old World civilizations — including the Eurasian continent and the part
of North Africa bordering the Mediterranean Sea — into two: Area 1 includes Western
Europe and Japan, which are far from the center of the Eurasian continent, and Area 2
includes all other civilizations and societies of the Eurasian continent.
The parallelism within the civilizations in Areas 1 and 2 -- and the differences between the
civilizations in Areas 1 and 2 – arises when we take the view that the history of these
civilizations can be evaluated from an ecological viewpoint. Note that the Eurasian continent
and North Africa are an oval area in which the arid region extends from the northeast to the
southwest (Figure 1). The ecologically important factor is that the civilizations in Area 2
directly face the arid region; the civilizations in Area 1, however, are far from the arid region.
That is why Umesao concluded that this factor was a central cause of the different patterns
of history in Areas 1 and 2. He deduced it by using an analogy, the succession of
ecosystems. The civilizations in Area 1 developed gradually since Area 1 is very far from
the arid region; thus, attacks on the civilizations in Area 1 by the peoples of the arid region
were not fatal (Figure 3, top).

Figure 3. Simplified model of the transformation of society in Area 1 and Area 2 on the
Eurasian continent according to an ecological view of history by Umesao. Top indicates
smooth transformation of society in Area 1 and Bottom indicates that the societies in Area
2 did not experience smooth transformation.
We may note that Asian societies in Area 1 experienced several gradual transformations: an
ancient kingdom, feudalism, absolute monarchy, and the people’s revolution.34, 35 The
continuous institutional changes in Japan have been pointed out by Western scholars as
well.17,18,36-38, 39 Although Western science and technology after the Age of Discovery and
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before the Meiji Restoration were continuously transferred into Japan,40 the spontaneous
development of social systems and institutions by Japan itself was a necessary factor for
modernization. During the spontaneous transformation of the social system, colonialism and
the Industrial Revolution occurred. These transformations produced an accumulation of
wealth, social capital, infrastructure, and technology. In other words, the parallelism of the
histories in Area 1 is primarily attributable to the similar ecological circumstances in these
areas.
In contrast, the peoples in the arid region repeatedly destroyed all the ancient civilizations
in Area 2, even though these ancient civilizations had originally emerged in Area 2 (Figure
3, bottom). Indeed, the civilizations in Area 2 did not experience the Industrial Revolution
until very recently. On the contrary, the industrial revolution began in the United Kingdom
and spread out smoothly to USA, other Western European countries, and Japan a few
decades later. This is because the civilizations in Area 2 did not smoothly experience
spontaneous transformation from the ancient civilizations.
We may consider the spontaneous transformation in Area 1 to have been the main driving
force that determined the histories of Area 1. Modernization is but an extrapolation of the
spontaneous transformations of civilization.13
Although there are obvious minor differences between Western Europe and Japan, the
parallel histories of Western Europe and Japan are evident. For instance, take the extension
of colonization from the 16th to the 19th century. Japan colonized Southeast Asia around the
middle of the sixteenth century, and it ended the colonization of Southeast Asia at the
beginning of the seventeenth century. During that time, one hundred thousand Japanese
people traveled to Southeast Asia.39 Japan’s national isolation occurred at the beginning of
the seventeenth century. This substantially delayed the accumulation of wealth in Japan
during the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries.
By contrast, the accumulation of wealth accelerated during the Industrial Revolution in
Western Europe. Although the Industrial Revolution in fact started in Western Europe, 41
Japan might have had an Industrial Revolution on its own if Western Europe had not
developed.38, 40, 43
Ecological historians can discern the parallel historical behaviors of civilizations —
especially up until the modernization of Western Europe and Japan — by observing that the
ecosystems of those civilizations were substantially important factors until the Industrial
Revolution (Figure 4). In other words, the environmental perspective of history is limited in
describing the behavior of civilizations after the Industrial Revolution and in the New
World. The importance of a civilization’s ecosystem becomes relatively weak after the
Industrial Revolution. In addition, the principle of ecosystems does not readily apply to the
behaviors of civilizations after the Industrial Revolution.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol73/iss73/16

86

Review: Full Issue

82

Number 73, Fall 2015

Figure 4. Factors, which determine the behavior of a civilizations, consisting of the inherent
nature of the civilization, the interaction with the environment, and the interaction with other
civilizations and societies.
Thus, because a civilization can be regarded as a biosystem, the biosystematics approach
helps explain the behavior of civilizations.
The Principle of the Biosystematic View of civilization (BVC)
If we can agree on a definition of civilization, we may proceed to analyze the structure and
function of civilizations.
There are several definitions of civilization, including the idea that civilization is an
extrapolation of human cultures.44, 45 Civilization is also sometimes evaluated as an
organism or system.2, 27 As readers know, however, there is little agreement on the actual
meaning of the terms civilization and culture. According to Umesao, civilization is a system
that includes human beings as well as instruments, technologies, and social systems. In
addition, he defines the cultures of a civilization as the relationships amongst individuals,
institutions, and so on within the civilization.13, 46
On the other hand, based on the comparative analysis of biosystems at different hierarchical
levels, I deduced in a previous paper that a civilization corresponds to a biosystem, and the
cultures in the civilization constitute the assignment between information and function
developed by humans. The term “assignment” used here was extrapolated from the term of
“assignment” between genotype and phenotype of molecular biology.22
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The importance of hierarchical levels in organisms is frequently pointed out.47 So, based on
this analysis, we may define civilization as a biosystem in which there is a hierarchy of
individual humans as the building blocks of the civilization. This definition reflects a trend
in modern society wherein individual humans in civilization do not interact directly with
their environments. I would note that the biosystematic principle of historical analysis is
based on the importance of the relationship between a biosystem and its environment, and
this assumption is consistent with conventional principle regarding the importance of the
environment for organisms.12, 48 This trend resembles the relationship between the system
and its building blocks.49
Furthermore, the trend of humans interacting indirectly with environments through
civilization becomes clearer when the civilization has experienced an industrial revolution.
Naturally, the role of civilization as an upper-hierarchical level for humans would not exist
in a non-civilized society.
This definition contrasts with the conventional view of civilization; that view is that
civilization arises as an extrapolation of human cultures. The presence of boundaries 25, 50
supports the analogies among these biosystems as well as the requisites for lifelike systems.
The requisites for a biosystem include the following: metabolism (Requisite I); selfreproduction (Requisite II), although it is sometimes said that cultures are unlikely to selfreproduce;51 mutation (Requisite III); assignment between information and function
(Requisite IV); and individuality and stability (Requisite V).25 Civilization—especially after
the Industrial Revolution—satisfies these requisites.
According to a biosystematics approach, the behavior of a civilization, as illustrated in
Figure 4, rests on the following three factors:
 the inherent nature of a civilization as a biosystem (Factor 1),
 the interaction of a civilization with the environment (Factor 2), and
 the interaction of a civilization with other civilizations and societies (Factor 3)
This model is similar to the evaluation of an organism in the environment and of chemical
phenomena.
Civilizations in the New World
Let us define “New-World Civilizations” -- North America, South America, Australia, and
South Africa -- as Area 3 in the present paper. We should ignore for the time being ancient
civilizations that emerged in Central to South America or Central Africa. In other words, the
societies and civilizations of Area 3 were more or less isolated from the civilizations formed
in Areas 1 and 2 until the Age of Discovery and colonialism. Naturally, isolation is an
important factor in determining the behaviors of human societies in relation to Factor 3.
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The characteristics of the present civilization in Area 3 after colonization may be evaluated
by applying Factors 1 through 3.
For Factor 1, regarding the inherent nature of civilization, let us classify the civilizations in
Area 3 into two types. Some civilizations in Area 3 such as North America and Australia
experienced industrial evolution simultaneously with the civilizations in Area 1 up until the
end of the nineteenth century. Industrial revolution in the civilizations in Area 1
synchronizes with the transplant of the civilizations of Area 1 to Area 3. However, some
societies in Area 3 such as Central America and South America did not experience industrial
revolution.
Thus, the civilizations at present in Area 3 might be also classed together into two groups
based on whether they experienced industrial revolution simultaneously with Area 1. If we
divide the civilizations in Area 3 into two groups, one involves the civilizations that
experienced industrial revolution, and the other involves those that did not experience it.
These trends relate to the origins of the civilizations in Area 3. The civilizations in Central
and South America, for instance, came mainly from Spain and Portugal. There is no
evidence that Spain and Portugal had experienced spontaneous transformation through
feudalism and absolute monarchy; their suzerains were strongly influenced by Islamic
civilizations. On the other hand, the civilizations of North America and Australia came
mainly from England and partly from the Netherlands, and France. The original civilizations
in Area 1 experienced spontaneous transformation through feudalism and absolute
monarchy before and after colonialism.

Regarding Factor 2, the ecological environments of the civilizations in the New World in
Area 3 (the first group above) are generally temperate climates, and those in the rest of Area
3 are tropical-to-temperate climates.
For Factor 3, the present civilizations in Area 3 are still geographically isolated from Areas
1 and 2. Thus, the interaction of a civilization in Area 3 with Areas 1 or 2 is geographically
weak. However, the influence of geographical isolation decreases in the face of
technological innovation.
The Stages of Civilizations and Societies Classified According to Interaction with the
Environment
Since the strength of the interaction between a civilization and its environment is notably
different before and after industrial revolution, one may profitably classify civilizations into
two stages—before (Stage 1) and after (Stage 2) industrial revolution. This becomes
significant when we observe the impact on society of natural disasters before and after the
Industrial Revolution in Area 1. For instance, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
in Japan, famines caused hundreds of thousands of deaths.52 Such famines have not emerged
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since the Japanese industrial revolution. This suggests that the improvement of the
civilization decreases the influence of the environment on the civilization.
Such trends are useful for classifying the stages of human societies. The interactions of
civilized and non-civilized societies with the environment are notably different; humans in
non-civilized societies interact directly with the environment, and the humans and its society
are merely building blocks of a surrounding ecosystem.
We can classify societies and civilizations into three stages, based on the interaction between
society and the environment. Non-civilized societies are Stage 0, civilizations before the
industrial revolution are Stage 1, and those after the revolution are Stage 2. Thus, all human
societies past and present resolve into nine types: Areas 1, 2, and 3 at Stages 0, 1, and 2
(Figure 5 and Figure 6).

Figure 5. Classification of the societies and civilizations present and past
Certain classes, such as Stages 0 and 1 in Area 1, have already disappeared, have been
incorporated into present civilizations, or were found to transform into a different stage. For
instance, there are neither non-civilized societies nor civilizations at Stage 1 in Area 1. Some
non-civilized societies are isolated from other civilizations and still maintain traditional
social styles. Figure 6 indicates the civilizations with the above classifications in simplified
continents at present. Areas 1 and 2 are drawn on the basis of an the ecological view of
history, and Area 3 includes North America, Central America, South America, Australia,
New Zealand, Africa, Hawaii, and Hokkaido.
Natural environments include solar energy, the location of the civilization or societies,
geographical features, the distribution of continent and ocean, and disasters emanating from
the earth’s interior (such as earthquakes and volcanoes). The stability of the civilization or
society regarding these natural perturbations increases in the order of Stage 0 < Stage 1 <
Stage 2 (Figure 7).
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Figure 6. Classified societies and civilizations appearing on the simplified earth.

Let us consider the societies at Stage 0 as systems that have a minimum consumption of
materials and energy from the environment. Although several societies at Stage 0 possess
technology, cultivation, and pastoralism, the surplus is not sufficient to form civilizations.
Thus, the society is strongly dependent on the natural environment. Many societies in the
past have disappeared following climate change or natural disaster. From this viewpoint, the
relationship between a society at Stage 0 and the environment is similar to that of a society
composed of earlier representatives of the family of man and the environment.
Stage 1 civilizations, although they possess a notable surplus compared to societies at Stage
0, are mostly dependent on large-scale irrigated agriculture and pastoralism where the
primary energy source is solar energy. The continuity of the large civilizations in Area 2 at
Stage 1—such as Arabic, Indian, and Chinese civilizations—from the emergence of these
civilizations to the present indicates that these civilizations are stable for long periods
against climate change and/or natural disasters. The surplus acts as energy and materials to
maintain the civilization, and the extensive area, including the large population, stores the
information necessary for the civilization. Such civilizations are, therefore, more stable than
non-civilized systems against environmental changes.
Civilizations at Stage 2 have more independence from environmental changes than those at
Stage 1. In other words, Stage 2 civilizations are strongly autonomous systems. This
autonomy is supported and protected by several factor -- such as the consumption of fossil
fuels, natural resources, and technologies, -- that are not adopted by Stage 1 civilizations
(Figure 7).
We may cite statistics such as primary energy consumption, level of education, and GDP to
support the importance of a difference between civilizations before and after industrial
revolution.53, 54 For instance, the disappearance of Chilean nitrate and Peruvian guano in the
early twentieth century was overcome by ammonium manufacturing — that is, the HaberPublished by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2015
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Bosch method.55-57 Many chemical industries today are maintained by fossil fuels.56 This
does not necessarily mean that a civilization at Stage 2 is totally independent of its
environmental ecosystems; natural disasters frequently destroy highly modernized
civilizations.58 So while it is mostly true that civilizations at Stages 1 and 2 develop
inventions that enhance independence from the environment, the trend at Stage 2 is clearer
than it is at Stage 1.

Figure 7. Surplus stabilizes the societies and civilizations towards the environment
The great difference in average energy consumption between Stages 1 and 2 becomes
obvious when the civilizations in Areas 1 and 2 are compared.53, 54 For Stage 2 civilizations,
fossil energy and its substitutions maintain the civilization. The energy consumed by
humans maintains the civilization’s autonomy against environmental fluctuations and feeds
the individual humans as living organisms. This phenomenon shows that agriculture and
pastoralism at Stage 2 are strongly dependent on fossil fuels rather than solar energy. This
also shows that the nature of Stage 2 civilization is quite different from that of Stage 1
civilization. Naturally, a part of the energy consumed in a Stage 1 civilization maintains
civilization itself, although the contribution of total energy is much smaller than that of Stage
2 (Figure 7). Using excess energy and materials to maintain civilization itself is a significant
characteristic of Stage 2 civilizations. One might even maintain justly that having a surplus
in both Stage 1 and Stage 2 civilizations maintains the civilization itself and is a useful tool
for distinguishing between civilized and non-civilized societies (Figure 7).
The characteristic of Stage 2 civilizations -- being more independent of the environment
than those at Stage 1 -- synchronizes with the trend of individual humans not directly
interacting with their environments. Once the civilization has experienced industrial
revolution, this becomes clearer. While energy consumption in Stage 2 comes principally
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from fossil fuels, the energy consumption used for the metabolism of individual humans as
living organisms— that is, food—is indirectly provided through the machinery, equipment,
and transportation used to maintain the civilization.
In other words, the necessities for individual humans as organisms—such as food and
water—in Stage 2 civilizations are regularly provided though the systems of the civilization.
Stage 2 civilizations behave as autonomous systems relatively independent of environmental
changes. This coincides with the trend of individual humans involving behaviors as the
building blocks of the civilization.25
From the Dynamics of Ecosystems to the Dynamics of a System Consisting of
Civilizations
The importance of each factor mentioned above for determining the behaviors of
civilizations past and present depends on whether the civilization is classified at Stage 0, 1,
or 2 and is located in Area 1, 2, or 3. What are the characteristics of these factors and the
spontaneous transformations of the stages?
Factor 1, regarding the inherent nature of civilization, derives from the fact that a biosystem
possesses inherent characteristics. Biosystems—such as prokaryotes, archaea, eukaryotes,
ecosystems, and social insects—possess different inherent characteristics.25 Analogous to
these biosystems, we may deduce, is that civilization should possess inherent characteristics.
First, some begin by assuming that it is required to have humans as building blocks for
civilization to determine the inherent nature of civilization. For instance, apes and even
fossil human species could not construct a civilization. Hypothetically, intelligent organisms
on a planet could build different types of civilizations where the intelligent organisms
behave as building blocks for their civilization. The inherent nature of civilization is
independent of race and ethnicity, since it is primarily dependent on the ecological
environment and geography.13 However, the inherent nature of the civilizations in relation
to the people in Areas 1, 2, and 3 and at Stages 1, 2, and 3 will be an important issue in the
future. Here I only wish to point out that the common characteristics of Stage 2 civilizations
are great energy consumption, high technology, and several social systems, as compared to
Stage1 civilizations.
In addition, the consumption of Stage 0 societies is much smaller than that of Stage 1 and
Stage 2 societies.
Regarding Factor 2—the relationship between civilization and the environment—natural
environments affect civilizations and societies differently. This is analogous to the way
organisms interact with their abiotic and biotic environments.59 As described earlier, Stage
2 civilizations are becoming independent of environmental changes and events. The
historical change regarding the interaction between a civilization and the environment and
between a civilization and other civilizations is illustrated in Figure 8. The black solid in
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Figure 8 indicate the interactions between civilizations and the environment, and the gray
dashed arrows indicate the interactions among civilizations. The influence of the
environment has become relatively small over human history.
Regarding Factor 3, behavior and history arise from the interactions among civilizations and
societies. Interactions among societies and civilizations are important for analyzing the
behavior of civilizations.60 Naturally, important events in history regarding such interactions
are simplified for heuristic purposes. In addition, there are several phenomena in which
civilizations and societies affect eather other mutually. Interactions among the major and
local civilizations on the planet are indispensable to each civilization; 11 interactions have
grown gradually over the course of history.
First, ancient large-scale civilizations appeared almost independently on the Eurasian
continent (Figure 8a). At the beginning of history, interactions between civilizations were
not strong, and trade and human exchange grew gradually since the population was much
smaller than today. Second, the non-civilized societies in Area 1 became civilized societies
by copying the systems of the civilizations that originally emerged in Area 2 (Figure 8a).
The copying of the original ancient civilizations occurred not only in Area 1, but also in the
remote regions of Area 2.

Figure 8. Changes in the interactions among civilizations from the emergence of
civilizations to the early modern and the modern period. Black solid lines indicate the
interaction with the environment and gray dashed lines indicate that with other civilizations.
(Continued)
Third, the civilizations in Area 2 were strongly affected by the societies in the arid region
until the early modern age (around the time of colonialism). See Figures 8b and 8c. On the
other hand, the influence of the societies in the arid region did not reach to Area 1 although
they sometimes overran Western Europe.
Fourth, after colonialism, the civilizations in Area 2 interacted with those civilizations at
Stage 2 in Area 1 which were primarily maintained by civilizations in Area 1 (Figure 8d).
Finally, most of the former colonies in Area 2 are no longer controlled by Area 1. On the
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other hand, the indigenous societies in Area 3 either were incorporated into the system of
Area 1 civilizations or were destroyed by invaders from Area 1. The rapid growth of several
developing countries at the end of the twentieth century indicates that societies in Areas 2
and 3 at Stages 0 and 1 are transitioning to Stage 2 by transplanting technologies and social
systems the appeared in Stage 2 civilizations.

Figure 8. (Continued)
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The Emergence of Hierarchical Levels Among Civilizations
The relationships among civilizations and societies become domination and equilibrium—
in other words, competition and cooperation. Here, domination means the phenomenon of
hierarchical levels forming between societies, unless the dominated society is destroyed.
The spontaneous emergence of hierarchical levels and the complexity of organisms are
regarded as general phenomena in biota.61-63 Although it is obvious that hierarchical levels
among humans appear within civilizations at any Area and Stage, the emergence of
hierarchical levels between civilizations and societies is a focus here since civilization is
considered as a biosystem.
The domination of Area 2 civilizations by Area 1 civilizations during colonialism is an
example of the emergence of hierarchical levels. This phenomenon resembles the emergence
of hierarchical levels appearing between herbivorous and carnivorous animals by adaptive
radiation in long-term evolution, although it is very controversial. The formation of
hierarchical levels of organisms is primarily due to interactions among organisms. Similarly,
hierarchical levels emerge spontaneously among civilizations by the interactions among
civilizations (Figure 9). The domination of one civilization by another is usually achieved
through military force that emanates from the dominating civilization.

Figure 9. Spontaneous formation of hierarchical levels among plural civilizations, which is
caused by domination of civilizations by the other civilization as well as an equilibrium of
interactions among the civilizations.
Because Stage 2 civilizations are more independent of the environment, the influence of
Factor 2 becomes relatively weak compared to Factors 1 and 3. We postulate, therefore,
that at Stage 2 the inherent nature of the civilization (Factor 1) and the influence of the
relationship between the civilization and other civilizations (Factor 3) become more
important in determining the behavior of the civilization than Factor 2.
North America as a Civilization
Stage 2 civilizations in Areas 1 and 3 such as Western Europe, Japan, and North America
are normally maintained by energy sources from fossil fuels. These civilizations are
relatively unleashed from constraints imposed by their environments. Applying the analogy
between the behaviors of civilization and living organisms, the domination and equilibrium
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regarding Factor 3 would be important in determining the relationships among civilizations
(Figure 9).
North American civilization, which was a copy of Western European civilization, started
extensive colonization around the beginning of the seventeenth century. The civilization of
the New World was established by continuous immigration and maintained by the
continuous development of the frontiers required for the construction of the civilization,
including cities, farms, factories, and military; also, it more or less obliterated the history of
the indigenous people. The expansion of North American civilization by military force
maintained the civilization; it is a fact that Area 1 civilizations tend to expand and
incorporate other societies.
North American civilization has become a civilization of the highest hierarchical level. Its
concentration of wealth, human resources, production, intellectual property, and military
force supports this assumption.53, 54 How concentration and unilateral flow occur is not
important, but the presence of concentration and unilateral flow is important from the
biosystematic view of civilization. This phenomenon resembles the formation of
hierarchical levels between the societies of Mongolian pastoralism and the surrounding
civilizations such as China, Arabia, India, and Russia, during the Middle Ages.64 In addition,
the colonization of Area 2 by the civilizations in Area 1 led to the formation of hierarchical
levels among the civilizations. These facts indicate that the emergence of hierarchical levels
among civilizations and societies constitute spontaneous phenomena regarding history as a
natural phenomenon (Figure 9).65
We evaluate the question of why North America settled at the highest hierarchical level from
a biosystematics view of history. Military force is one of the most important factors in
producing hierarchy. The prosperity of Mongolia in the Middle Ages supports this
assumption. In this, human history is analogous to other biosystems, with their hierarchies,
such as the food chain, in which carnivorous animals possess much more physical strength
than herbivorous animals. The number of civilizations located at higher hierarchical levels
may be determined by the size of the earth, population, and geographical conditions. This
assumption follows from the fact that the number of hierarchical levels in the food chain
structure is dependent on the size of the ecosystem.66 If the earth were larger, the hierarchical
complexity would be greater. This is analogous to the differences between the sizes and
complexity of the ecosystems in Eurasia and Australia. It indicates that the complexity of
the whole ecosystem on a continent would increase if the size of the continent increased. If
this rule can be applied to the behavior of civilizations, the complexity of the relationship
among civilizations and societies would be determined primarily by the size of the
ecosystem, that is, ultimately, the size of the earth.
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Analogy Between Hokkaido for Japan and North America for Western Europe from
the Early Modern to the Modern Periods
The parallel histories of Area 1 at the west and east ends of Eurasia—that is, Western Europe
and Japan—include developments during ancient society, feudal society, absolute
monarchy, colonialism, and the Industrial Revolution.13,36 The colonization of Area 2 by
both Western Europe and Japan started at the beginning of the sixteenth century in parallel.
The colonization by Western civilizations in Area 1 expanded to Areas 2 and 3. It is
generally considered, however, that Japan suddenly quit colonization and entered into
seclusion in the early seventeenth century13, 39, 67 while Britain and other Western countries
continued to manage colonies in India, Southeast Asia, and North America. The colonization
of Area 2 by Japan started again at the end of the nineteenth century, as national isolation
subsided.
We see a parallel phenomenon regarding the colonization of societies in Area 3 by Japan.
The indigenous societies in North America, Australia, and New Zealand in Area 3 were
absorbed by Western European civilizations. The Japanese incorporation of the indigenous
society of Ainus in Hokkaido, which is now part of Japan, started in earnest at the beginning
of the seventeenth century.66-69 This colonization was mainly a result of Tokugawa
absolutism, which would also be regarded as an extrapolation of the continuous expansion
of Japan toward the northern area of the Japanese islands from around the eighth century
(Figure 10). Although Japan quit the colonization of Southeast Asia in 1639, it did not
release the substantial colonies in the Ryukyu Islands and on Hokkaido. The colonization in
the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries occurred under the absolute monarchy of
Tokugawa Bakufu. Hokkaido was a frontier for Japan at the beginning of the seventeenth
century, which was the era of absolute monarchy in both Japan and Western Europe. Finally,
Hokkaido and the Ryukyus were incorporated into Japan until the end of the nineteenth
century. Before the seventeenth century, the Ryukyu were an independent country, and
Hokkaido was the land of the Ainu people. Thus, the situation of Hokkaido and the Ryukus
after the seventeenth century, occupied by Japan, was very similar to that of societies in
India, Southeast Asia, North America, and South America that were all occupied by Western
civilizations.
Hokkaido is located along the northern boundary of Japan, but it is not considered to
constitute a society categorized in Area 2. The Ainu people were not influenced by the
civilizations in Area 2 and had not enough experience to build even an ancient style of
kingdom. This is different from other societies in the Far East and Southeast Asia such as
Korea, Thailand, the Ryukyus, and Vietnam. Korea and Ryukyu had built ancient-style
civilizations, mostly copied from Chinese civilization, especially regarding the political
system based on the Ritsuryo codes; it is noteworthy that some civilizations in Southeast
Asia have been influenced by the civilizations of both India and China.
From this viewpoint, the situation of indigenous people in Hokkaido is different. The society
of Ainu would be similar to that of the Native American people in North America, although
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there are obvious geographical differences between Hokkaido and North America. The area
of Hokkaido faces Japan’s Honshu island, which is categorized in Area 1; only a short strait
of about 20 kilometers separate the two, while the distance between Western Europe and
North America reaches over 5,000 kilometers; the distance between Tokyo and Hokkaido is
roughly 900 kilometers, and the distance between London and New York is 5,500
kilometers. Second, the area of Hokkaido is notably smaller than that of the North American
continent. The area of Hokkaido is 0.08 million km2; the area of the North American
continent is 25 million km2. However, according to the definition of Area 3, which we may
categorize as neither Area 1 nor Area 2, the location and the size of Area 3 do not matter.
Neither North America nor Hokkaido were influenced by the civilizations that emerged in
Area 2 before these were affected by the civilizations in Area 1. The influence on these areas
by Area 1 civilizations was indeed very weak until the beginning of the seventeenth century.
This indicates that both Hokkaido and North America should be considered as Area 3 from
the viewpoint of the relationship between the indigenous people and the civilization of Area
1. On the other hand, Ryukyu should be categorized as a civilization in Area 2, along with
Korea and Southeast Asia.
The invasion and occupation of Hokkaido by Japan from the early-modern period to the
modern period is comparable to the invasion of North America, Australia, and New Zealand
by Western Europe (Figure 10).

Figure 10. Parallel phenomena between the New World for Western Europe and Hokkaido
for Japan
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First, Area 3 experienced industrial revolution simultaneously with Area 1 until the end of
the nineteenth century. South America, however, had not experienced industrial revolution
until the end of the nineteenth century. North America obtained modernity through the
Industrial Revolution following the absolute monarchy of Britain. Similarly, Hokkaido was
modernized as a part of Japan through industrial revolution up until the end of the nineteenth
century.
Second, in these areas, the hierarchical structures for the society of the indigenous people
and that of the invader are analogous.68-74 From this viewpoint, the invasion of Hokkaido by
Japan parallels events in Western Europe. The similarities of the hierarchical levels—that
is, the formation of colonization—that emerged at the similar age and situation of the
societies of indigenous people in Area 3 forced by Area 1 are clear.
We should point out the following differences between the New World and Hokkaido: North
America, Australia, and New Zealand in New World became independent countries from
Britain in the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries, and Hokkaido remains a part of Japan.
Although the USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are independent from the suzerain,
these countries still possess strong interactions with the original suzerain. For instance, the
monarch of Britain is also the monarch of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
These facts suggest that the differences between Hokkaido for Japan and the New World for
Western Europe just reflect variations: the interactions between the newly developed
civilizations in Area 3 and the civilizations in Area 1 are in a broad spectrum. The
interactions would be dependent on the inherent nature of the civilizations in Area 1 and the
societies in Area 3, the distance between Area 1 and Area 3, the size of the civilizations in
Area 1, and so forth.
To analyze the differences between North America and Hokkaido let us apply three factors.
About Factor 1, concerning the inherent nature of civilization, the fundamental cultures and
humans as building blocks of the civilizations are different in Japan and Western Europe.
The aspects of culture — including agriculture, politics, military, and education — that laid
the groundwork for the growth of modern civilization in the social system, technologies, and
cultures of Hokkaido, were primarily transported from Japan, although some modern
technologies were transferred from Western civilizations. Besides, those from North
America were mainly transported through Britain.
Naturally, some useful cultural manifestations and technologies remain in the newly seeded
civilizations, although the technologies and cultures of indigenous people have mostly
disappeared (for instance, in the West, cultivation, such as corn in North America, originally
developed by indigenous people). In the case of Hokkaido, the cultures present amongst the
Ainu built on a method of salmon fishing; this remains the modern style of fishing in
Hokkaido. Regarding Factor 2, concerning the interaction with the ecosystem surrounding
the civilization, the size and geological location of North America and Hokkaido are quite
different. In addition, although both the civilizations are located in the middle latitudes,
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Hokkaido is a relatively small island and a cool temperate zone, although North America is
a continent with a huge area and several ecosystems, from frigid to subtropical. Thus,
production and surplus by cultivation in these areas are different.
Regarding Factor 3, concerning the interactions with other civilizations and societies,
Tokugawa rule curtailed Japan’s interaction with other countries in the early modern age.
Hokkaido was an exception. In addition, Hokkaido is located adjacently, to the north of
Japan, while North America is located far from Western European civilizations. Hokkaido
is indeed a local municipality of Japan today. This fact implies that Hokkaido in Japan
constitutes a symbiosis incorporated into the system of Japanese civilization.
Conclusions
1. The biosystematic view of civilization shows that the behaviors of
civilizations can be evaluated from the three factors and stages of civilization. This
view supports the fact that the formation of the New World for Western Europe
and the incorporation of Hokkaido in Japan are parallel phenomena.
2. In determining the behavior of a civilization, the relationship between a
civilization and other civilizations is more important than the relationship between
the civilization and the environment after the Industrial Revolution.
3. The spontaneous formation of hierarchical levels is a system found in many
civilizations and societies. This indicates that (a) multiple hierarchical levels and
complicated interactions appear among the civilizations and societies while (b) it
seems that the societies and civilizations are becoming a singular system.
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Cerebral Predestination?
A Review of CCR’s Issue No. 72
Leland Conley Barrows
Voorhees College
The theme that underlies this issue of Comparative Civilizations Review is that observable
parallels in the development of human thought, particularly during the pre-modern period,
among societies that had little or no contact with one another (China vis-à-vis Hellenic and
Hellenistic Greece; both vis-à-vis Mesoamerican civilizations) owe their similarities to “the
[common] structure of the brain, which, in turn, reflects a structure that can be described as
fractal-like” (p. 7).
The principal article, “Commentary Traditions and the Evolution of Pre-modern Religious
and Philosophical Systems: A Cross-Cultural Model” (pp. 22-59) first published in 1997 by
Steve Farmer, John B. Henderson, and Peter Robinson along with an introductory update by
the same authors (pp.12-21) (and a preceding introductory article, “The Commentarial
Engine” by J. Randall Groves (pp. 5-11) compose the topic section of the Review to which
two critical responses by Andrew Targowski and Michael Andregg are appended (pp. 6063).
The lead authors, Farmer, Henderson, and Robinson along with Groves propose a system of
computer modeling of the “structural growth of pre-modern religious and philosophical
systems” that are themselves “pictured as byproducts of exegetical processes operating in
manuscript traditions over long periods of time”. This modeling has enabled the authors to
identify similarities at five levels of thought: brain organization, correlative thought, myth,
religion, and philosophy in China, India, the Graeco-Roman world, and medieval Europe (p
7); however, these similarities collapse at the dawn of modern thought (Voltaire and postVoltaire). Presumably, human thought patterns became more heterogeneous at this time and
cannot be so easily modeled. However, the lead authors claim that the modeling techniques
that they have developed might be refined and adapted so as to anticipate future intellectual
developments.
Although Farmer, Henderson, Robinson, and Groves do soften the impact of what seem to
be very deterministic theories with a number of soothing caveats, one cannot resist the
thought that humanity, in their eyes, has rather limited control over the unfolding of its fate,
that the human brain and therefore human actions have more limited possibilities for
independent action than such philosopher/historians as Wilhelm Dilthey or Paul Oskar
Kristeller might have assumed.
But, citing the human traits imposed by the realities of human genes, Mariana Tepfenhart,
the reviewer of Ethnic Conflicts: their Biological Roots in Ethnic Nepotism (2012) by Tatu
Vanhanen (pp. 167-168) warns that “because ethnic nepotism is encoded in our genes, it is
expected that ethnic conflicts will continue in the future”. (p. 168). One could add that in
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the recent past, ethnic rivalries certainly contributed to the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, despite the favorable light in which Anthony M. Stevens-Arroyo presents its post1848 history in his article, “Austria-Hungary 1914: Nationalisms in a Multi-National
Nation-State” (pp. 99-113). Indeed two of this empire’s successor states, Czechoslovakia
and Yugoslavia, collapsed after 1990, the one peaceably, the other violently, mostly because
of ethnic conflicts.
The lead articles along with the article on the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the book review
by Mariana Tepfenhart provide, on balance, rather pessimistic reading. As for the other
articles, they can be interpreted from either an optimistic or a pessimistic point of view.
Vytautas Kavolis’ “The Sociological Location of Art” (pp. 64-74) tells us that although art
is defined as such by the beholder, an overly powerful beholder (i.e., sponsor) can skew the
legitimate purposes of art. Thomas Kiefer’s “Collective Wisdom and Civilization:
Revitalizing Ancient Wisdom Traditions” (pp. 65-98) suggests that while it is possible to
revitalize and to profit positively from ancient wisdom traditions, the danger is that the
wrong traditions, like ethno-centrism, might be what is revitalized rather than idealized
conceptions of human solidarity. Lynn Rhodes, who discusses environmental precarity in
her article, “Verge of Collapse? Survival of Civilization in the Anthropocene” (pp. 115-130)
anticipates that civilization will survive but suggests that its survival is seriously threatened
by a number of factors, particularly environmental deterioration. Bertil Haggman, however,
author of “The Global Civil War: Will the West Survive” (pp. 131-136) avoids the question
of whether or not the West will survive but predicts continuing local conflicts like the
Russian attempts to dominate Ukraine, Islamic terrorism, and the like. So universal peace
will not reign.
Only the final article, “Witchcraft in the Early Modern West” by Larry Gragg (pp. 137-148)
ends on a note of quiet optimism, at least from the point of view of thinking people: “After
generations of trying to eradicate witchcraft, secular leaders in Europe simply concluded
that there was no reasonable way to try witches and repealed the statutes prohibiting its
practice” (p. 148). Of course, European (and American) leaders remained irrational in other
ways but at least the ending of the brutalization of women and men who were perceived as
being different in certain occult ways ended. In this particular instance, civilization certainly
took a major step forward.
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Andrew Targowski, The Limits of Civilization
Nova Science, 2015
Reviewed by Joseph Drew
josephdrew4920@verizon.net
Can there be a larger problem confronting mankind than the fact that we are approaching
the limits, the end, of our civilization? This is the looming disaster examined in depth by
one of the world’s leading civilizationists, Prof. Andrew Targowski, in his new book, The
Limits of Civilization.
The book begins with Targowski’s probe of the near and distant future. Of course, life on
Earth is ultimately doomed with the expiration of our sun; but much sooner, in about 3,000
years, or less, we will have exhausted all resources necessary for our survival. The present
simultaneous crises of overpopulation, depletion of resources, and deteriorating ecology are
not likely to be reversed. We face this “Triangle of Civilizational Death” now, and it can
only be confronted by the emergence of a wise universal civilization, one which substitutes
more intelligent economic and social systems for those currently leading us to the pit.
Dr. Targowski divides his examination into three parts:
“Civilization in Crisis,” and “The End of Civilization?”

“Introduction to Civilization,”

Civilization began about 6,000 years ago and has been manifested in 26 separate, discrete
examples, of which nine currently exist: Western, Eastern, Chinese, Japanese, Islamic,
Buddhist, Hindu, African, and Global. These civilizations shape the way we view the world,
and they also interact with each other. Moreover, each civilization gradually transforms into
something else.
The author provides an excellent review of the leading thinkers about civilizations. He
explains the theories of the Russian Danilevsky; the German Spengler; the English Toynbee;
the Polish Koneczny; the Russo-American Sorokin; two earlier Americans, Kroeber and
Kluckhohn; the French Braudel; the American Coulborn; three recent Americans, Quigley,
Melko, and Wilkinson; and himself.
We have arrived at what Dr. Targowski labels a Twenty-First Century Global Civilization.
Unfortunately, we have reached, simultaneously, a second Great Crisis of Civilization, the
first having been the fall of the Roman Empire. This one arrives in stealth -- it is relatively
unnoticed. Comprising this new great crisis are subsidiary crises in ideas/morality, politics,
religion, ecology, and technology, plus twelve others.
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The first great crisis was resolved when the Renaissance arose. Today, Dr. Targowski fears,
we have to await a second Renaissance. Will it come, and in time? The rapacious workings
of global business – a religion in itself – have already destroyed much of the world. What is
needed is wisdom to save the planet and its people. Will we generate the necessary wisdom?
Perhaps we can begin to answer that by looking at how well we have met subsidiary
problems – for example, the population explosion. The United Nations set out Millennium
Development Goals to be reached this year: eliminating extreme poverty; securing basic
education; promoting gender equality and reinforcing the position of women; reducing
infant mortality; improving mother health; fighting disease such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and
others; securing environmental indestructibility; and developing global partnership for
development (see page 62).
Addressing these eight areas of concern would not solve the problem of overpopulation.
Yet, even meeting these seems too difficult; any observer today can see the paucity of
mankind’s responses to such goals. It’s too little, too late. By the year 2050, we are going
to need three worlds like ours simply to maintain even the present civilization at current
levels of quality of life, he projects. Human life is likely to become extinct or vastly reduced,
just as species of animals have disappeared. To avoid catastrophe we need to reduce
mankind’s population down to five billion by 2050, drop the fertility rate dramatically
(fewer than two children per mother), and meet the Millennium Development Goals. Even
if we do all that, climate catastrophes loom.
In a more general sense, to save ourselves we need to replace what we call capitalism with
a more sustainable political and economic system. Second, we must recognize that
consumerism has become the new opiate of the masses; it depletes the planet of resources
rapidly, while making humans less intelligent. And so, third, while praising science and
technology, which have brought great advances and have been seemingly friendly to man,
let us recognize that they have resulted in culture being subservient to technology. What is
needed, therefore, is a more sophisticated culture, and wise regulation of science and
technology. But, can we act wisely and in time?
Surely, neither capitalism (today’s “turbo-capitalism” oriented toward generating exorbitant
profit for the elite), nor socialism (too expensive for seven-to-nine billion people), nor
communism (a murderous system cavalierly destructive of the environment) will provide
the wisdom we need. Neither will the virtual world. True, we have become more connected
to others, but these connections are impoverished and impersonal, says Dr. Targowski, with
educated humanity less and less responsible for the content of what is being communicated.
So what can we hope for? A new civilization based on tolerance, wisdom, kindness, equal
access, and sensitivity to ecology and sustainable development points the way.
Unfortunately, assesses Dr. Targowski, mankind most likely will fail to overcome the crises
now facing it. Thus it will not develop such a new civilization based on wisdom, and the
beginning of the end will be manifest this century.
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Let us hope that while his prescription is right, we, given our 200,000 years of existence and
adaptability, ultimately will rally and thus, will prove his prediction wrong.
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Barry Cunliffe, Europe Between the Oceans: 9000 BC to AD 1000
Yale University Press, 2008
Reviewed by Laina Farhat-Holzman
lfarhat102@aol.com

Scholars are once again exploring why Europe, which appears to be just an insignificant
geographic appendage to Asia, has risen to world dominance in the past thousand years. In
the nineteenth century, scholars such as Arthur de Gobineau (1816-1882) took up the racial
superiority theory that Aryans, speakers of Indo-European languages, were a special breed,
blessed with superior intelligence whose mission was to civilize the rest of the world. He
added to this the physical element of pale skin. The lighter the complexions of the Aryans,
the more superior they were to the dark-skinned Aryans, and certainly all of them were
superior in mind, morals, and talents to the other human “races.”
During the first half of the twentieth century, the European fascist movement, particularly
Nazi Germany, cited Gobineau’s work as proof that the Germans were the epitome of Aryan
purity and that it was their duty to purge “inferior races” from their midst—and from the
world, if they could. Nazis, and their racial theories, were disgraced after they lost World
War II, and younger scholars launched the movement toward racially-sensitive historicity
which eventually spawned a movement of studying every culture except for that of the
Western world. “Western Civilization” nearly disappeared from university curricula.
Once more, the pendulum is swinging and we have such scholars as Ricardo Duchesne
exploring why European (Western) civilization has had such enormous and far-reaching
vitality and power. Duchesne attributes this in part to a certain “restlessness” of IndoEuropean peoples from their very beginnings. Certainly they have been the most mobile of
all humans since at least 1,000 BC, as can be observed in the widespread tenure of IndoEuropean languages. In addition, there has been a strong strain of individualism that still
permeates our culture.
Another scholar, Barry Cunliffe, a leading archeologist in Europe and emeritus professor at
Oxford, has produced an interdisciplinary tour de force with his latest work: Europe
Between the Oceans. Here he explores Europe’s history from 9000 BC to 1000 AD, the
period before which Europe’s global domination began. He attributes this domination to the
same “restlessness” that Duchesne is exploring, but also looks at the role of geography (as
Jared Diamond has done)—the peninsular nature of Europe, surrounded by seas and cut up
by navigable rivers. This geography, of course, played an enormous role in river trade and
going out to sea for trade and conquest.
Cunliffe addresses a new way of looking at space, time and people, and their interaction.
He takes up the geography of land between oceans, the foods available for gathering, the
first farmers (7500-5000 BC), movement into the Maritime regions (6000-3800 BC), the
infinite variety of Europe’s geography and botany, taking to the sea (2800-1300 BC), the
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300 years that changed the world (800-500 BC), interlude of empire (140 BC-300 AD, the
dark ages (300-800 AD), and the longue durée (an approach to the study of history, which
gives priority to long-term historical structures over events).
The book is well illustrated with photos, maps, and drawings. It seems to me a perfect text
book for a course devoted to the long history of the Indo-European peoples—and is
fascinating reading for us in the ISCSC, who so often take the long and interdisciplinary
view of civilizations.
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John Keegan, The First World War
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999
Reviewed by Laina Farhat-Holzman
lfarhat102@aol.com

In August 2014, it will be exactly one century since the beginning of a small war that became
a global conflict. Many historians are revisiting this war, but two earlier works stand out as
classics of the genre: The Guns of August by Barbara Tuchman (1962) and The First World
War by John Keegan.
Tuchman’s work focused on the first month of a war that could have been avoided had the
major European powers used judgment. However, a combination of foolish (and stupid)
misreading of the intentions of others spiraled into a war that killed off nearly a whole
generation of young men across Europe and destroyed the entire historic culture of Russia.
Three empires collapsed and a number of new nations were born, few of them to survive the
second stage of World War I, World War II.
Keegan is an excellent military historian, whose book, A History of Warfare (1994), has
become a classic and is much admired in military institutions.
The First World War is comprehensive, full of maps, photos, and detailed accounts of every
battle fought in that war, but what makes it most valuable to me are the author’s insights
about the consequences of that war. It produced its second phase, the very different World
War II. All of us getting immersed in the centennial of World War I should read this work.
If you read nothing more than Chapter 1, “A European Tragedy,” you will see what a horror
was created by a handful of national leaders who were rash and foolish, and upon whose
heads should fall the blame for the turmoil that characterized the rest of the century.
Keegan notes: “The First World War was a tragic and unnecessary conflict. Unnecessary
because the train of events that led to its outbreak might have been broken at any point
during the five weeks of crisis that preceded the first clash of arms, had prudence or common
goodwill found a voice; tragic because the consequences of the first clash ended the lives of
ten million human beings, tortured the emotional lives of millions more, destroyed the
benevolent and optimistic culture of the European continent and left, when the guns at last
fell silent four years later, a legacy of political rancor and racial hatred so intense that no
explanation of the causes of the Second World War can stand without reference to those
roots. The Second World War, five times more destructive of human life and incalculably
more costly in material terms, was the direct outcome of the First. On 18 September 1922,
Adolf Hitler, the demobilized front fighter, threw down a challenge to defeated Germany
that he would realize seventeen years later: ‘It cannot be that two million Germans should
have fallen in vain…No, we do not pardon, we demand---vengeance!’”
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Keegan describes the deaths of so many in the First World War, but notes that by comparison
with the war of 1939-45, it did little material damage. For all the carnage on Europe’s young
men, the First war was rural and the carnage took place on fields and in some villages, all
of which were restored by a few years later. “The war inflicted no harm to Europe’s cultural
heritage that was not easily repaired,” he writes. The civilian populations involved suffered
almost none of the deliberate disruption and atrocities that were to be a feature of the Second
World War. Except in Turkish Armenia, no population was subjected to genocide. “The
First, unlike the Second World War, saw no systematic displacement of populations, no
deliberate starvation, no expropriation, little massacre or atrocity. It was, despite the efforts
by state propaganda machines to prove otherwise, and the cruelties of the battlefield apart,
a curiously civilized war,” he concludes.
Even so, that war set the tone for what was to almost destroy European civilization, its
values, its Enlightenment, forever, had the Nazis won. It set the tone for the demise of
democracy (or the promise of it) in Germany, Italy, Russia (and Greece, Spain, and
Portugal). We are all paying for these horrors today, as a new cadre of religious fascists
attempt to derail liberal modernity throughout the world.
I would recommend a new movie, The Monument Men, as a companion piece to this book.
Not only had the Second World War’s horrific destruction devastated the architectural
treasures of Europe’s 2,000-year history, but a new group of Vandals, the Nazis, undertook
the looting of all the paintings, sculptures and altarpieces that they confiscated from
museums and private collections to display in private Nazi homes and in a proposed
enormous museum to be built in Hitler’s home town in Austria. Hitler had even given orders
that if he were to die during the war, these treasures were to be destroyed.
The ‘Monument Men’ were mostly American art experts, well beyond the age of soldiers,
who volunteered to find and save Europe’s art treasures, not for our own use, but to be
returned to the owners. Unfortunately, many of the private art collectors were European
Jews, most of whom had been murdered by the Nazis. These brave men risked their lives
in the last days of the war to find these treasures before either the Nazis destroyed them or
the Soviets looted them for their own collections.
It is amazing that in the midst of a brutalizing war, some values of the humanity and decency
of Western Civilization could still exist and accomplish such good.
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Andrew Targowski, The Deadly Effect of Informatics on the Holocaust
Tate Publishing and Enterprises, 2014
Reviewed by Peter Hecht
hiphecht@gmail.com

The Deadly Effect of Informatics on the Holocaust reveals how one of the most important
inventions of the industrial age was turned against civilization and used to facilitate the
nearly successful attempt, by the Nazis, to murder all Europeans of Jewish descent. Prof.
Targowski first examines the historical significance of the German people throughout
Europe in the centuries leading up to the Second World War. Leaders of European
superpowers, Queen Victoria of England and Catherine the Great of Russia, are shown to
be German by birth, along with many of Europe’s greatest philosophical and artistic
thinkers. How then was it possible that such a sophisticated nation could so readily and
completely capitulate to the insane whims of a radically sociopathic political party? After
more than a decade of suffering after World War One the German population was
emotionally distraught. The Nazis were able to use this weakness to manipulate the
Germans, presenting the notion that it was necessary to “secure the hygiene” of the German
people in order to regain the greatness of the past. The evil philosophy delivered to the
German people in the most effective way by the Nazi party's overwhelmingly effective
propaganda apparatus, made it clear that it was patriotically necessary for the German people
to conduct a campaign of ethnic cleansing.
Technology became the greatest tool of the Nazis. The energy that reshaped civilization
through the period of the Second World War brought advances in technology at a pace that
had never been achieved, and has not been matched since. It transformed the world from the
industrial revolution to the technological revolution and the information age.
In Europe Prof. Targowski reports that 7,365,194 Jews were murdered by the Gestapo. As
the Third Reich entered into each country, a detailed accounting of the ethnic makeup of
each nation was required. In some cases there was direct resistance, and sabotage, of the
efforts to collect this data. After careful calculation of Jewish populations in several
countries, compared with actual deportations and executions, and comparing countries that
resisted accurate tabulation of ethnic groups by the Nazis, Targowski arrives at a sobering
figure. His calculations indicate that the IBM Hollerith machines, diligently maintained by
IBM employees and their "contractors" throughout the holocaust, were directly responsible
for 4.4 million deaths.
Herman Hollerith’s “punch card” invention was originally an entrant in a contest held by
the U.S. Census Bureau in the mid-1890s. The goal of the contest was to find innovative
ways to manage data for the good of the people. Forty years later Thomas Watson, CEO of
IBM, like Hitler, Stalin, Roosevelt, and Mao, was yet another win at all costs 20th century
ideologue who sadly invested his considerable assets, and the eternal reputation of Hollerith
and IBM, to work for the Third Reich.
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Prof. Targowski is one of the world’s most accomplished experts in the field of informatics,
the science of data processing through the design of intricate, and often elegant, processing
systems. He engineered and implemented the Polish equivalent of the American social
security system in the early 1970’s by designing computer programs that processed many
millions of points of data about the Polish citizenry. After proudly and successfully
contributing to the evolution of his native Poland for nearly two decades, Prof. Targowski’s
efforts were suddenly seen as a threat to the establishment, and he was forced out of public
life. For more than forty years in the United States Prof. Targowski has taught and conducted
research in the fields of Cognitive Informatics, Civilizational Studies, and Philosophy.
Expertise in each of these areas contributes to his recent publication.
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Bruce Mazlish & Ralph Buultjens, eds., Conceptualizing Global History
Westview, 1993
New Global History Pr, January 2004
Reviewed by Vitaliy Sholokhov

This collection of works on globalization is worthwhile to revisit, or to ponder for the first
time, if you are unfamiliar with it. Its essays reveal that the philosophical problems of
globalization have been for twenty years a focus of the international scientific community,
since global history is the only source for justifying the correctness of any scientific
sociological theories. But global history requires a conceptualization, a formulation of its
general ideas and concepts.
The contents of the book are as follows:
An Introduction to Global History, Bruce Mazlish
Part One: The Theory of Global History
1 The Rounding of the Earth: Ecology and Global History, Neva R. Goodwin
2 Global History: Historiographical Feasibility and Environmental Reality, Wolf Schafer
3 Global History and the Third World, Ralph Buultjens
4 From Universal History to Global History, Manfred Kossok
5 Global History in а Postmodernist Era? Bruce Mazlish
Part Two: Applied Global History
6 Migration and Its Enemies, Wang Gungwu
7 А Globalizing Economy: Some Implications and Consequences, Richard J. Barnet and
John Cavanagh
8 Human Rights as Global Imperative, Louis Menand III
9 The Globalization of Music: Expanding Spheres of Influence, John Joyce
Part Three: An Overview
10 Оn the Prospect of Global History, Raymond Grew
Let us consider briefly the contents of the collection. In the introduction to the collection
editor Bruce Mazlish describes the time since 1993 as "the era of globalization.” But he
also writes that, as sociologists and historians know, there is nothing absolutely new. Well
before 1993, scientists had identified industrial processes as global and gave them the
definition of "industrial revolution." Travel around the globe had created a vision of the
world as a "whole." Time zones for the globe were established in the nineteenth century.
Already at that time it was possible to identify the early signs of a global era. However, new
factors like international migration, ideas of universal human rights, the expansion of the
transnational corporations, and environmental problems created by the scientific and
technological revolution, have increased the intensity of the processes of globalization.
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Raymond Grew and Neva R. Goodwin consider questions of method. Should Global History
be mainly descriptive or analytical? Answer: it is necessary to describe the experience of
globalization, and the structures and processes must be obtained by analysis. If the states
are no longer the object of historical study, who are now the principal actors of global
history? Answer: international movements and transnational corporations.
Wolf Schafer considers the historiographical possibility and reality of the “environment.”
Ralph Buultjens, Manfred Kossok and Bruce Mazlish considered theoretical issues in
connecting Global History with Third World History, Universal History and Postmodern
History. All of these sections of history are intertwined with Global History. National
histories will continue, and the boundaries of histories are difficult to establish, and will
affect the development of the structures and processes of global history.
In the section on Applied Global History, Wang Gungwu addresses international migration;
Richard J. Barnet and John Cavanagh examine issues of economic globalization; Louis
Menand III explores human rights, and John Joyce considers the globalization of culture.
But the main problems are, so to say, philosophical. In Russia and in Britain, N.Y.
Danilevsky and Arnold Joseph Toynbee had already created their own concepts of the
philosophy of history. Bruce Mazlish writes that in the United States, Marshall McLuhan
felt intuitively what happens when he wrote, misleadingly, about the "global village."
New problem-areas for global history have emerged: the growth of cities in a globalizing
society; science as a universal force; religion in the same perspective; gender issues;
problems of communication and media; problems of globalism and localism.
The book under review prefigured extensive research that has since been carried out
worldwide on the problems of globalization. For example, in 2003, Raduga Publishers,
Moscow, produced a Global Studies Encyclopedia, edited by Alexander N. Chumakov,
Ivan I. Mazour and William C. Gay. This book provides brief expositions of the central
concepts in the field of Global Studies. Former President of the Soviet Union Mikhail
Gorbachev says, “The book is intelligent, rich in content and, I believe, necessary in our
complex, turbulent, and fragile world.” Three hundred authors from 50 countries contributed
450 entries.
The contributors include scholars, researchers, and professionals in social, natural, and
technological sciences. They cover globalization problems within ecology, business,
economics, politics, culture, and law. This interdisciplinary collection provides a basis for
understanding the concepts and methods within global studies and for accessing lengthier
and more technical research in the field. The articles treat such important topics as
biosphere, ozone depletion, land resources, pollution, world health challenges, education,
global modeling, sustainable development, war, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism.
The book also promotes academic cooperation, political dialogue, and mutual understanding
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across diverse traditions and national identities that are needed to engage successfully the
many daunting challenges of globalization.
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CALL FOR PAPERS
46th Annual Conference of the International Society
for the Comparative Study of Civilizations
June 29-July 2, 2016
Monmouth University, West Long Branch, New Jersey, USA
“The West” and its Discontents: Contemporary Challenges to Western Dominance
Since 1500, the West has moved from the edge of Eurasia, from insignificance to dominate
the world politically, culturally, and economically. Since the end of World War II, its values
have established the de facto “global system” of trade, economics, and preferred
governance. The last challenges to these particularly Anglo-Saxon values survived bitterlyfought wars against Fascist Nazi Germany and Fascist Japan in World War II and prolonged
surrogate wars against the Soviet Union ending in the collapse of their empire in 1991. The
Western Global System seemed to be without challenge.
But now challenges come from all sides.


Islam, a religion whose dominance had begun a decline in 1250, is having a renewal
of militant zeal. To what degree is the West at war with Islam, contrary to the
repeated assurances of our leaders? How can this be thought of as a “clash of
civilizations”? Can the revival of the model of the ancient Caliphate: a single
religious dictatorship, replace the western Global System?



Environmental Crisis . Pope Francis has issued an Encyclical urging his believers
and the world to heed the danger of global warming. He warns that rampant
industrialization has created luxury for the rich nations but undue suffering in the
way of pollution and misery for the poor. To what degree has capitalism, with its
ethos of materialism, contributed to the environmental crisis? Can technologies
address the adverse effects of environmental damage? Can a global system of
mandatory environmentalism replace capitalism without increasing global poverty?



The Crisis of Capitalism. Is capitalism really working? For whom? The gulf
between rich and poor seems to be growing ever wider. Is the “American Dream”
even relevant anymore? How are the cost-saving mechanisms of outsourcing and
technological innovation contributing to the unemployment crisis in the US? Yet
many of the world’s poor have been lifted out of poverty by science, technology, and
democracy in this past century. Capitalism has worked in ways that no other
ideologies have managed to do. Or was much of that prosperity built on “borrowed”
money and deferred payments? Perhaps the Great Recession” of 2008 has made it
painfully clear that it is now time to pay the overdue bill.
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China and Russia: Challenges to the Western System. China is a newly
awakened ancient culture that has its own amalgam of the old and the new. To some
degree China rejects the hegemony of the Western Global System, though it also
appears to have lately appropriated elements of it to its own benefit. Russia also
indicates unwillingness to accept Western hegemony. What institutions do they
offer that provide better societal solutions?



Multiculturalism.
Many European countries have attempted the model of
multiculturalism, admitting large numbers of immigrants and abolishing internal
borders in an attempt to create a united Europe. Has this model succeeded? Can it
really succeed when immigrants are not willing or able to integrate into their host
country’s culture? Is this model now under fire? Also interesting to consider are the
challenges to Western culture in the realm of art and music. As globalization
progresses in the cultural realm we are seeing unprecedented cultural exchange in
these areas. While non-Western music and art do not represent challenges per se to
the West, they are an important part of the encounter of the West with the other. Of
particular interest will be modes of cultural appropriation and synthesis.



The Energy Revolution. As the United States becomes energy independent and an
energy exporter, how does that affect the Global System? Do we still need the
Middle East? Israel has become a water exporter in the Middle East, the only
country with technologies dealing with water. How does this affect the relationships
in that region and the Global System?



Decadence and Moral Decay: The Challenge from Within. Why are so many
people in the US more interested in the latest cell-phone app, online video game, or
“reality TV” distraction, than they are about the urgent issues facing civilization
today? Was Spengler right about the "Decline of the West," not only in terms of the
political or economic spheres, but in a spiritual sense as well? What are the
implications of this for civilizational study?

The world is changing at a rapid pace. How are we to understand these challenges to
Western hegemony? What are the positives and what are the negatives?
Papers are invited on the above topics, and any other topics of civilizational relevance.
Please send abstracts by April 15 to Program Chair, Dr. Laina Farhat-Holzman
Lfarhat102@aol.com
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The International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations
In October 1961, in Salzburg, Austria, an extraordinary group of scholars gathered to
create the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations. Among the 26
founding members from Austria, Germany, France, Switzerland, The Netherlands, Spain,
Italy, England, Russia, the United States, China and Japan were such luminaries as Pitirim
Sorokin and Arnold Toynbee.
For six days, the participants debated such topics as the definition of “civilization,”
problems in the analysis of complex cultures, civilizational encounters in the past, the Orient
versus the Occident, problems of universal history, theories of historiography, and the role
of the “human sciences” in “globalization.” The meeting was funded by the Austrian
government, in cooperation with UNESCO, and received considerable press coverage.
Sorokin was elected the Society’s first president.
After several meetings in Europe, the advancing age of its founding members and the
declining health of then president, Othmar F. Anderle, were important factors in the decision
to transfer the Society to the United States.
Between 1968 and 1970 Roger Williams Wescott of Drew University facilitated that
transition. In 1971, the first annual meeting of the ISCSC (US) was held in Philadelphia.
Important participants in that meeting and in the Society’s activities during the next years
included Benjamin Nelson (the Society’s first American president), Roger Wescott,
Vytautas Kavolis, Matthew Melko, David Wilkinson, Rushton Coulborn and C.P. Wolf. In
1974, the Salzburg branch was formally dissolved, and from that year to the present there
has been only one International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations (ISCSC).
The presidents of the ISCSC are, in order: In Europe, Pitirim Sorokin and Othmar
Anderle; in the United States, Benjamin Nelson, Vytautas Kavolis, Matthew Melko,
Michael Palencia-Roth, Roger Wescott, Shuntaro Ito (from Japan), Wayne Bledsoe, Lee
Daniel Snyder, Andrew Targowski, and the current president David Rosner. To date, the
Society has held 45 meetings, most of them in the United States but also in Salzburg,
Austria; Santo Domingo, The Dominican Republic; Dublin, Ireland; Chiba, Japan;
Frenchman’s Cove, Jamaica; St. Petersburg, Russia; Paris, France; New Brunswick,
Canada; and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
More than 30 countries are represented in the Society’s membership. Its intellectual
dynamism and vibrancy over the years have been maintained and enhanced through its
annual meetings, its publications, and the participation of such scholars as Talcott Parsons,
Hayden White, Immanuel Wallerstein, Gordon Hewes, André Gunder Frank, Marshall
Sahlins, Lynn White Jr., and Jeremy Sabloff.
The Society is committed to the idea that complex civilizational problems can best be
approached through multidisciplinary analyses and debate by scholars from a variety of
fields. The Comparative Civilizations Review, which welcomes submissions from the
Society’s members as well as other scholars, has been published continually since its
inaugural issue in 1979
Prof. Michael Palencia-Roth
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Membership Information
If you are not a member of the ISCSC please consider joining. For a $60
yearly membership fee members receive a one-year subscription to this
journal, are invited to attend the annual conference, receive the ISCSC
newsletter, and may participate in ongoing dialogues. Membership is open
to all interested in civilizations. Visit www.wmich.edu/ISCSC for further
information.
To Obtain Issues of This Journal
Soft cover issues of this journal may be purchased from Amazon.com,
bn.com, or from other Internet booksellers. CD and other electronic copies
of this issue may be obtained from the H.W.Wilson website at
www.hwwilson.com or the ProQuest website at www.proquest.com.
Coming soon to EBSCO Electronic Journals Service.

Online Access
This issue, and previous issues, may be accessed, searched by keyword or
topic, and read by pasting the following URL into your browser:
https://ojs.lib.byu.edu/spc/index.php/CCR
We thank the Brigham Young University for providing this service
worldwide to all who are interested in the topics our journal covers.
We will be switching to a new electronic platform via Brigham Young
University for the next issue.
Upcoming 2016 ISCSC Conference
The 46th Annual Meeting of the International Society for the Comparative
Study of Civilizations will take place at Monmouth University in
Monmouth, New Jersey, U.S.A.
Look for conference information soon on the ISCSC website:
www.wmich.edu/ISCSC
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